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l. lNTRODUcnON

Listening to !he hysteria from !he Western powers, one
might be forgiven for thinking this was a re-run of the racist 'yeUow peril' propaganda that arose at the time Africa
was being colonized ... I'm against the singling out of the
Chinese. I think that much is a Western con trick. It's a
pretty neat trick, trying to turn one formerly imperialized
people against another."
-Prof. Steven Chan, University of London Africanist'
A globaUy-prorninent Zambian economist, Dambisa Moyo,
has remarked that "When I speak to Chinese policy-makers the
thing that annoys them the most about Western policy-makers is
that they're not given any credit for anything. There's always bad
news. " 2 That is especiaUy the case regarding Chinese activities in
Africa, about which a negative narrative, !he China-in-Africa discourse, pervades Western media and guides global discussions.3
Scholars have gauged how biased• and inaccurate' the discourse is
and many dismiss it as based on ignorance of facts and methods,
political posturing. or disregard of professional standards. The discourse, however, has intensified lately, as Western politicians and
media ratchet up !he rhetoric of strategic rivalry with China in Africa. The US government bas bad several tactics in that rivalry, one
1. "Is China Good for Africa," New lnternotionalist (Oc:t. 2012): 3().32.
2. "Economist Dambisa Moyo on lhe Life and Death Battle for the World's Re·
sourees." Telegraph (UK), July 2, 2012. Among many Chinese "there's a real frustra·
don with the West and a sense that China can never do right in its eyes. •• Oarissa Tan,
"China's Civilising Mission," Spectator (UK), June 30, 20U. Lu Sllaye, head of Airi<:an
Affain at China's Ministry of Foreilll' Affairs, has stated that bad behavior by Chinese
"LS tile kind of thing the Western medta like to report on ... even when in most cases
these tncidents are isolated .. ." "ChUla Warns Otizens Abroad." Dati)' Mail (OM.
Zamboa), Nov. 9, 2012.
3. Te·Ping Olen, "China 111 AI...,. Podeast: Undentandm& the Negative Narrallve," China Talking Points, June 12, 21:110. www.cbinataJkin&points.com/ehina·inollfrica·
podcast-the-negative--narrali\'e/.
4. On bias in UK print medio coverage of Chinese activities In Africa, see Emma
Mawdsley,"'Fu Manchu versus Dr Livin&>tone in tbe Dark Continent? Representing
China, Arrlca and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers." Political Geography 27
(,), 2008: 509·529. Our survey of two hundred 200S-2012 articles in Ove leading US
newspapers has produced similar findtnp.
' · Deborah Brautigam, The Drt~~on 's Gift: 1M Rml Swry of China in Africa (Ox·
ford: Oxford University Pre$$. 2009): Jan Taylor, China's Ntw Roltln Afr= (Boulder:
Lynne Re10er. 2009); Axel Hamett.Soe•ers. et al (eels.). ChiMs• tmd A/nc<Jn P<,..p«·
""' on China in Afric• (Oxford: Fahamu Books, 2010).
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of which is "to criticize China's practice publicly,'>6 as Secretary of
State Hilary Clinton did in Zambia in 2011:
China's foreign assistance and investment practices in Africa have not always been consistent with generally accepted international norms of transparency and good
governance. [China] bas not always utilized the talents of
the African people in pursuing its business interests. It is
easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders
and leave. And when you leave, you didn't leave much behind for the people who are there. You don't improve the
standard of living. You don't create a ladder of opportunity. We don't want to see a new colonialism in Africa."'
Ex-colonial European powers have made similar statements. 8
A key aspect of the negative China-in-Africa discourse is the
2011 Human Rights Watch (HRW) study of labor abuses at copper
mining firms in Zambia parented by state-owned enterprise (SOE)
China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co. (CNMC). 9 CNMC's $2b investment in Zambia represents some 15% of the $13b total outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) of Chinese firms in Africa
6. Zhang Cll.un, "Preparing for Competition, Working for Cooperation: US Eyes
on China-Afri<:a Relations," FrttnUJn Report 10:10 (2011): 2, csis.orglpublicationlfreeman-report-oc:tober-2011-volll•noiO.
7. "Cat Fight over Africa Mounts Between US and Otina," New York Amsterdam
News, June 16~ 2011. Sbib Cb.ib- Yu, "Harmonious Racism," The Newslater 60, lnterna·
tionallnstitute of Asian Studies (llAS)(2012): 28-29 bas observed, ''The notion of tbe
new colonialism implies, likely correctly, that the new colonialism mimics the old one.,.
The Chinese presenre in Africa however does noL See Barry Sautman and Yan
Hairong, East Mountain nger, West Mounlilin Tiger: China, Africi4 the West and
«Colonialism..., Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 186 (Baltimore:
Univer>ity of Maryland School of Law, 2007).
8. A German ambassador stated in 2011 that "China's dealings with African coun-

tries such as Zimbabwe are imbalanced and exploitative [and) his country was concerned about China's underhanded approach to trade wbicb left African countries
poorer ... Most of the Qj!reements signed today by China will buy out the whole world's

raw materials and block other countries from having access to these raw materials."
"China Exploiting Africa: Germany," Doily News (Zimbabwe). June 3, 2011. He added
in 2012 that "It is up to Africa's new elites to explain to China that African copper and
cotton should not be shipped overseas before added value bas been created in situ~··
Albrecht Conze, "Emergence and Emancipation: a Fresh Look at Africa," 2012. programs.wcfia. harvard.edulfellowslfileslconze.pdf. It is however Western-based firms
that export 95% of the copper from Africa's largest producer. Zambia.
9. HRW, "You'll be Fired if You Refuse': Labor Abuses in Zambia's Chinese
State-owned Copper Mines." Nov. 3, 2011. www.brw.org/reports/2011/JliOOiyou-ll-befired-if-you-reruse.
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Chinese "neocolonialists""; US conservatives called the miners the
Chinese Communist Party's "serfs."18 A month after it was issued, a
Polish member of the European Parliament's right-wing group demanded to know, in light of the HRW report, what the European
Commission would do to bring about decent working conditions for
Zambian miners.' 9 Zambia's Vice-President Guy Scott said of uthe
Chinese" that "at present, they don't really think they should pay
tax, or be guided by labor laws. " 20
As a centerpiece of the China-in-Africa discourse, the HRW
report should be empirically analyzed using a sound methodology
that accounts for similarities and differences in the operational conditions for CNMC and other foreign mining firms in Zambia. That
analysis yields explanations that should not be taken as a general
defense of CNMC. In fact, all foreign mining firms in Zambia are
doubly exploitative. Contrary to what has been implied by a Chinese government official {discussed below),~' foreign-owned mining
firms do not provide Zambian miners with a living wage, let alone
one that allows for savings.22 Facilitated moreover by what is per17. "Zambian Minen Resist New Colooiatists." A World to Wm. Mar 27, 2012.
_,.,aworld towin.netlbk>&fZambian-maners-resut-oew-<X>Iomaii>IS.htmL
18. The Federalist, "The Chinese Communist State owned Noo-Ferrous Metals
Mining Corporation Works their "Serfs" in Brutally Long Shifts" Feb. 3, 2012, http://
thefederalist-aary.btoaspot.com/2012102/chinese-stavery-in-afrlca.htrnl.
19. Filip Kaczmarek. "ExploiUttlon of Zambian Minen by Chinese Corporations.·
European Parhtmeoc ParhamenUtry Questioos, Dec. 14, 2011, www.europarl.europa.
eu/sideslgetDoc.do?pubRef:.//EP/fTEXT+ WQ+E·2011-011860+0+00C+XML-+VOl/
EN.
20. "Zambia's Test to Bridge Gap with Chinese," Wu/c~nd llwtra/1on, Mar. 31.
2012.
21. "fbe Records of Jeune Afnque's Intemew with Dirc<:tor-General Lu Shaye,"
Ministry of Foreign Allain, PRC, Oct. 21, 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cnlenglwjblzzjglxoo/
gjlb/3291/3293/t8706:23.htm.
22. Zambia's Jesuit Centre for Theological Renc<:tioo Basic Needs Index sbo»-.d
2012liYing <XJOts for a Lusaka family of fi\·e as alnlo<t K4m (US$710) a month. • After 9
Months of PF, JCfR Says Cost of Uving Increases," Zambian Watchdoa (ZW), June
29, 2012. Many miners make less than that and live in areas, such as Sotwezi. with C<XIlS·
of-living bi&her than in Lusaka. "Solwezi - Anotber Copperbelt?" Zambia-advisor.
com. 2011, www.zambia-adY150r.onm/Solwczio1Zambia.html; each employed Zambian
on ~>·erage supports .,..o depeodents; each employed black South African supports 3.2.
"Employed South Africans Have High Number of Dependents," Voice of America
(VOA), Jan. 22, 20123. In mining, dependency rati<XI are bl£her. Each South African
miner supports 7-10 dependents. Meaan Lim, et at., "Unnatural Deaths in Soutb Afri·
ctn Platinum Mmen. 1992-2008." PL.oS One 6:9 (2011), •-ww.plosone.orJIIanidelciUt·
tiOI'IUst.actioo?anicleURt-info%3Adoi'\2FIO. 1371 %2Fjoumal.pone.0022807. The
Znmbia ratio seems similar. Sec "$2.Sb Reserves Show Economic Growth: Rupiah,"
/..usa/co Timer (LT), July 3. 2011, post 31.
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haps the world's most "business friendly" host state,23 these firms
also remove the country's chief wasting asset without adequate
compensation to the host nation and often without adequate concern for the environment. 24
The main conclusion of the analysis of HRW's report that follows is thus not that CNMC is blameless. Rather, it is that among
foreign copper mining firms in Zambia, CNMC is not, as HRW
would have it, especially blameworthy. In presenting that evidencebased conclusion, our critique does not differ from other empirical
studies that disconfirm commonplace understandings within the
larger negative narrative of "China" and "the Chinese." Recent examples include Cambridge University economist Peter Nolan's
findings that China is not "buying the world"2 ' and Harvard University political scientist Gary King's massive study that concludes
that the Chinese government does silence social media posts that
advocate collective action, but does not generally censor online criticisms of the government.26
HRW is assumed to be empirically accurate, methodologically
sophisticated, and politically independent. A week after its report
emerged, an official Zambian newspaper reported that the government of President Michael Sata, the historically anti-Chinese head
of Zambia's Patriotic Front (PF),27 had "stepped into the Chinese
23. For example, Deputy Fmance Minister Miles Sampa noted in 2012 that "We
boast of a free market economy with very Uttle prohibitive industry regulation and we
have virtually no exchange controls. You can repatriate a hundred percent of your
dividends from Zambia as a business and our labo.r coots are low." Anthony Mukwita,
"Scratching the Surface: are Zambians about to Get their Dues from Foreign Miners?,"
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, June 15, 2012, www.thebureauinvestigateS.<om/
2012/06/lS/scratebing-the-surface-are-zambians-about·to-get-their-dues-from-foreign-

miners/.
24. World Banlc and UKaid, "Wbat would it take for Zambia's Copper Mining In·
dustry to achieve its Potential?" 2011, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT
ZAMBWResources/oopper-mining-summary-note (online-copy).pd~ "Increased In·

vestment in Zambia's Resources Means Displacement of Rural Poor,'1 Inter Press Ser·
vice (IPS), June 22, 2012.
25. Peter Nolan, Is China Buying the World? (London: Polity, 2012). Nolan's find"
ings contradict a view held by both "China Bashers," and more balanced scholars, sucb
as Dambisa Moyo, Wiruur Taker All: China'• RI>Cll for Reso"""'-' and What it Means for
the World (New York: Basic Books, 2012).
26. Gary King, et al., "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but
Silences CoUective Expression," forthcoming in Amtrican PoliJical Scknce Review in
2013.
Zl. On anti-Olinese agitation in Zambia, see Rohit Negj, "Beyond the 'Chinese
Scramble': The Political Economy of anti-China Sentiment in Zambia. • African Geographical RevU!w 27 (2008): 41-63; Barry Sautman and Yoon Park, Dragon Slayers:
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and the Human Rights Watch's row, with Minister of Labor Facli:son Shamenda demandinJ a stop to the abuse of Zambians working
Ifor) Chinese investors." Another organ of the Government of the
Republic of Zambia (GRZ) assured readers, quoting verbatim (but
without attribution) irom HRW's own publicity, that
Human Rights Watch established in 1978 is a non-profit,
independent, non-governmental human rights organization renowned for its accurate fact-finding, impartial reporting, effective use of the media and targeted advocacy
often in partnership with local human rights groups.29
These assumptions about HRW are problematic as to its report
on CNMC in Zambia, which draws empirically inaccurate conclusions and uses a dubious methodology. Despite HRW's verbal gestures distancing itself from the China-in-Africa discourse, the
report appears to reflect a political agenda, which sets out to provoke inferences based on that narrative. Thus, HRW avers (p.l}
that through the report, it "begin[s) to paint a picture of China's
broader role in Africa."
The report implicitly re-invigorates highly racialized claims
made about the CNMC and Chinese investments in Zambia. These
were described in 2fJY1 by John Lungu of Zambia's Copperbelt
University and Alastair Fraser of Oxford University, leading specialists of mine labor conditions in Zambia, writing when the sole
CNMC firm there was NFCA:
NFCA are commonly claimed to be 'the worst investors',
usually one step ahead of 'the Indians' ... on a ladder of
shame of abusing the workforce, ignoring local businesses
and labor, and showing little interest in environmental
protection. Swiss, British, South African, Canadian and
other Western investors are typically labeled 'white' and
...despite plenty of poor practice ... are assumed to have
a more sympathetic style of management. The debate is
Anti·C1tina/anti Chincsc Sentiment in Southern Africa, book ms. in progress. Sata is
SJlid to have "swept to power on a largely anti.Cbinese, populist ticket." Andrea Hotter,
"Zambia's Sata Faces Test of Mining Mettle," The Source (IVu/1 Strut Journaf) (WSJ),
Oct. 20,2011, bttp:/lblogs.wsj.com/ source/2011/IM01umbia%E2%80%99s-sata-r..,.,..
4

lest--of min.ing·mettle/.
4

28. "Kanyant.a Katongo. "Work within the Law, Cbtnese Told," OM. Nov. 9. 201 t.
29. "Chinese Labor Abuse True: Human Rights Wotdl," Timn of Zambia {TOZ).
Nov. 9, 2011 , quotin& HRW. "Wbo are we," www.luw.org/nodei7SI36.
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clearly heavily informed by racist assumptions ... and a
fair sprinkling of frequently repeated urban myths.30
In this paper, we examine conditions at CNMC and Zambia's
mining enterprises, with an eye to assessing charges of CNMC being "the worst." We do not conclude that CNMC firms have not
engaged in labor malpractices, but that, if the empirical evidence is
engaged through a sound comparative methodology, they cannot
properly be deemed "the worst." Empirically, we examine CNMC
practices implicating rights related to safety, wages, hours, unions,
and job security, finding that the binary approach taken by HRW of
CNMC vs. the rest is inappropriate.31 At the level of explanation,
we interpret our findings in the context of the development and
configuration of Zambian copper mines and find wanting HRW's
interpretation that CNMC's practices are a result of trivializing
safety and exporting labor abuses from China. HRW's binarist approach also does not allow readers to consider a possible rough
equivalence of rights-affecting practices among foreign mining
firms in Zambia32 and ignores that practices at CNMC firms are
generally better than at Zambian-owned companies, whose mines
are even smaller than those of CNMC,33 not to speak of the mines
in and across Zambia's borders.34
30. John Lungu and Alastair Fraser, "For Whom the WindfaUs: Winners and Losers
in the Privatization of Zambia's Copper Mines." Civil Society Trade Network of
Zambia, 2008, www.liberationafrique.org/ IMG/.../Minewatebzambia.php.
31. Many media presentations on Africa/China links are explicitly binary. See, e.g.
"China in Africa: Friend or Foe?" BBC. Nov. 26,2007, http://news.bbc.oo.uk/2/hi/africa/
7086777.stm; "China in Zambia: Jobs or Exploitation?" BBC. Dec. 13, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/newslworld-africa·ll898960. A number of Western academic analyses,
including some even~baoded ones. also present readers with a binary in which Clioa's
role in Africa is either positive or negative,. See, e.g., David Haroz, ..China in Africa:
Symbiosis or Exploitation?" FleJcMr Forum 011 World Affairs 35:2 (2011): 65-88; Pat·
rick I. Keenan. "Curse or Cure? Otina, Africa and the Effects of Unconditional
Wealth," Btrkeky Journal of lmernatio11al Law, 27:1 (2009): 84-126.
32. We treat this equivalence in a monograph in progress, Red Dragon, Red Metal:
China's fnyeslmtnl in Zambiiln Copper Mining.
33. See Munyindei Masialeti, "SmaU Scale Mining in Zambia," Southern African
Network for Training and Research on the Environment, 2001, www.casmcblna.org/
attach..view.asp?IDa49.
34. See Pan Jibua and John Fogacb, "Going Global, Going Green: CCICED on
Investment, Trade and Environment," lntematiooallnstitute for Sustainable Development, 2012, : 4.3.l("in relative terms, tbe Zambian copper belt was still considered
'heaven' as a wort location. when compared to the mines in neighboring DR Congo
and Zimbabwe"), www.iisd.org/pubUcations/pub.aspx?pno;161S.
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Comparisons of Zambia's mining labor conditions moreover
become almost beside the point when the abuses that HRW addresses in its study are viewed in the context of human rights in
Africa generally. Chinese-owned mining assets are a tiny proportion of all foreign-owned mining assets in Africa. In 2010, the assets
of the top 40 mining companies in Africa exceeded one trillion US
dollars and their profits were $110 billion. Chinese investment in
mining in Africa is a very small proportion of the total investment
by the top 40 firms; Chinese firms' investment in mining in Africa
was 29.2% of China's $9.33 billion total stock of all investments in
Africa in late 2009, i.e. $2.9 billion, compared to $25 billion for the
US and Euro 11.7 billion for France.3 s As a 2011 UN study
recorded,
Chinese mining investments abroad are small relative to
those from other countries. Less than 1 percent of total
world mine production outside China is controlled by Chinese companies. (Despite rapid growth in recent years, it
was from an almost zero base). It will take years before
Chinese companies and China become powerful global
players in international rnining. 36
Chinese investment in mining in Africa, calculated at about $2.9
billion in 2009, is also a small ~art of global Chinese mining OFDI,
which was $41 billion in 2009.3 Chinese investment in Zambia, the
bulk of it in mining, has also been far behind that of several other
countries. In 2009, 64% of FDI stock in Zambia was derived from
five countries, all of whose investment was largely in mining: Canada: 19%; India 17%; Australia 11%; Switzerland 11 %; China:
8%.38
35. Wu Fang. Chinese Investments: 6,7!}. Outward stock of FDI is the value of
capital and reserves attributable to a parent enterprise resident in a host economy. If
measured as cumulative investment flows however, there may be serious measurement

errors. Sheila Page and Dirk Willem te Velde, ..Foreign Direct Investment by African
Countries," Overseas Development Institute (London), 2004, www.odi.org.uklre·
soureesldoc:s/5739.pdf
36. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "The International Study
Group Report on African Mineral Regimes, 2011: 34, 36, ISGReporLEng.pdf.
37. Michael Custer, "The China Syndrome: EffectS of Chinese Investment on Governance in Africa," Journal of Polirics and /nrernarional Affairs 9 (2011): 11-41 (13).
38. Judith Fessebaie, "Development and Knowledge Intensification of Industries
Upstream of Zambia's Copper Mining Sector.• University of Cape Town, MMCP Dis·
cussion Paper No. 3, 2011: 21, www.cssr.uct.ac.za/.. J MMCP%20Paper%203_0.pdf.
FDI flows in 2006-2010 ranged from S600m to $1.3b a year, 90% for mining and (often
mining-related) manufacturing. From 2000-2010, about 115,000 new jobs were created
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Much more egregious violations of labor and community rights
exist in mining elsewhere on the continent than at CNMC facilities.39 Indeed, the African Union Commission on Human Rights
and People's Rights stated in 2010 that "Mine workers in most parts
of Africa work in deplorable conditions often prone to accidents." 40
HRW, however, bas chosen to report on much less deplorable conditions affecting several thousand Zambian miners and, in doing
so, it shores up the hegemonic China-in-Africa discourse. As one
scholar has effectively described it, this discourse is
accompanied by a 'surfeit of poor and tentative scholarship' ... much of which has exotica as its hallmark, involving generalized analyses of China and 'Africa'- as if there
were relationships between two countries, instead of between one and 54. Whilst remaining fiercely critical of a
Chinese 'resource grab' in Africa, the US and UK media
have constructed 'China Inc' as a monolithic beast with an
insatiable appetite for African resources in ways which
draw upon wider Orientalist discourses. 41
In the end then, the HRW report tells us less about CNMC in
Zambia or China-in-Africa than about HRW's political agenda. The
politics of HRW, while avowedly universal and independent, are in
fact incorporated in global governance as "the capillary ends of the
in the formal sector; FDI was responsible for about 20% of that. OrganJzation for £co.
nomic Cooperation & Development, OECD lnV<Srmenr Policy Reviews, Zllmbia 2012:
29-30, bttp://www.keepeek.com!Oigital·Asset·Managementloecdlfinance·and·invest·
menl/oeed-investment-policy-reviews-zambia-2012_ 9789264169050-en.
39. See, e.g., Khadija Sharife, "Zimbabwean Diamond Workers Treated No Differ·
ent to Prisoners." Pambazuka News (PN), Nov. 3, 2011, www.pambazuka.orglenlcategory/comment/77644/print; War on Want, "Fanning the Flames: the Role of British
Mining in Conflict and tbe Violation of Human Rights,'' 1JX!I: 2().23, www. waronwanL
orgl. . JFanning%20the%20Flames.pdf.
40. "African Union to Tackle Human Rights Abuses of Mineworkers,'' Coal Mountain, Oct. 2.5, 2010, http://coalmountain.wordpress.com/2010110f25/african-union-totackl..human-rights-abuse-of-mine-worken/.
41. Marcus Power, "Angola 202.5: The Future of the 'World's Richest Poor Country'
as Seen Through a Chinese Rear-View Mirror," Antipode 44:3 (2012): 993-1014 (994).
A widely-viewed BBC presentation on Chinese in Zambia has cast Chinese "both as
exploiters of African workers and as an 'influx•, thar is, a quasi·natura1 •tidal' threat to
the continent's indigenous population.• Stepben Harper, "The Chinese are Coming:
Representations of Cbinese Soft Power in a BBCTelevision Documentary," in Lili Her·
nandez (ed.), Chintl and tlu West: Encounttrs with the Othu in Culruu, Arts Politics
and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge Scbola,.. Publishing, 2012): 33-44 (36).
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contemporary networks of power."42 The binarist HRW report and
the discourse in which it is embedded are a Manichaeist obstacle to
understanding Chinese activities in Africa and give rise to another
entrapping binarism that dismisses criticism as a defense of the Chinese state.

n. EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS
Days after HRW issued its CNMC study, Mineworkers Union
of Zambia (MUZ) President Oswell Munyenyembe responded to it
by saying that "his union cannot entirely blame the Chinese companies because other mining houses are equally culprits." He added
We cannot wholesomely condemn the Chinese-owned
mining houses. Remember when we had the global crisis
no worker was retrenched at any Chinese mine [unlike at
other mines]. Yes, they have their own problems like mistreating workers and not following labor laws, but other
mining houses are also culprits in this area. It is not only
the Chinese mining companies.43
The MUZ President thus disputed HRW's central argument: that
CNMC, among the foreign investors that dominate Zambian mining, is almost uniquely culpable of abusing workers' rights. That
argument is based on HRW's proclaimed "accurate fact finding,"
yet Zambian union leaders and monitors of mining, who know
more about practices across the industry than do the individual
workers interviewed by HRW, differ with it factually- and with its
conclusions that single out Chinese-owned firms as the worst
employers.
Even Minister of Sport Chisamba Kambwili, the PF's most
consistent baiter of "the Chinese," 44 has indirectly negated HRW's
42. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire (cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000): 313. On NOOs in Africa bolstering neoliberal hegemony, see Issa
Shivji. "Silences in NOO Discourse: the Role and Future of NOOs in ACrica," 2iXJI,
www.pambazuka.org/enlpublications/pz_sr_l4.pdf
43. "'Cbjnese Firms not that Bad. says Miners' Union,'' OM, Nov. 4, 2011. See also
"Minister, Union Defend Chinese Labor Conditions," ZW, Nov. 5, 2011 ("(Deputy
Minister of Labor Rayford Mbulu] says not only Chinese mining companies have been
Ooutiog labor laws but all employe~ should try and ensure their workers are properly
looked after"), www.zambianwatchdog.com/archives/2.S835.
44. Kambwili stated in a 2010 Parliament debate that "the miners in Luanshya and I
have declared war on the Otinese . .. These boo. Ministers must listen to us. We liYe
with these Cbinese and when we tell them that these Otinese are bad, they must listen
and not defend them.'' Nov. 25, 2010. www.parliameot.gov.zml index.php? op-
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conclusions. During his stint in 2012 as Minister of Labor, he paid
many surprise visits to enterprises in Copperbelt, the center of
Zambia's mining industry. Several visits were to Chinese-owned
firms, but many were to non-Chinese firms. Kambwili concluded
that "three quarters of the companies owned by foreign nationals
he visited on the Copperbelt were not complying with labor laws. "45

A. Safety Records Compared and Contextualized
Among Zambia's foreign copper mining firms, CNMC is a relatively small producer. Like other foreign investors, its entry into
Zambia was facilitated by a World Bank-ordered privatization of
Zambian SOE's. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 280 parastatals, accounting for 85% of Zambia's economy, were privatized through a
corrupt process"'~: 6% of firms were closed, 65% were sold to Zambians, and 29% went to foreign firms, with firms of Zambia's excolonizer Britain the leading beneficiaries.•' Zambia Consolidated
Copper Mines (ZCCM), the country's largest parastatal, was divided and sold to seven foreign investors.~
Scholars of mining in Zambia attribute worsened conditions in
mining since the 1990s to privatization,49 a result that parallels
worsened conditions for miners in China due to privatization and
marketization. Western media, however, have a history of claims
that safety conditions at CMNC mines in Zambia, but not mines of
tionECOm_oontent&task;view&id;1316&Jtemid;86&limit;1&!imitstart.o3.
Kambwili's anti-Chinese stance continued after the PF attained power in 20ll. See
Barry Sautman, "The Chinese Defilement Case: Racial Profiling in an African 'Model
Democracy,'" forthcoming in the Rutgen Journal of RDct Dnd Law. 2013.
45. "Kambwili Justifies Stance on Investors," The Post (TP; Zambia), Feb. 3, 2012.
46. Miles Larmer, Mimworken in Zambio: LAbour and Political Change in P<mO>Ionlal Afrltll, 1964 - 199/ (London: LB. Tauris 2007): 5; John R. Craig, "Evaluating
Privatization in Zambia: a Tale of Two Processes," Review ofAfrican Political Economy
27 (85) (2000): 355-366. See also 1R Craig, State Ent<rprise and Privatitation in
:!Ambia, 1968-/998, unpub'd diss., University of Leeds, 1999, http:lletheses.whiterose.
ac.uk/46111luk_bLethos.)41205.pdf; RAID-UK. "Privatisation in Zambia: What it
Means for the Majority," s.d. 1999?, raid-uk.org/docs/Zambia/FacLSMets.pdf.
<f'l. Ton Dietz. "Revisiting Peripheral Capitalism in Zambia," in Paul Hebind<, et
a!., Taks of Developmeru: People, Power and Space (Assam, Netherlands: Van Oorcum,
2008): 61-78 (70, 72). See also UNCTAD, Investment Polley Review :!Ambia, 2006: 9
(list of privatized firms), unctad.org/enldocsliteipc200614_en.pdf.
48. See Luka Powanga, "Divesting the Zambian Mining Industry," Ivey School of
Business, 2004. www.smcmba.com/index.php?option:com,
49. Fraser and Lungu, For Whom: 21-31. Mine community residents also complain
that "'standards of living in their towns have deteriorated since ZCCM.'' i.e. since priva·
tization. "Riots Rock Cbingola," LT, Mar. 15, 2012.
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Western-based firms, are in general abysmal. In 2011, for example,
a "trusted" UK business journal asserted that
At Chinese-run mines in Zambia's copper belt [employees] must work for two years before they get safety helmets. Ventilation below ground is poor and deadly
accidents occur almost daily. To avoid censure, Ch inese
managers bribe union bosses and take them on 'study
tours' to massage parlors in Cbina. 50
No evidence accompanied these assertions. As we will show, deadly
accidents at Chinese-run mines occur not daily, but 2-3 a year on
average. Miners have helmets from the onset of their work.51
CNMC Zambian employees sent to China who we interviewed
went there to learn about CNMC and China's development and did
so.5 2 We will compare CNMC's fatality rate with the overall fatality
rate of foreign-owned mines in Zambia from 2001-2011, and also
compare Zambia's fatality rate with that of other countries, particularly China. We will then interpret CNMC's safety records in the
context of mining development in Zambia. We find not that
CNMC mines have no safety problems, but that they are not the
worst in that regard.

/.

Falalities as a Key Indicator of Safely

Many HRW study readers have doubtless been impressed that
it was based on interviews with miners. Indeed specific observations of miner interviewees about safety deficiencies they experienced or witnessed, such as having to work in unsafe conditions,
cannot be wholly dismissed. The interviewees cannot however reliably infer from their experiences that CNMC operations are less safe
than those at other firms. Any such inferences are highly suspect,
given the climate of intense anti-Chinese prejudice present where
they work and live.
A better measure of whether one mining firm is safety deficient, compared to others, is whether the firm accounts for a highly
disproportionate share of fatalities. A leading sociologist of indusSO. ''Trying to Pull Toselhcr: 1hc Otinese in Africa." The &onoml3t. Apr. 23, 2011.
51. See Deborah Brautigam, "The Chinese in Afriea: tbc EconomiSI Gets Some
Thinll' Right, Some Thinll' Wrong.," China in Africa: the Real Story. May 20, 2011.
www .chinaalrica!ealstory.axn/.
52. Interview. Mr. Maupa, NFCA Operations Superinteodent, Otambishi. Aug. 23.
2008. An NFCA employee stated in 2008 tbat the fum seods lour :Z.mbtans to China
per month. Didtens Kauoda, Knv.e, Aug. 13, 2008.
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trial injuries has put forward that "The data which are the most
reliable indication of safety are those for fatalities."~3 Less-than-serious injuries may go unreported, but firms in Zambia cannot avoid
reporting fatalities, while serious injuries correlate with deaths, as
both mostly result from rock falls.54 Fatalities data are thus indicative of safety practices, although the logical principle of ceteris
paribus (other things being equal) must also be applied, to account
for the differing features of mines. Given the small number of
Zambian mine fatalities, comparison of rates between firms is not
useful,~~ comparing CNMC firm fatalities and the 2001-2011 total for foreign-owned copper firms does not indicate that CNMC's
safety record is extraordinarily bad.
According to union-provided statistics, fatalities in all foreignowned copper firms from 2001-2011, with corresponding figures for
the CNMCowned operations, were:

53. Tbeo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Industry (London: Mansell, 1997):

126.
54. H.B. Miller, et al., "Identifying Anteoedent Conditions Responsible for the
High Rate of Mining Injuries in Zambia," lnternatwnal Journal of Occupa!ionol Envi·
ronmental Health 12:4 (2006): 329-339.
55. The HRW report author agrees. "Rights Group Blast Cbinese Mines in
Zambia," Associated Press (AP), Nov. 3, 2011.
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Table 1: Total Fatalities in Zambia Copper Mining
and CNMC Zambia Fatalities

Years
2001

2002
2003

2004
2005

2006
2007
2008

2009
2010

Deaths in all Foreign-owned
Mines and their Total
Workers (Higher & Lower
Estimates)
23 (21,000) 13,500
17 (21,000) 13,500

CNMC Firm Fatalities and
Total Workers (Higher &
Lower Estimates)
1 (2800) 2300
2 (2800) 2300

21 (26.000) 13,500
19 (30,000) 13,500

4 (2800) 2300
2 (2800) 2300

34 (50,000) 40,000
18 (52,000) 40,000

1 (2800) 2300
3 (2800) 2300

15 (58,000) 40,000
22 (59,000) 38.000
17 (40,000) 32,500

0 (2800) 2300
1 (2800) 2300
4 (5800) 5800

14 (55,000) 53,000
19 (55,000) 53,000

3 (5800) 5800
4 ( 5800) 5800
2001-2008: 14 Falalities; Ave.
CNMC Workers (2800) 2300
2001-2011:25 Fatalities; Ave.
CNMC Workers (3618) 3255

2011
Total Fatalities 2001-2008: 169 Fatalities;
and Ave. No.
Ave. Total Workers (39,600)
of Workers
26,500
for 2001-2008 2001-2011: 219 Fatalities:
and 2001-2011 Ave. Total Workers (42.700)
31,900
Sources for Fatalities: 56

From 2001-2008, before CNMC acquired CLM and operationalized CCS, we estimate that its firms averaged 2,800 employees 7.1 o/o of foreign-owned copper mining firm employees, which according to one source averaged 39,600.'7 Using the 39,600 figure
for all foreign copper mining firms' average employment in 20012008, CNMC firms had 8.2% of the 169 fatalities and 7.1 o/o of the
56. For 200!-2010, MUZ. "Statistics of Mine Accidents by the Mine/Division lor the
Past 11 Years." photocopy, MUZ, Lusaka. Aug. 17, 2011: for 2011. Mine Safety Oep't
(MSO). "Mining Industry Safety Record from the Year 2000 to August 19, 2011."
photocopy. Kitwe, August 23.2011 and interview, Wilford B<:sa, Inspector, MSD, Aug.
19, 2012. There were 46 fatalities in a 2005 explosion at BGRIMM dynamite plant,
which was 60% BRIMM-owned, 40% NFCA-owned and BGRIMM·managed. MUZ
does not attribute BGRlMM fatalities to NFCA and we omit them. W<.e MUZ. we
include fatalities at (white-owned) Ox Drilling Co.
57. Nicholas Wilson. "Economic Growth and tbe HIV/AIOS Pandemic: Evidence
from the Early 21st Century Copper Boom,'' 2010: Figure 4, mitsloan.miLedulneudc/
papers/paper_302.pdf.
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workers. It thus bad a slightly higher than average fatality rate, but
that is before taking into account the key safety-affecting factor of
mine operation configurations: whether a firm's mines are underground, an open pit or a mix (see below).
The 39,600 average of miners in 2001-2008 is uncertain however. 1n 2011, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce
Trade and Industry Lubasi Sakwiba told a parliamentary committee
that "An estimated 13,500 people were employed in the mining sector between 2000 and 2004." 58 While that may seem too low anumber, a 2002 business journal article also stated that Zambia's mines
then had "about 10,000 full-time employees and 4,000 contractors,"59 numbers which do not include the 30,000 small-scale miners
in the country. 60 Zambia's Chamber of Mines stated in 2010 that
total employment in mining at the end of2007 was 40,017 and at the
end of 2008, 37,751.61 Assuming 40,000 employees in Zambian mining for 2005 and for 2006,62 average mining employment for 20012008, using these alternative figures, would be 26,500. Given an estimate of 2,800 CNMC employees for 2001-2008, but an average of
26,500 for Zambian copper mining's total 2001-2008 workforce,
CNMC would have had 10.6% of Zambia's mining workforce, but
8.2% of fatalities. If the estimate for CNMC workers is also lowered, to say 2,300, the CNMC firm share of the total mining
workforce would be 8.6% and, again, 8.2% of fatalities.
58. "Zambian Mining Sector Creates 44,000 Jobo in 4 Years," UKZAMBIAN$,
Feb. 6, 2011, www.uk%ambians.ro.ulclbomei2011/02Rl6/zambia·mining-sector-create..
44000-jobo-4-years/.
59. Ous Selassie, "Mining Oiant Agrees on Exit Deal witb Oovernment," World
Markets Analysis, Aug. 20, 2002. See also Brian Denny, "Mining Oiant Plans Exit from
Zambia," Morning Star (UK), Jan. 26, 2002 (more tban 10,000 permanent employees

and 4,1Xl0 contractors in Zambian mining).
60. Munyindei Masialeti and Crispin Kinabn, "The Socio-Economic Impacts of
Small-Scale Mining: the Case of Zambia," in Oavin M. Hilson (ed.),
Soci()o&f>.
nomic Impacts of Arti.sanal and Smal/ Scole Mining in Developing Countries (London:
Taylor & Francis, 2003): 325·334 (331).
61. 01amber of Mines of Zambia, "The Mining Tax Debate: an Endless Tug of
War?" Presentation to the Public Discussion Forum, July 16, 2010, Solwezi: 8, www.eaz.
org.zml...1201007230426570.CMZ. %20PRESENTATl0N%200N%.
62. A study indicates Zambia had 38,000 miners in 2005, all formal sector miners,
but not only copper miners. Maarten van Klaveren. et at, "An Overview of Women's
Work and Employment in Zambia: Decision for Ufe MD03 Project Country Report
No.4," University of Amsterdam, 2009, OecisionsJor..Ufe_Country_ Report-Zambia.
pdf; Lungu and Fraser, For Whom: 22 reoord almost 39,000 Zambian oopper miners in
September, 2006.
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In any case, for 2001-2008, CNMC's share of fatalities appears
to roughly approximate its share of Zambia's copper mining
workforce. That may actually be better than expected, as NFCA's
managers during that period, unlike many of the managers at other
mines, began working there with no experience of the idiosyncrasies of the long-closed Chambishi mine. A study of de-Nazification
of Germany has described how the victorious Allies in 1945 removed Nazi mine managers and replaced them with others who
lacked experience of the mines where they were placed. Many
mine accidents occurred, including, in early 1946, the Peine cage fall
that killed 46 miners and Unna explosion that killed 418 miners.63
In 2009-2011, CNMC's proportion of fatalities was higher, because its workforces grew and incorporated more inexperienced
workers. New mines built at Chambishi and Luanshya meant more
workers doing construction, which raises the likelihood of fatalities.
From 2001-2011, using the higher average total foreign mining firms
workers (see Table 1), CNMC firm workforces averaged 8.5% of
total Zambian copper mining foreign investor employees, but
11.5% of total fatalities. Using the lower estimates of total foreign
firms' workforces and the CNMC workforce for 2001-2011, CNMC
had 10.2% of the total workforce and 11.5% of total fatalities. For
2001-2011 then, CNMC had a slightly higher than average fatality
rate, but without taking into account differences in mine operation
configurations.
These figures in themselves make it unlikely that CNMC firms'
safety conditions are markedly worse than those at other mines.
Fatalities statistics also put paid to fantastically inaccurate recollections such as "NFCA used to have fatalities almost every month. " 64
Zambian foreign-owned mines averaged ten fatalities a z,ear
from 1997-2002, but by 2004 that number increased by 70%. s A
study of a large, non-Chinese-owned mine showed 20 fatalities from
63. Frederick Taylor. Exorcising Hltltr: The Occupation and Denazificatwn of Ger·
many (London: Bloomsbury Press. 2011): 309.
64. Goodwell Kaluba, General Secretary of NUMAW, quoted in Mary Kay Magis·
tad. "Mining in Zambia: One Year alter Collum Coal incident." PRJ's The World, Oct.
4, 2011, www.theworld/org/2011/lOfmining·in·zambia-one·year·after..collum-coal-incident/.
65. Otristopher Adam and Anthony Simpasa, "The Economics or the Copper Price
Boom in Zambia/' in Alastair Fraser and Miles Larmer, Zambla. Mining, and Neoliber·
a/ism: Boom and Bust on tlu: Globalized Cop~rbelt (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010): 59-90 (90. fn. 29).
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January 2005-May 2007.66 Then-MUZ president and now Deputy
Labor Minister Rayford Mbulu stated, with only slight exaggeration, that in the 2000s "at least two employees per month [were)
dying" in the whole set of privatized copper mines.67 His successor,
Acting President of MUZ Charles Mukuka told us in 2011 that
''The current investors don't invest in safety. They're in a burry to
make money ..... Now every month there are fatalities. " 68
Zambia is not however a high mining fatality country by world
standards. It is not among the 60 most dangerous countries for
miners listed in 2011 by the International Federation of Chemical,
Mining and General Workers Unions {ICEM).69 ICBM has annually tracked, 12,000 or 15,000 reported fatalities in mining as a
whole. In many countries, a lot of mining deaths are not recorded
however, because firms pay miners' survivors to keep quiet.'0 No
accurate figure for the world total of miners exists either, as artisanal miners may or may not be included. A union federation bas
guessed at a 20 million miner total. 71 Assuming that number and
20,000 fatalities, the annual world death rate would be 100 fatalities
per 100,000 miners. Zambia foreign-owned mine fatalities are now
at about 16 a year, among some 55,000 copper miners or 29 deaths
per 100,000 workers. It is a much higher rate than in Australian
mining (3.5 deaths per 100,000 workers in 2009-2010),72 where the
death rate may be especially low, not only because of very advanced technology, but also because of the predominance of open
66. Prudence Micbelo, et al., "Occupation Injuries and Fatalities in Copper Mining
in Zambia," Occupational Medicine 59:3 (2009): 194.
(il. Frederick Mutesa, "China aod Zambia: Betw«n Development and Politics," in
Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi, The Rise of China and India in Africtl: Challenges, Opportll·
nities and Critical Interventions (Uppsala: Nordiska Alrikainstitutet, 2010): 167-1&0
(176).
6&. Interview, Charles Mututa, Acting MUZ President, Kitwe, Aug. IS, 2011.
69. ICEM, "Mine Safety and ILO Convention 176: a Continued Priority Cor
ICEM," Apr. 24, 2011, www.icem. org/en/209-!L0/4383-Mine-Safety-and-ILO-Convention-176:-A-Continued-Priority-for-the-ICEM; ICEM, "World Conference for the Mining Industry: Global Mining, Global Otallenges, Global Union Action," 2004: 24, www.
icem.org/files/PDF/Events.. .12004MineEN.pdf .
70. "Fatalities Go Unrecorded in Mining Industry: Experts, • Reuters, Oct. 11, 2010.
For Ch.irul, see Tim Wright, ~ Polili<al Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry: Black
Gold and Blood-Stained Coal (London: Routledge, 2012): 161.
71. "Purpose, Otaracter and Aims of an International Miners' Conference," Inter-

national Coalminers, May 24, 2010, www.minersnet/org.
72. Karen McNab and Magaly Garcia-Vasquez, "Autonomous and Remote Operation Technologies in Australilln Mining,": 15, Nov. 2011, www.csrm.uq.edu.au/Link
Oick..aspx?fileticket.
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cut mining. 13 The fatality rate is however lower than in South Africa's platinum mines in 2008. 74 Zambia's rate is half that of US
mining" and the rate in Chile, the world's largest copper producer,
may be up to four times higher than in the US. 76
Zambia's fatality rate is much lower than in China, a world
center of mining fatalities due to poor governance, remote rural
mines,n fast expansion of small township and village enterprise
(TVE) mines and a huge mining workforce - up to 3 million in the
mid-2000s in coal alone, working in thousands of legal and illegal
mines. 78 China's coal mining fatality rate, for example, even just for
key SOE mines, exceeds the rate for all US mines, although 90% of
Chinese coal mines are underground, while two-thirds of US mines
are open-pit.71> Moreover, China's top eight mining groups accounted for only around 20% of national coal output in 2010 ...
whereas in the U.S. just three companies produced 70%." Thus, in
addition to other factors, the comparatively high fatality rate in
China also reflects much more scattered control over safety conditions, "the difficulty of regulating 12,000 mines, and the fact that its
coal veins are so deep underground. "so
Ownership also matters: China's national SOE mines are on
par with other developed countries and safer than local SOE mines,
which are in turn safer than the (disguised privately-owned) TVE
73. "Mining Rights," Dally Examiner (Grafton, Australia), Nov. 5, 2011.
74. Unnatural Deaths. ICEM uses fatalities per 100,000 workers "because what
matters to a miner in considering whether a mine is safe or unsafe is whether be or she
goes home intact at the end ol the day. The number ol tons mined in that day is secon·
dary to that fact." ICEM, Mine Safety.
75. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in
2010," Aug. 25,2011.
76. Gideon Long, "Mining Safety: What Ues Beneath?" AmCham Chile, Oct. 2010,
www.businesscbile.cllenl news/mining-safety-what-lies-beneath.
77. See Andrew Horner, ''Coal Mining Safety Regulation in China and the USA,"
Journal of Comemporary Asia 39:3 (2009): 424-439.
78. Vincent Kolo, "Privatization and Greedy Officials Responsible for Coal Mining
Accidents," China Worker, May 28.2007, httpJ/chinaworker.info.enloontent/newsll91;
Jeffrey Hays. "Coal in China," Facts and Details," 2008, httpJ/factsanddetails.coml
china.php?itemid:322&catid:J3&subcatid:85. Some 80% of mines in China are said
to operate illegally and without safely regulations. Edward Wong, ..Chinese Mine Dis-

aster Ends with 74 Dead," N•w York Times (NYT), Feb. 24. 2009.
79. Wright, The Political Economy: 163·164. In the US, 97% of all metals come
from OC mines; in the world, two-thirds come from OC mines. Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy Network, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office ol Industrial
Technologies, website on mining. http:J/www.oit.doe.gov/mining.
80. James Areddy, "China Coal Sector has Safety Setback." WSJ. Sept. 3, 2012.
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mines.81 For coal mining fatalities, in per million tons terms from
2001-2009, the rates were key SOEs 0.7, local SOEs 2.2 and TVE
mines 3.9.62 Put another way,
Large, government-run coal producers in China recorded
a fatality rate of 0.28 per million metric tons mined in 2010
while small operations killed five times as many people, or
1.4 . . . China's national average in 2010 was 0.75 deaths
per million tons, down sharply from 7.6 deaths per million
during the mid-1980s.83
Responding to growing public concern, China's central government took measures over the past decade to reduce fatality rates,84
by revamping the regulatory framework for work safety and closure
of tens of thousands of TVE coal mines. 85 Reported fatalities
dropped from 6,000 in coal mining alone in 2005 to 1,973 in 2011.!6
It is unlikely the drop is due to mine bosses being more successful
at covering up deaths, as "the discrepancy between reported coal
mine deaths and true fatality levels has been narrowed down in recent years"87 and there is now more public scrutiny and tougher
penalties for cover-ups.88
Some 65% of copper worldwide is mined in open pits, which
are less dangerous than underground mines. China has just seven
open pit copper mines, accounting for 10-20% of its mined cop81. UNCfAD, World Investment Repon 2(}()7 (Geneva: UNCfAO. 2(}()7): 149.
82. Wright, The Political Economy: 169.
83. Areddy. 2012.
84. Wang Shaoguang, "Regulating Deaths at Coal Mines: O>anging Mode of Gov·
ernance in O>ina," Journal of Contemporary China 15:46 (2006): 1·30. From the mid·
2000s, officials who covered up mine deaths were executed and mine managers ordered
to go down the shafts. The Iauer practice was strengthened in 2010. "China Official
Executed in Accident Cover-up," NYT, Feb. 21, 2004; "Mine Bosses to be Scot Down,"
Nov. 8. NYT, 2005; "China Introduces Mine Safety Rule," BBC News, Oct. 7, 2010.

SS. For example, Otinese regulations now ban temperatures above 26 degrees in
mines and require iostaUation of cooling systems. See "Fir>t Central Mine-Cooling Sys.
tem with Siemag Tecbeg Technology in China," Siemag Tecberg. s.d., www.siegmagtecberg.com/ inforcenter/tecbnical-infromation/tL31-liuzbuang.html.
86. "Mining the Story of King Coal," Shanghai Daily, Juoe 6, 2012.
81. Tu Jiaojun. "Coal Mining Sarety: China's Achilles' Heal," China S.curily Review 3:2 (2007): 36-53 (38).
88. See "Cbina Mine Cove.r-up Leads to Dismissal of Officials," Xinhua, May 2,
2011; "Mine Cover-up Exposed," Bon, June 3, 2010, www.bonlive.con/116712465-minecover-up-exposed.sl!tml; Wright, The Political Economy: 169 ("it seems certain that the
industry bas substantially improved safety over the past eight yean;").
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per.89 No figures exist for copper mining fatalities alone, but with
500,000 workers in non-ferrous mining and dressing, which includes
copper, China's non-ferrous reported fatalities are 83 per 100,00090
or 2.9 times the Zambian copper mining rate. 9 t This difference indicates that if CNMC officials are determined to disregard human life
by trivializing safety and bent on exporting China's mining conditions to Zambia, they are doing a poor job of it. 92 The argument of
exporting China's practices is also ironic given changes in safety
conditions in China's mines. The leading Western specialist of coal
mining in China has observed that
There has been a spectacular improvement in China's coal
safety record over the last decade - the number of deaths
has fallen by about two-thirds during a period when output has more than doubled. Although one has to remain
skeptical about the details of the official statistics, at least
a major part of the decline in fatalities does reflect a real
improvement. This improvement has been due to a number of factors: high profits creating the resources to invest
in safety; the beginnings of labor shortages allowing
workers to demand better conditions; the higher priority

89. Martin Streicher-Porte and Hans Jorg Althaus, "Ollna and Global Markets:
Copper Supply Chain Sustainable Development," International Institute for Sustainable Development (Winnipeg: !ISO, 2010): 16.
90. The State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) website show< that China's
non-coal minins sector ill 2009 had 1,540 fatalities. www.cbznasafety,aov.en. Non-ferrous milling aa:ounled for 27% of 2010 non-coal fatalities, Telephone illterview wilh
SAWS, Beijing. Nov. 16,2011. U that percentage also applied m 2009, non-ferrous min'"' had 416 fatalities. Around 2008, lhere were 116.600 emplo)ees 111 copper mining
and dressing. Shang Fushan, et al., •Sustainable Development of the Olinese Copper
Market," (Winnipeg; IISD. 2010): 16.
91. No one reties only on reported fatality rates in China however. When reported
deaths in mining in China still topped 6,000 annually in the mid-20005. it wa.• noted that
•·unorricial data provided by a senior wort~safety bureaucrat suggests that as many as
20.000 miners actually die each year." Tu. Coal Mine Safety. 38.
92. Managers at CNMC rlrms are aware they cannot replicate Chinese practices in
Zambia. An NFCA executive hos stated that "The Chinese way doesn't work here. and
copying it will make trouble." Another bas said " We can't apply Chinese standards
v.hen making demands of Zambtan workers.· HAN Weo and SHEN Hu, "China's
Harsh Sque= in Zamboa's Copperbelt," Csiltin. Nov. 10. 2011. hn.p:llcbina-wire.org/
?p-16823.
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put on social and safety issues by the WEN Jiabao - HU
Jintao government; and collaboration with foreign safety
experts. 93

2. Operational Configurations and Fatality Rates
Unlike NFCA and CLM, non-CNMC foreign-owned Zambian
copper mining firms do not have only underground (UG) mines.
Some have open cast (open pit, open cut, or surface) mines; others
are mixed. The two firms with mixed configurations are KCM and
MCM: KCM Nchanga is OC (55% of production) and UG (45% of
production). MCM Nkana also has both UG and OC mines.
Chibuluma South (in operation from 2004), Kansanshi (in operation from 2005), and Lumwana (in operation from 2008) have only
OC mines. 94
HRW's compares safety in terms of attitudes or practices, but
operational configurations also determine outcomes: UG mines
usually have many more casualties, including many more fatalities,
than OC mines. A mining safety journal explains that "The main
factors contributing to high injury and fatality rates in underground
mines are the confined spaces people work in, the lower degree of
visibility and that personnel may work directly beneath (undetected) unstable grounds."95 The deeper the UG mine, the more
likely there will be casualties.96 At over 900 meters, NFCA 's
Chambishi Main is a deep UG mine. CNMC Luanshya's (CLM)
main Baluba mine, at 580 meters, is also a fairly deep UG
operation.97
93. "Eight Questions: Tim Wright on China's Blood-Stained Coal," Otina Real
rune Report, Feb. 2, 2002, http:/lblogs.wsj.cornlcbinarealtime/2012102102/eigbt-questions-tim-wrigbt-blaclc-gold·and·blood-suined-coall?mod=WSJBiog.
94. MUZ, Statistics and Mine Safety Dep't. Mining Industry.
95. "Incident Alert," Minesafe (Australia) 12:1 (May, 2001): 12.
96. See S.K. Puri, "Safety Management in Indian Coal Mines," in Pradeep
Chaturvedi (ed.), Challences of Occupational Safety and Health (New Delhi, Concept
Publishing Co., 2006): 161-168 (166).
IJ'I. CLM commissioned an OC mine, Mulyashi (Mulia.shi) in early 2012. Its initial
workforce was to be~. but by April, 2012, 800 young Zambians had been hired, many
from the workforce of the CNMC.affiliated mine construction flfiD 15MCC. The Mulyashi workforoe is expected to reacb 1,500, all pensionable permanent employees, when
the mine is fully operational. "$368m Mulia.shi Mine Opens this Months-End," OM,
Feb. II, 2012; "Muliashi Mine Opening: Is this the Rebirth of Luanshya?" Zambian
Guardian Weekly, Mar. 23, 2012: "Muliashi Leading Luansbya to Lost Glory," TOZ.
Apr. S, 2012.
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Mining firms in Zambia are well aware that UG mmmg is
much more dangerous than OC mining. KCM, which has two UG
and three OC mines, has stated that its safety "record was impressive considering that 70 percent of its workforce is involved in underground operations where the risk factor is high. " 98 Zambian
officials also know UG mining is more perilous: Minister of Mines
Maxwell Mwale noted in 2010 that Collum Coal Mine "was experiencing a lot of accidents especially underground and urged CCM
management to consider having an open pit mine lilce their counterparts at Maamba Collieries....,.,
Exactly how much more dangerous Zambia's UG mines are
compared to OC mines is not certain, as we lack documentary data
for the Mopani Copper Mine disaggregated as to UG and OC
workers. Even reports of MCM's number of UG and OC mines are
not necessarily accurate. It has been said to have four UG and four
OC mines."X> More precisely it seems, MCM has four UG and four
OC mines in its Nkana concession, but only the four Nkana OC
mines produce copper. The UG mines produce cobalt. MCM also
has three copper-producing UG mines at Mufulira, 101 which "currently" employ either 5,000 or 8,000 workers. 102 Breakdowns for
workers in Nkana·s UG cobalt and OC copper mines, as well as at
the Nkana Concentrator and Nkana Cobalt Plant have apparently
not been published.
Nevertheless, in 2012 MSD inspectors provided us fatality
figures by mine for 2006-2011 that identified those that are OC and
UG. These indicate that 12 died in OC mines and 92 died in UG
mines, a ratio of 7.7:1, while we estimate that for the non-CNMC
foreign-owned mines as a whole, half of the workers arc in UG and
98. "KCM in Safely Pcrfonnanee Reoo<d as Employees Que>IIOO 11," LT. Mar. 1.
2010
99. "CCM 10 Re-open Soon, say• Mwale." TP, Jan. 2A, 2012.
100. The Nkana OC llllilOS appear to be designated as Areas A, D and J. as well as
Mindola. while the Mufulira UG mines are Mufilira Central, Mufilira East and Mufulira
West. Golder Associates, "MOP"ni Copper Mines Pic,": 61S, 625, 740, psh.hkex.
oom.hk/userpages/eipo/englishl Glencore_2_e.pdf: John Chadwick. "Cuprum Zambia,"
lnrtmatlonol Mining (July, 201 1): 46-52 (48).
101. "Gieocore: the Value in Volatilily Initiating wilb a Buy." Deutsch Bank AGI
London, June 6. 2011:89, www.$Crtbd.eomldoc/S72S4342132/Mopani-%E2%80%93-UpJT&ding-and..:onsolldatiog·lo-lamot-eost·infiatioo.
102. "Mopani Copper Mme." Wokopedia, updated to Jan. 21, 2012, bupJ/en...iki
pedoa.orlf"'iki/Mopani_Copper _Mone ; "Mopani Needs 10 Caleb Second Wind," Africa
Monong lm~Uig<na, Sep1. 22. 2010.
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half in OC mines. The inspectors themselves put the UG/OC fatality ratio for the copper mining industry over the years at 8-9:1. 103
Statistics from other countries that distinguish fatality rates by
UG and OC mines show much higher rates in UG mines. In the
US, the fatality rate of UG mining is nearly three times that of OC
mining. 104 US copper mining is concentrated in Arizona, where
"Copper represents the lion's share of the state's mineral production" and fatality rates are low. The Arizona Department of Mines
and Mineral Resources director has "said the fact that Arizona has
few underground mines also could be a reason for lower fatality
rates. "Surface mining is always ... in general safer than underground. " 1os In Australia, the fatality incident rate (fatalities per
1,000 employees) for the metalliferous sector from 1997-2007 shows
deaths in UG mines were 6.3 times higher than in OC mines. 106
Another indication of the fatalities rate differential between
UG and OC mines in Zambia is found in a study of KCM from
January, 2005 to May, 2007, when 6,338 KCM's workers were in the
Underground Department and 2,601 in the Open Pit/Construction
Department. There were 17 fatalities among the UG miners and
one fatality among OC miners, a fatality ratio of 7:1 when the relative size of the UG and OC workforces are taken into account. 107
Another way to show that fatalities are more likely to occur in
Zambia's UG copper mines than its OC mines is to compare fatality records of firms that only have OC mines with the overall fatality rate in Zambian copper mining. Such comparisons will still yield
a significant underrepresentation of the UG/OC difference in fatality rates, because the fatality rate for OC mines only is not being
compared with the fatality rate for UG mines only, which is pre103. Besa interview.
104. See table "Mining Fatalities: AD U.S. Mines Accident/Injury Oasses• in "Briefing Book for the Niosb Mining Program" (section 1.4 "Research Needs'') (Atlanta:
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005), http://www.edc.gov/niosblnaslmininglpdfslwbatis-resean:bneeds.pdf (We calculate fatality ratios for 1990-2004 using
1992-2002 employment fogures). See also a 20-year US study, V.K. Karra, "Analysis of
Non-Fatal and Fatal Injuries Rates for Mine Operator and Contrac10r Employees and
tbe Influence of Location," Journal of Safety Research, 36:5 (2005): 413421 (418} (surface mine fatalities are 64.3% lower than UO mine fatalities}.
105. "Arizona Mining Fatalities have Declined, Injury Rates Up," Arkoflll RepublJc,
Oct. 17, 2009.
106. Minerals Council of Australia, "Safety Performance Repo.rt of the Australian
Minerals Industry 2006-2007": 15. www.minerals.org.au/safety.
107. Michelo, et al., Occupational injuries: 192.
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eluded by the lack of published data on the workforce breakdown
of MCM's UG/OC.
Kansanshi, an OC mine with about 4,000 workers has operated
since early 2005. In 2005-2011, there were four fatalities, for a fatality rate of .00014. Using the higher estimate of miners at all UG
and mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which had 130 fa.
talities in 2005-2011, their fatality rate was .00042, i.e. three times
the Kansanshi rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at the UG
and mixed UG/OC mines, the fatality rate at these mines was
.00055 or almost four times the rate for Kansanshi.
Lumwana, an OC mine with about 3,800 workers, bas operated
since late 2008. In 2009-2011 it had two fatalities, for a fatality rate
of .00017. Using the higher estimate of miners at all UG or mixed
UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which had 44 fatalities in
2009-2011, their fatality rate was .00035, i.e. twice the Lumwana
rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at the UG and mixed UG/
OC mines, the fatality rate average at these mines was .00039 or
almost three times the rate for Lumwana.
Chibuluma South, an OC mine with about 600 employees bas
operated since mid-2004. In 2005-2011, it had one fatality, for a
fatality rate of .00023. Using the higher estimate of miners at aU
UG or mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines, which bad 130
fatalities in 2005-2009, their fatality rate was .00042, i.e. almost
twice the Chibuluma rate. Using the lower estimate of miners at
the UG and mixed UG/OC mines, the fatality rate at these mines
was .00055 or about two and a half as high as at Chibuluma.
The above comparisons were between each of these three OC
mines and the combined fatality rates of all Zambian UG and
mixed UG/OC foreign-owned copper mines. Much higher UG/OC
fatality ratios would be found if comparisons could be made between the overall fatality rate of the three OC-only mines and the
overall fatality rate of the UG mines. That is especially so given
that the mixed UG/OC mines are KCM and MCM, which employ
roughly two-thirds the total of Zambia's foreign-owned mines'
workforce and had two-thirds of the fatalities in 2001 -2011 (145 of
217).
CNMC firm facilities have bad a high level of rehabilitative
and new construction. Deaths are more likely among building,
rather than working in mines, because mine construction in Zambia
is done mainly by less-skilled contract workers and because, as a US
SIUdy notes, mine construction has ·•a relatively high frequency and
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severity of worker injuries and fatalities from acx:idents." 108 Skill
levels affect safety and are lower at CNMC mines than at other
mines, in part due to salaries,109 but in large measure because most
of Zambia's non-CNMC mines have been open continuously; for
example, Mopani has operated since 1932.
NFCA Chambisbi Mine was closed for 13 years before its acquisition in 1998 by CNMC and was the first African mine bought
by a Chinese company. 11 CLM had been abandoned repeatedly by
former owners. Luanshya mine was acquired in 1997 by Ramcoz,
whose main investor was the UK/Indian firm Binani. Ramcoz went
into receivership in 2000 and the mine was flooded, closed and
stripped until 2004. Its next owner, Switzerland-based J&W
("Enya"), abandoned it in 2008, during the global financial crisis. It
was stripped again, requiring a year of refurbishment before CNMC
could fully resume operations. Continuously opened mines create
more skilled, experienced and higher-paid workers;'" when mines
close, skilled workers drift away or are de-skilled and are often hard
to recruit again, especially in Zambia which, like many mining
countries, is acutely short of skilled miners. 112 A longer development of technicaVmanagerial expertise in a particular mine setting
may also matter. 113

°

to& Pllilip Udo-lnyana and Toulolope Adenubi, "Safely Chanctcriotia of Mine
Constructloll Sites,• ASC Proceedlll&S, 40th Annual Conference, 2004, http://ascproO.ascweb.org/an:hiveskd/200412004pro/20031 Udoinyang04.hrm.
109. See Rozemarijn Apntbeker, "Foreign Copper Mining Companies in Zambia:
Who &nefilS7" unpub'd MA thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2009: 60, dare.uva.nV
document/134161.
110. Kopinski and Polus: ISS.
Ill. Due to long continuity of employment by ooo.cNMC miners and discontinui·
tieS at OIMC mines created by former owoers. mo<e non-0-IMC mu>ers bave IDO\'ed
up tbetr salary lacldets. Interview, Waq JIDJUD, Deputy CEO (prndiiCIJOII) and Robert
Ko.manp. Deputy CEO (technical), CLM, Luansbya. August 17. 2012; Interview. Fredcrick Chola, Human Resoun:es MlDaJer, CLM, Luansbya, AuJ. 17,2012.
I 12. "Zambia KCM Launcba Onve to Boost Stills of Local M1nen." Tenderslnfo,
Mar. 25, 2010. It bas been noted that "Low productivity am<liiJ Zambian workers eau
be due to lack of sttills and social ottitudes or culture ... The World Ba.n t ... puiS tbe
value added per Zambian worker at US$2,700 per annum, far below countries lil:e Kenya, India and China. Similarly, stilts shortages bave been obocrvcd by oome local and
foreign investors ..." Sebastian Kopulandc and Chilesbc Mulengo, "Impact of SnutbSnulh Cooperation and Integration oo tbe Zambian Economy: the Case of Chinese
ln,·estment," Background Paper No.4 for UNCTAD, 1be Least Developed Countries
Report 201 I, Idcr.)OI IJ<opulande'!f.20an<l'lf._CD(I).pdf. See abo Wbat 10'0Uid it Take:
7 ("Low productivity is in larJe part driven by pps in worken' udts tbat arc rooted in
..eat technical and vocatiooal trau11na from industry and tninina inotltulioas").
I 13. See WriaJ>t, 1be Polital Economy: 172.
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Fatalities are also linked to subcontracting, as accidents disproponionately occur among contract workers. who are not permanently employed by a mining firm. 114 Zambia's MSD Director bas
noted that "Most companies do little work on their own. This bas
contributed to accidents, because contractors are poorly supervised
and don't employ people on a full-time basis. Their workers might
get a quarter of the regular salary ... Most accidents occur with
contractors' employees."'" Many accidents occur because contract
workers' bosses try to meet unattainable targets in order to collect
bonuses. 1 ' 6 MUZ's CLM branch chairman bas also pointed to subcontracting as hazardous:
There's a quite OK safety record in the main mine (but]
the contractors [constructing a new CLM mine] are not
good in safety. Both foreign and Zambian contractors
need to understand our standards ... With Chinese, you
just need to convince them. Then they will give you
whatever safety equipment you want." 117
Fatalities rise with work expansion and the pressure to produce, especially when copper prices are high. 118 The MSD Director
has stated that "Supervisors in mines are all supposed to be safety
officers, but are often pressured to maintain production schedules."
He did not single out Chinese-owned mines in that regard. When
mining firms push to expand, fatality rates rise as new workers are
brought in to boost production. For 22 months, from October, 2006
114. Similarly, in China, mining accident very disproportionately occur among mi·
srant workers and contract workers. Wright, The Political E<>onomy: 187·188. In the
US. the fatality nne among contract mtners is about 3.3 times higher than among per·
mancnt mine employees Karra. Analysis: 420.
liS. Interview with Mr. Mooya Lumamba, August 19.2011, who ated shaft sinking
by South Afri<:ao ooolnlelors 11 KCM and Brazilian oootroctors 11 MCM. edding that
·Fon:igners take the btg ooouacu. Zambians have small and mcdtum •ized oonlriCIS."
The Dislrict Commissioner of Sol•·ezi. home 10 Kansansbi DllOe, cril.az.ed its owners
tor twng fO<eign oonttac~ors for tub $UCh as cleaning and stated that "the former
Zambian oootractors were PIY"'i their employees between Kl.2 mtlhon to K2 million.
but the new foreign investors are paying the same workers K400.000 net.'' He added
that Kansa.nsbi sources supplies from South Africa and Ghana. "Zambians Being
Treated Like Children." 1..T. Jun. 21. 2008.
116. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 67.
117. Interview. Stanislas Mwinbe. Luanshya. Aug. 17. 2011. The contract workers
referred to did mine construction, not mining.
lt8. In China. reduced demand for coal in the 1990s led to strapped mines reducing
.. pendllures for and adversely tmpacltn8 safety. The boO<n tn demand for coal in the
2000s resulted in a dme for tncre...,d production and that too negatively affected
safety. Wright. The PohiJcal Economy: 188-189.
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to August, 2008, NFCA had no fatalities, an industry rarity. In August, 2008 GAO Xiang, then NFCA vice CEO for human resources,
stated "Now we pay special attention to safety. We would rather
spend the money on preventive measures than spend it on the aftermath. The good conditions [including this record] we have don't
come easily. We value them." 119 In a 2011 interview, referring to
this past experience and expressed determination, we asked CEO
WANG Chunlai about NFCA's fluctuating safety record. He said
The amount of work that we have is much greater than
before. Before, we only had one ore body to work on;
now we have two which are in operation and a third one is
in development. With the main ore body, as you go
deeper there is more stress on structures. Now we go
down to more than 1,000 meters. The ceiling there gets
unstable and that can create injury. We do try to look for
weaknesses in our safety work. As the scale of work enlarges, we've recruited more new workers, so our trainin:£
may be lagging and we have to invest more in training. 1

3.

Health & Safety Compared

In 2011 interviews, union leaders and mining regulators held
views on safety and other labor matters more in keeping with MUZ
President Munyenyembe's than those of HRW. MUZ Acting President Charles Mukuka said labor abuses occur mostly because the
law permits them and added "I don't blame the Chinese for what
they're doing, because of what they found in terms of our labor
law." 121 Zambia's Chief Mining Engineer said NFCA is "doing well
now around these issues. They're raising the bar. "122 The MSD
Chief Inspector of Mines singled out NFCA in terms of its first five
years of operation (2003-2008), when he said it "was the worst mine
in terms of safety. It didn't want to do sufficient support work. And
it didn't have proper ventilation." Now, however, he said "NFCA is
OK" and "no longer stands out.'' 123 When asked which Chinese
firms comply with the country's labor laws, Zambia's Assistant Labor Commissioner listed only CNMC firms: CLM, NFCA and CCS,
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Interview, Gao Xiang. Cbambishi, Aug. 19, 2008.
InterView, Wang Olunlai, Cbambishi, Aug, 15, 2011.
Interview with Charles Mukuka, August 15, 2011.
Interview, Delax Olilumbu, Lusaka, Aug, 10, 2011.
Interview, Mr. Kal.,;, Kitwe, Aug, 16, 2011.
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three of the four companies HRW says are labor abusers.' 24 Similarly, two scholars in the US have noted that "Roy Mwaba, General
Secretary of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, acknowledged
that the larger Chinese enterprises were abiding by local labor
law." 125
MUZ's Director of Occupational Health and Safety told us
that at Chambishi mine, the firm was still not doing well in terms of
ventilation systems, but that the safety situation at Chambisbi was
better now than it was during the period from the 1970s to late
1990s, when Zambia's copper mines were state-owned. Safety
training had particularly improved. 126 The president of the main
union at Chambisbi, the National Union of Mine and Allied Workers (NUMAW), also stated that safety was improving there. 127 The
MSD Director stated that
Chinese mines have some of the most advanced technology. For example, CLM has got the best winder, having
replaced the old one that was in place since the 1930s.
NFCA has the best trolley line. CLM has introduced the
best dust abatement system. They've done a good job in
terms of dust control. 128
GAO Xiang, then-CLM Vice CEO, related that "When we
took over the mine, there was so much dust underground that it was
impossible to stay there." Displaying then-and-now pictures in
CLM's newsletter, Gao remarked that ''The local Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) didn't seem to interfere with the previous
owners in that regard. Had we been like that, the EPA would certainly have come to us. CLM spent $60 million on updating equipment and now when you go down the shaft, it's much better." On .
safety, he noted that from June 2009-December 2010 there was only
124. Interview, Venus Seti, Lusaka, Aug. 12, 2011.
125. Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang, "African Shenz.ben: China's Special
Economic Zones in Africa," Journal of Modem African Studies 49:1 (2011): 27-54 (45).
126. Interview, Webby Mushota, IGtwe, Aug. 16, 2010. A 2011 study of Zambia min·
ing concludes that "The standards of safety have declined since privatization and con·
Iribuled to an increase in aecideniS and fatalities." Swedish Trnde Council, Gabrone,
Botswana, "Pre-Study of the Mining Sector in Zambia for Geological Survey of Sweden," SGU-Pre-Study-Zambia-Mining-Final-Version-September-2(}.2011-Short-Version-Final(! ].pdf.
127. Interview, Goodwell Kaluba. NUMAW President, IGtwe, Aug, 19, 2011.
128. Interview. Mooya Lumamba, Kitwe, Aug, 19,2011. A winder or hoist raises or
lowers conveyances. such as the cage containing miners, into a shaft. TroiJey lines feed
trolley trucks thai carry cargo.
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one fatality, also that "We've been complemented on the health
and safety front" and that "this record bas completely changed the
situation from what was obtained earlier, when we weren't in control of the situation."' 29
Health and safety remain industry-wide problems. Lungu and
Fraser found it improved in recent years, largely due to technical
advances; yet, substantial problems remain, because the privatization of the mines in the late 1990s and early 2000s allowed new
owners to bring in many contract or casual workers, whose firms
are often paid by how much tunnel they develop. 130 There have
been several studies of conditions at foreign-owned copper mines in
Zambia that have drawn conclusions about health and safety generally or about specific mines. NGOs that studied conditions at KCM
around 2()(J7 reported that
Some contract workers told us their firms had given them
insufficient equipment. .. underground workers said they
are meant to have two pairs of disposable gloves a week
but are given only one pair a month; and they often have
to buy protective clothing from their own meager wages.
The unions sbare this concern about the safety of contractors. NUMAW general secretary Albert Mando told us
that contracting firms 'do not put much interest on [contract workers') safety; they want to do the job, take the
money and forget about the safety of their workers'. Officials from the Mines Safety Department have also said
that the use of contractors is their biggest worry. 131
129. Interview. Gao Xiang. Luanshya, Aug. 17, 2011.
130. Lungu and Fraser, For Whom: 24. A UN report bas stated that "Casualization
has been described as one of the 'salient results' of privatization on tbe Zambian Copperbelt, with traditional •permanent' positions reportedly accounting for only half of all
mining jobs in the five major copper companies in 2fX)8. .. Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA), "Minerals and Africa's Development: the International Study Group
Report on Africa's Mineral Regime" 2011: 62, www.africaminingvision.org/amv•. J
AMV/ISG%20Report_ eng. pdf. "Contractors are paid 'by the meter', so some will driU
ahead in tunnels as fast as tbey can to maximize their wages. without stopping to properly reinforoe the roof sheets. leading to collapses and rock-falls." "Zambia Conned for

Copper," Azaonline. Dec. 4, 2011. www.azaonline.org{Jndex.php?option:com_content
&view---article&i(i;68:z.ambia·conned..for..copper&catid•3S:demo-oontent
131. Action for Southern Africa, et a!., "Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, Oet. 2007, www.actsa.org/Pictures/Uplmageslpdf/Undermining%20de
velnpment%20report.pdf. An NOO stated in 2007, abnut mines generally, tbat "Conditions on health and safety are of concern. Workers are given insufficient equipment or
nothing at all." Apotbeker, Foreign Copper: 63. citing " Annual Report 2007 Caritas

Ndola." The HRW reports devotes much attention to the failure of three of the four
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Another NGO did a study of. MCM, published in 2010, which stated
that
working conditions are difficult. 1n the mine they are described as "pathetic" due to the lack of ventilation and the
heat. A worker explained: "They will tell us to go ahead,
where there is no ventilation, as long as they're producing
. . . When there is an inspection, they show other parts
underground (than those not ventilated)." Many miners
complain of leg pain and respiratory problems . . . A study
in 2008 revealed however that in mines managed by the
company ... levels of silica in the air exceed rates authorized by US regulations. This means that emission controls
are insufficient, and that miners are ex~sed to greater
risks of lung diseases, especially silicosis. 32
A study by still another NGO of the (white) South African firm
Metorex's Chibuluma mine in Zambia concluded that
The company has no clear policy on occupational health
and safety. Union officials claim the company bas done
away with safety committees that used to be in place during the (state-owned) regime and now arranges ad hoc
safety meetings at sections underground . . . contrary to
(Tnternational Labor Organization] Convention 176. 133
CNMC firms to replace workers' personal protective equipment (PPE) more than an·
oually. According to a Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions spokesman. the failure
to even provide PPE is common in Zambian industry. "'Strikes are Avoidable: ZCfU,"
TP. Jan. 12, 2012. ZAN Baosen, general manager of Zambia·Olina Economic and
Trade Cooperation Zone Development Ltd., the firm managing the Chambishi MulliFacility Eoonomic Zone (MFEZ) where the Chambishi Copper Smelter is located. has
declared that MFEZ enterprise managers who allow workers to report for work without
the PPE issued to them will be fined. He noted that some workers leave their PPE at
home. others report it stolen when it was not been, and still others stU their PPE and
expect to be issued more. "Chinese Developer Speaks Tough on Safety Standards,"
TOZ, Dec. 26,2011. While dnmaged PPE should be replaced promptly, it is far.fetched

to claim, as HRW does.. that a failure to do so more than once a year. without cost to
the worker, necessarily amounts to a huma.n rights violation.
I32. Counter Balance. "The Mopani Copper Mine, Zambia: How European Development Money has Fed a Mining S<:andal," Dec. 2010: 16-17, www.oounterbalance-eib.
org/?1"'347.
133. Austin Muneku, "South African Multinationals in Zambia: the Case of
Chibuluma Mines, Pic." in Devan Pillay (ed.) South African MNCs Labour and Social
Performance, 2005: 258-283 (275), www.gurn.info/...lmining-africa-south·african·mo<slabour-and-society.
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No one, including CNMC, asserts there are no health and
safety problems in its Zambia facilities or that at these and other
mines such problems do not require urgent attention. Yet, a 2010
study monitoring the underground environmental in Zambian copper mines "revealed that very little is being done by the owners of
the mines to ensure a safe working environment for the miners ..."
and "that the current methods are not very effective and a number
of accidents that could have been avoided were recorded in the past
five years."134
Taking into account fatality figures and differences in the configuration of mines, there is no empirical basis for labeling CNMC
the worst in terms of safety. There is also a logical contradiction
between HRW's acknowledgment that safety at CNMC firms is being improved and its assertion (pp. 1-2) that these firms "have
tended to treat safety and health measures as trivial" and "appear
to be exporting abuses along with investment." In any case, HRW's
assertion of exporting abuse does not square with fatality rates in
China and Zambia. The assertion about trivialization not only ignores different structural conditions of mining development, but
also calls to mind hoary stereotypes, which have been around for
more than a century in the West and spread to Africa, that the Chinese are cruel and have a disregard for human life.' 3'
Such stereotypes are found in both contemporary Western
journalism about China-in-Africa and in the minds of Zambians influenced by the PF anti-Chinese campaigns. For example, workers
at Chambishi Mine told a researcher in 2008 that "the Chinese do
not value life because there are so many of them in China." 136 The
father of a worker injured in a 2010 shooting by two Chinese supervisors at a small, privately-owned Zambian coal mine told journalists that "The Chinese don't care about human life and do just what
they want." 137
Referring to the HRW report, then-Minister of Labor Fackson
Sharnenda "said the ruling party (PF) had been 'vindicated' for its
134. Nchimunya Olaamwe, et al., "An Assessment of Underground Mine Environ·
mental Monitoring Methods at Zambia's Copper Mines." Rtseorch Journal of Applied
Sciences 5:5 (2010): 345-351.
135. We extensively discuss past and present notions of Chinese cruelty and disregard for human life, including in Africa, in a paper in progress "Bashing the Ollnese:
Contextualizing Zambia's Collum Coal Mine Shooting," forthcoming in 2014 in the
Journal of Contemporary Chino.
136. Jamie Whitloelr., "Digging for Prosperity: Mining and Labor Practices in
Chambishi, Zamiba," unpub'd MSc thesis, Unive,.ity of Oxford, 2008: 9.
137. '1'he Dark Side of Coal," TP, Nov. 15,2010.
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hard stance on Chinese investment ahead of the polls." 138 Thus, the
PF now proclaims that the HRW report shows that it was right to
engage in years of anti-Chinese incitement. Judged by global reportage, the main result of the HRW report has been to bolster
anti-Chinese sentiment, rather than to improve safety in the mines.
B. The Wage Gap: Factoring in Contract Workers, Productivity
and Profits
The HRW report contends there is a large pay gap between
CNMCowned firms and other foreign copper mining investors, asserting that "Chinese copper mining companies offer base salaries
around one-fourth of their competitors' for the same work"
(p.24). 139 In contrast, in 2011, John Lungu compared miners'
CNMC mine salaries with those at MCM and KCM, the two largest
foreign-owned copper firms in Zambia.
MCM and KCM are the best payers among the mine owners. But the Chinese have responded to criticisms. The
lowest wage in Chambishi went up from 400,000 Kwacha
to Kl.S million and there've been later increments ... Chinese companies have not caught up completely with the
Western companies in terms of incomes in the mines, but
they're not lagging behind too much. There's been great
improvement. 14<l
A wage gap continues. It is explicable, however, in terms other
than the desire of CNMC - and by extension, Chinese enterprises
more generally, to export China's labor standards, as claimed by the
HRW report and larger China-in-Africa discourse. Factors that
mitigate and explain - but do not excuse- the wage gap, include
I38. ••we are Good Guy: China," OM, Nov. 9, 2011.
I39. Base salary or basic pay excludes subsidies for housing, transporl and medical
care that all foreign-owned mines pay in Zambia and that amount to much of miners'
IOta! income. Base salary or basic pay figures quoted are Iypically for the lowest paid
miner at a given firm. The HRW report itself contains contradictions and makes generalizations about pay not supported by the specifics it provides; for example, the report's
generalization that "Chinese copper mining companies offer pay base salaries around
one-fourth of their competitors' for the same work." This unqualified statement applies
only to CNMC processing plants. wbere only 20% of CNMC firm employees work and
which bave particular difficulty turning a profit. The report's wage annex differentiates

between pay in processing plan IS and mines. Large pay hikes at the CNMC processing
plants in 2012 have narrowed the difference in pay between these small enterprises and
the mines.

I40. Interview with John Lungu, Kitwe. Aug. IS, 2011.
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the presence of a much larger number of low-paid contract workers
at several non-CNMC mines 141and lower productivity and profits at
CNMC mines than at other foreign-owned mines in Zambia.
HRW did not taken these factors into account when comparing
wages at CNMC and other firms. Yet, as MUZ president Charles
Mukuka has observed, "It is common knowledge that undertakings
141. CNMC firm openotions on Dec. 31, 2011 had 10,716 workers. Contrary to a
common assumption, Chinese are only a small proportion: NFCA 3,433 (Chinese 388);
CLM 4,889 (Ch 458); CCS 1,995 (Ch 347) and SML 399 (Ch 47); total: Chinese 11.6%;
Zambians 89.4%. Yet, 732 of the 1240 Chinese were mine construction-exploration

firm workers who leave on project completion. In mine construction. lSMCC bad 1.320
workers (Cb 370; Zm 950) at CLM and 804 workers (Ch 212; Zm 592) at CCS. A mine
construction contractor at NFCA, Tongling Zhongdu, bad 90 Chinese and 205 Zambians; exploration firm Sinomine Resources had 60 Cllinese and 192 Zambians. "Web
Proof lnfonnation Pack, Chi.na Nonferrous Mining Corp. Ltd.," June 29, 2012: 185, III148-150, iis.aastocks.com/20120629A:)()1454807-0.pdf. As Zambia's Minisler of Mines
pointed out in 2011, "whenever there are big projectS being undertaken at any operation, there is an increased number of expatriates." Zambia Parliamen~ Debate, May 31,
2011, www.partiamenLgov.zm/index.pbp?option=CODLCOntent&task=view&id;;1440&
ltemid><U&limit-l&limitstart-4. Disregarding construction and exploration firm employees, CNMC employees were 6.3% Chinese (508 of 8,045), in acoord with CNMC's
claim that 6.3% (324) of its 5,137 direct employees in Zambia are Chinese and all others
Zambians. Ibid: 145, 181, 183. As of June 30, 2012, locals were 94% of all direct
CNMC employees in Zambia (6,194 total: 379 Chinese and 5,815 Zambians). See
China Nonferrous Mining Corp. Ltd, "2012 fnterim Report'': 25, http://nuodayir.com/
todayinlttachmenUtk/cltinanonferrous/attacbment/20120914170201001503963_en.pdf.
That ratio also acoords with local-to-Chinese ratios at large Otinese SOEs operating
abroad. See "Getting the Balance Right," Chlt~afrlca 4 (June 2012} (20:11ocal: Chinese
ratio at Sinohydro operations in Africa); "Chinese Firms Build Bridges witb Commurtities in Africa," ChinD Daily (CD), Nov. 3, 2011 (local: Chinese ratio 15:1 at China Road
& Bridge Co. in Kenya); "Annual Report 2011," China National Petroleum Corp.,
2012: 16 (non·Chinese 91% in CNPC overseas), www.cnpc.com.cn/enlpress/publica
tlons/annualreport/20111. Non-directly employed workers (5,579) at CNMC operations
in Zambia are "subcontractors' employees." Web Proof: 145. Most have the same con·
ditions as direct CNMC employees or else do ntine construction/exploration. Since
early 2011, most workers in NFCA's operations (1,907 [176 Chinese) of 3,433) work for

JCHX Mining Construction, a .. long·-term cooperative partner" of CNMC lbat does
mining at NFCA. "Otarnbisbi Copper Mine in Zambia, Africa (Under Construction),"
2011, www.tjskl.org.cnlproducts-search/czae93f5/cbambishi....copper..mine_in...zambia_
africa_under_construction-pz2709502.htrnl. NFCA said then that tbe transfer of its
mining workers to JCHX "was purely administnoth-e and ... would not in any way
disadvantage or alter the status quo of all the employees concerned in terms of conditions of service." JCHX workers' permanent and pensionable status seems to have not
been affected and they are part of labor contracts covering NFCA employees.
"Chambishi Workers End Strike," Plarts Metals Week, Jan. 24, 2011; "18 Miners Accused of Damaging Property at Otinese Nonferrous Metals in Zambia,• SteelGuru,
Feb. 22,2011. In contrast, many contnoct workers at non-CNMC mining firms do min-

ing. bul are paid much less than permanent miners.
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or employers have unique productivity and unit cost profiles and
their ability to pay differs from employer to employer, due to numerous factors." 142 Even after critiques of its report pointed out
these factors, 143 HRW still ignores the presence of large proportions of contract workers at non-CNMC firms who sharply diminish
average wages, as well as these firms' much higher levels of productivity and profitability compared to CNMC companies.

1.

Making Contract Workers Visible

Zambia's Vice President stated in 2005 that J&W, the then
Swiss owner of Luansbya, was the lowest payer in the copper mining industry.' 44 There were structural reasons for that and no one
has yet claimed that it reflected stereotypical Swiss financial probity. Luanshya was closed from 2000-2004, and from 2004-2008 financially-strapped J&W imposed a wage freeze.'•~ Thus, workers
could not progress up the pay scale and their pay was the lowest.
CNMC argues it has not been the lowest payer in Zambia's
copper mining industry and that pay is related to its mines' circumstances. NFCA's CEO stated in 2011 that "Our production scale is
fifth in the industry and our salaries are at mid-level, corresponding
to our position in the industry." He added that the firm's average
basic pay is about half that of KCM, the highest payer. 146 Former
Vice-CEO of CLM GAO Xiang had averred that average basic pay
there is about 80% of KCM's level. 147 CNMC's assertion that its
mines, where 80% of CNMC Zambian employees work, pay 50142. "Don't Take Advanl8ge of President Sata's Threat to Dismiss Civil Servants.
MUZ Cautions Employers," OM. Mar. 12, 2012.
143. See, e.g. our short essays "Barking up the Wrong Tree: Human Rights Wateh
and Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia," Pambazuka News No. 563, Dec. 14. 2011.
www.pambazuka.orglenlcategorylfeaturesl78660; "Gilded OuiSide, Shoddy Within: the
Human Rights Watch report on Chinese onpper mining in Zambia.'' Asia-Pacific Jour·
nal, Vol. 9, Dec. 26,2011, www.japanfocus.orgi·Yan-Hairong/3668; "Wrong Answers to
the Wrong Question: Response to HRW" Pambazuka News No. 568, Feb. 2, 2012, www.
pambazuka.orglen/category/ features/79602; "One Dog Barking Sets the Whole Street
A-barking," China-in-Africa: the Real Story. Feb. 7, 2012, www.chinaafricarealstory.
comi2012102Jhrw.meets<ritics·report-on ..chinas.btml.
144. '"Stop Employing Casual Workers,'" TOZ, May 6, 2005.
145. "Zambia Mining Making R()8ring Profits from the Sale of Copper," SteeiGuru,
Mar. 24, 2011.
146. NFCA CEO Wang Cbunlai and tile unions interviewed in "Zhongse Zanbiya
bagong shijian" (The Incident of Strike at NFCA in Zambia). Xin shi ji Nov. 7. 2011,
http:i/magazine.caixin.cn/2011·11.0S/100322640.html.
147. Interview. Gao Xiang, Beijing, Oct. 20, 2011.
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80% of what is paid at KCM contradicts HRW's claim of a larger
gap based on the companies' apparent wage scales.
The estimates of CNMC firm workers earning 50-80% of what
miners at the highest-paying KCM earn are because, unlike at
NFCA and CLM, workers at KCM (and at MCM and other mines,
as of 2011, and Lumwana, since 2010)148 include many low paid
contractors'. NFCA's CEO and the CLM Vice-CEO have said
however that almost all their firms' workers are permanent. 149
Comparisons about pay that fail to take into account the large numbers of contract workers at some mines, but not others, are
misleading.

Table 2: Permanent Employees and Contract Workers
("Contractors"), 2009-2011
Contractors %

FU11ls/Mines

Permanents

Contractors

Vedanta: KCM

9696 {2010)

11,081 {2010)

54

Glencore; MCM

ca. 8,250 {2011)

ca. 8,250 {2011)

50

FQM: Kansanshi

ca. 3,000 {2011)

ca. 1,000 {2011)

25

Equinox: Lumwana

1,347 {2009)

1,764 {2009)

57%

Metorex/Chibuluma

621 {2010)

222 {2010)

26%

Sources: 150
148. "Lumwana Reaches Deal," M<tals W«k, Jan. 25, 2010.
149. Except managers above age SO, who had contracts, and builders of new [acilities, wbo no firm regards as permanent. CNMC firms do bowever bite permanents
from among contract workers wben mine conslruction projects are finished. Wang
Chunlai and Gao Xiang August2011 interviews. From 2008, NFCA made the vast majority of its workers permanent. In that year, o( 2,062 employees {probably locals only)
were permanent; 167 were contract workers. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 41. In October, 2009, it was announced that CLM would hire 2,300-3,000 employees and that all
would be "pensionable." Zambian Parliament, Debate, Oct.!, 2009, www.parliament.
gov.un/index.pbp?option...,om_content&task=view&id=1022&Itemid=86&1imit=l&
limitstart=2. In early 20!0, CLM stated that 2,300 workers were permanent. "Labor
Laws should be Reviewed," TOZ. Jan. 8, 2010. The Deputy Minister of Labor noted in
2009 that at CNMC firms "only those that have passed the retirement age of 55 would
be engaged on special contracts of between two and three years. • "Chinese Firm to
Build $300USm Leach Plant," OM, Aug. !9, 2009.
ISO. Konkola Resources Pic, "Announcement of Initital P\lblic Offering on the
London Stock Exchange,": 2, s.d.Nov. 2010?, www.bloomberg.com/appslnews?pid=co
newsstory&lkr=VEO:LN&sidaamCdCrSNif4M; Rob Davies, ''The Other Face of
Glenoore Mining that Investors Never See," Daily Mail {UK), Nov. 21, 2011; Felix
Ngosa and James van Alstine, •·Seeking Benefits and Avoiding Conflicts: a CommunityCompany Assessment of Copper Mining in Solwezi, Zambia," 2011:23, www2.1se.ac.uk/
geographyAndEnvironmenthesearcb!Sustainable%20Syoergies/PublicationsiZambia%
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Regarding contract worker's wages, the HRW report (p. 119)
states that "government officials and business representatives told
(HRW) that the Ministry of Labor outlined in 2008 that subcontractors had to pay salaries that were at least 80% of that paid by the
main company to their permanent employees, reducing the previous disparity." In fact, according to MUZ, while Zambia's Ministry
of Labor did make such a proposal in 2008, the policy was never
implemented. 151 In 2012 the then-Minister of Labor "bemoaned the
high levels of casualization of labor in mining companies, saying the
Ministry of Labor will review labor laws to resolve the problem."152
Even in countries with laws requiring narrow contract-permanent worker pay disparities, the laws may not be enforced. For example, Thailand's labor code has, since 2008, required firms to pay
equal wages to "agency" workers doing the same jobs as permanent
workers. The law however has been "severely undermined" by
company practice, so much so that Thailand is now a focus of an
international confederation of unions' contract labor project. 153
With casualization so prominent in recent years and a huge gap
continuing to be seen between the wages and benefits of permanent

20Community-Company%20Assessment.pdf; Zambian Parliament, "Report of the
Committee on Economic Affairs and Labor ..• September 23, 2010,": 19, www.
parUarnent.gov.zm!index.php?option:com_docman&task;doc_view&gid=867;
"Equinox: Annual Report, 2009," 2010: 19, btlp:lica.hotstocked.comidocs/EQN/
equinoJLminerals_limitedlannua(Jeport/annual2010.pdf. See also "Mopani Copper
Mines." E-Biz Guides, s.d. (MCM has 17,600 worker.;: 8,200 "employees." 9,400
contract worker>}, s.d., 2011? www.ebizguides.com/ebizpartner.;_see.php?id_country_
sponsor.;=15&ebizpartnersid=336; "KCM Launches New SIOOm Concentrator," OM,
Jan. 20, 2012 (KCM has "over 22,800 permanent and contractor workers"). Before
J&W closed Luanshya in 2008, it bad 1,740 direct employees and 1,000 contract
workers. Apolheker, Foreign Copper: 99.
151. Telephone interview, Charles Mukuka, in Ndola, Dec. 20, 2011. See also
Mine Watch Zambia, Apr. 2008 (discussing proposal), bttp~/minewatchzambia.blogspot.
com/20Q8_()4_01_arcbive.btml.
152. "Expatriates Face 'Audit,'" OM, Jan. 8, 2012.
153. "Special Newsletter: Developments in the Global Contract and Agency Labor
Project," Sept. 15, 2010, www.icem.org/eni73-/Contract-and-Agency·Labour/400S.Special-Newsletter-Developments-in-the-Giobai-Contract-and-Agency-Labour-ProjeC1.
Lower·paid contract miners also exist in developed countries. Equal pay for contract
workers (50% of the workforce) and prevention of a seven·day-on, seven·day..off work
schedule were goals of a 2011 strike by BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Australian coal miners.
"Coal Miners Go on Strike in Queensland, Australia," The Militant, July 4, 2011, www.
themiUtant.com12011n524/752432.hlml.

THE CHINEse ARE THE WoRST?

39

and casual workers, the World Bank has come to consider casual
employment as part of the informal sector. 154
In Zambia, casuals seem to not be deemed as employees under
the law155 and "little has been done to compel mine owners to engage more permanent employees."156 In the 2008 presidential elections, the PF "promised laws that would compel mine owners to
respect Zambia's labor laws by hiring workers on a permanent basis, with full benefits. " 157 Casualization in mining continues however under the PF: in 2012, Copperbelt minister Davis Mwila still
had to "urge mining firms to employ workers on a permanent basis
to ensure development in the country,"158 as none of the promised
laws were enacted.159 The head of the United Mineworkers Union
of Zambia stated in 2012 that "There's been too much casualization
in our country in all sectors of the economy, and the mining sector
is no exception. 160
Researchers for a European NGO have stated that "When we
visited [Mopani'sJ Mufulira in 2009 and 2010, the miners confirmed
that their wages were still far from sufficient, and that those employed by sub-contractors could be paid as little as half the wages of
permanent employees, for the same work. " 161 The Deputy Commissioner of Labor said in 2011 that contract workers may get as little
154. Franco Barchiesi, "Informality and Casualitation as Olallenges to South Africa's Industrial Unionism: Manufacturing Workers in Ute East Rand/Ekurhuleni Region in the 1990s," African Studies Quarterly 11:2·3 (2010): 67-85
ISS. "Revised Labor Laws to Stimulate Production," TOZ. Dec. 24, 2012.
156. "Examining Zambia's Mining Industry," Consultancy Africa, Aug.2, 2010, www.
consultancyafrica.coml index.php7option"""'m...con1ent&view=article&id..499:examining-zambias-copper-industry·&catid=82:african·industry-a-business&ltemid=266. The
MMD government did "implore KCM to ensure that Ute mining firm employed people
on pensionable permanent jobs. "Veep Tells KCM to Give Zambians Key Positions."
TOZ, Jan. 12, 2007. It also launch an investigation in 2010 into KCM's use of cootract
workers, but nolbing seems to have come of it. See "Zambia Launches Probe into
KCM Outsourcing," Teoderslnfo. Aug. 23, 2010.
157. Neo Simutanyi, "Copper Mining in Zambia: Ute De\'lllopmental Legacy of
Privatization," Institute for Security Studies Paper 165, July, 2008: www.iss.co~za/
uploads IPAPER16S.pdf.
1S8. "CB Minister Urges Mines to End Casualisation," TOZ. Feb. 14,2012.

159. Casualization in fact remains common even in the few remaining prominent
Zambian parastatals, where some workers have been very long·term casuals and assur·
edly earn less than the minimum wage. See Zesco Casual Workers Protest," TP, Nov.
20, 2012; "Zesco Casuals Demand Minimum Wage," OM, Nov. 20. 2012.
160. "UMUZ Backs Sata's CaU for Permanent Jobs." TP, July 5, 2012.
161. Counter Balance, The Mopani: 17.
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as one-fourth the pay of permanent employees.' 62 A UK journalist
who interviewed MCM miners in 2011 found they were "typically
paid" three British pounds per day.' 63 That is only US$120
(K600,000) a month, too low a figure for regular MCM miners, who
earn several times that, but likely the basic salary of contract workers, who constitute half MCM's workforce. In 2011 also, the Labor
Ministry reported "[L]abor offices have recorded a number of reports, especially in areas such as Mopani Copper Mines and
Konkola Copper Mines, where several sub-contracted companies
have been paying below the Government's minimum wage requirements,"164 which was then only K419,000 or about $82 a month.16!
When KCM contract workers went on strike in October, 2011,
they stated that no contract worker was paid more than K500,000 or
about US$100 a month.'66 In 2012, striking Kansanshi miners demanded all workers be placed on "permanent and pensionable conditions of service as opposed to working on contract." 167 They
added that they were paid between Kl million-S million monthly,
indicating that the contract workers among them were likely receiv162. Siti interview. Zambia's minimum wage in 2011 was K419,00>. Contract workers paid that made less than one quarter of what most permanent employee miners
made.
163. Davies, The Other Face.
164. "Labor Ministry ·war-Front' Opens over Minimum Wages," TOZ, Oct. I , 2011.
165. The minimum wage for the lowest level .. general and shop workers,,. was increased in July, 2012. The lowest basic minimum wage was upped in January, 2011 from
K268,800 to K419,000. There was also severalaUowances: housing at 30%, i.e. 125,700,
transport at K102,000, lunch at K120.000 and subsistence at K19S.OOO. for a total of
K961,700. In 2012, the basic minimum wage rose to K700,000, plus housing at 210.000.
transport at K102,400, and lunch at 120,000, for a total of K1,132,400, representing a
17.7% increase. "Minimum Wages," MyWage.org/Zambia, 2011, http://m.mywage.org/
zambia/main/salary/ minimum-wage! minimum-wage-2011/new-minimum-wage-for·
zambian-worlc.ers-in-2011; "Domestic Workers in Windfall, Minimum Wage lncreased1'"
OM, July 12, 2012.
166. "KCM Contractors' Workers Down Tools." TP, Oct. 18,2011. See also Zambia
Conned for Copper ("Subcontracted laborers at Vedanta's KCM mine receive an average of £63 a month [$95], but often less"); "Konkola Copper Mines, Zambia," www.
banktrack.org, Apr. 18, 2011, ("some sub-contracted skilled laborers [claim) they are
paid as little as £37 per month"), www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydealslkonkola _copper
_ minesl_blank.
167. "Miners Paralyze Kansanshi Ops." TOZ.Jan. 3. 2012. There were no such de·
mands raised at CNMC firms during Zambia's strike wave from fall 2011 through win·
ter 2012. For example, the principle demands of miners at NFCA were salaries equal to
those paid at KCM, standardization of grading of miners. and the localization of some
jobs being done by Otinese. "Government Directs NFCA to Increase Salaries," TP,
Oct. 11, 2011. As discussed herein, the salaries gap with KCM was subsequently
narrowed.
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ing half or less than half of what permanent employees' were being
paid.168 CLM's Deputy CEO and its Zambian Human Resource
Manager have both stated that before CNMC got Luanshya in
2009, contract workers there were paid half of what permanent
workers made. 169 According to Hamilton Musenga, a longstanding
MUZ activist at Luanshya, "the new [CNM~ owners ... have increased wages, in some cases fourfold ..." 1
When it is taken into account that CNMC mines employ only
permanent workers and that KCM, MCM and other larger firms
employ contract workers who are paid low salaries, the actual wage
gap between Chinese-owned firms and these much larger ones diminishes significantly. The HRW report however bases its conclusion on the apparent wage scales differential, ignoring the impact
on average basic pay of actual workforce compositions in these
firms.
2. Productivity Differences
CNMC's NFCA and CLM together produced 4.5% of
Zambia's copper output in 2010, but had 10.5% of the foreignowned mines' total workforce. Their productivity is significantly
lower than industry averages in both Zambia and China.

168. "Strike Halts FQM Copper Production; DM, Jan. 3, 2012. The strikes also
stated that some expatriate managers earned Kl5().250m a month, i.e. about $30,000·
$50,000. Ibid.
169. Gao Xiang interview, Oct. 20, 20U; Chola interview. Permanent workers are

largely unionized; contract workers are not. Pay for contract workers may however be
specified in union contracts; at NFCA in 2008, basic salary for the lowest paid contract
worlr.er was about half that for the lowest paid permanent worker. Apotheker, Foreign
Copper: 59.
170. "Hig)l Hopes for Zambia's Copperbelt Ghost Town," Mail & Guardian (South
Africa), July 23, 2010.
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Table 3: Productivity and Wa.ges in China, Zambia,
NFCAand CLM
Country or
Company

Copper
produced
(tons)

No. of
Workers

Productivity
(ton/
person)

China (2009)

l,(XX),()(X)

76,769

13

Zambia (2010)

676,198

55,000

12.3

NFCA (2011)

23,243

3500

6.6

$229-$485
($334
average)

CLM (2011)

18,680

2350 (in
mining)

7.9

$358-$712

Monthly Wage
$398
(average)

Sources 171

As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, except for CNMC, other major copper
mining firms in Zambia are all near, above, or far above the average in terms of productivity. The two CNMC mines are the only
ones far below the average; even more so if one uses the 2010 Zambian government figures of 22,0:>0 tons for NFCA and 10,000 tons
for CLM.

Table 4: Productivity in non-CMMC Foreign-owned
Copper Mining FIJ1IIS
F'lnns/Mines 2010

Total Employees

2010Tons
Copper

2010Tons/
Worker

Vedanta: Konkola

2o.m

217,000

10.4

Glencore: Mopani

16,500

198.000

12.0

17,000

20.2

Metorex: Chibuluma

843

Equinox: Lumwana

3,800

147,000

38.4

FQM: Kansanshi

4,000

233.000

58.3

Sources 172
171. Shang, Sustainable Devel opmen~ China Data Online (2011), "Copper Ores
Mining & Dressing/Basic Condition," China Yearly Industrial Data, All China Data
Center. sourced from National Statistics Bureau; Wang Otunlai interview, Interview,
GAO Xiang, Executive Vice General Manager, CNMC International Trade Ud.,
Beijing, Oct. 21. 2011; Ministry of Mines. 2010 Mineral Production tables: Interview. Hu
Aibin, Company Secretary, China Nonfenous Mining Corp. Lid, Beijing, November 27,
2012.
172. 2010 Mineral Production; Konkola Resources Pic, Announcement, "KCM not
Decided on Next Step Towards IPO Yet," Steel Guru, May 27, 2011; "Giencore
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In copper mining, differences in the mineral contents level of
mining concessions greatly affect productivity. CNMC concessions
have a low content, which they have to extract from deep underground.t73 An NFCA engineer told us that "With 1.8% copper
content, the former [owner] didn't think it was worth their while to
mine it. 1.8o/o in Zambia is considered a tail mine. They don't think
it was worth their effort if it's lower than 3o/o. Other mines had 4o/o
or So/o."t 74 Mines with lower copper content are more labor intensive, require greater extractive effort and incur higher cost of production. A mining giant had abandoned Chambishi mine and
NFCA's Vice-CEO GAO Xiang commented on how his firm revived it:
Anglo-American had given up on this mine because it
couldn't go further in here. They were very dogmatic and
didn't adapt conventional methods. NFCA found a way to
explore this mine by adapting conventional methods to local geological conditions, but it requires labor intensive
work underground. We managed to improve the mining
efficiency by working harder. "t75
Besides copper content, the other major factor in productivity
is whether a mine is OC or UG. A study of productivity in Australian mining has noted that for its growth, "An increase in the use of
open-cut mining has been a key development," that became economic after the discovery of solvent extraction-electrowinning

ForecasiS 23% Increase in Mopani Copper Output in 2015," Metals Bulletin, Apr. 15,
2011; "More Jobs Coming at Lumwana." TradeMark Southern Africa, July 2 2010,
www.trademark.sa.orgl news/more-jobs-coming-lumwana; Zambian Parliamenl,
Committee on: 19;Ngosa and van Alstine, Seeking Benefits: 23. "Kansan
173. CLM's Baluba mine reportedly bas a1-2% copper contenL Pan and Forgacb,
Going Global: 4.3.1.

174. Interview, Section Engineer Xu, Cbambis:hi, Aug. 23, 2008. Tailings are materi·
als left over after most copper bas been removed from ore and are profitably extracted
when copper prices are high.
175. Interview, GAO Xiang, August 19,2008. Due to low copper content and depletion, NFCA bas never been able to come close to producing the 38.ooot pe.r year that
Chambisbi mine was said to produce before its closure in 1985. See "State Firm Buys
Zambian Mine," South China Morning Post, July I, 1998. In the first half of 2012, it
produced 12,600t. "China Nonferrous Mining Corporation Ltd. Announces 2012 ln·
terim Results," Aug. 29, 2012, http://bk.todayir.com/enlpress_pop.pbp?id:l23307&1ang
•O&tYP""l. KCM produced seven times that amount (86,0001) in the same period.
"KCM in 20% Copper Production Rise," TP, Oct. 18, 2012.
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methods of ore extraction, which enabled metal to be produced
from lower grades of ore.176
There is a world-wide tendency for highly productive enterprises to pay higher wages than less productive ones. For example,
productivity and wages in China and Zambia are very low by the
standards of some other copper producing countries. Chilean miners produce about 100 tons each per annum. 177 The same appears
to be true in Peru, where at the major Antamina mine in 2010, productivity was a lso 103 tons per worker, 178 fourteen times the average at CNMC mines. Yet, although the industry average pay for
Peruvian miners (including benefits) is some $30 per day; 179 the average pay for the much less productive CNMC miners is not far
below at about $23 a day. In 2005, US copper miners produced an
average of 150 tons.' 80 In 2009, Canada's Highland Valley Copper
(HVC) feroduced 118,000 tons with 880 employees or 134 tons per
worker, st more than twice the level of productivity of the Canadian-owned K.ansanshi mine in Zambia, more than ten times the
China or Zambia average, and about eighteen times the average at
CNMC mines in Zambia. Basic salaries for HVC miners in 2011
were $5,700 a month or some fourteen times that at CNMC Zambia
mines.ta2
176. Vernon Topp. et al., "Productivity in the Mining Sector: Measurement and In·
terpretation," Australian Productivity Commission. 2008: xiv, SS, http://www.pe.gov.au/
_data/assetslpdLfilel0005/84911/mining·productivity.pdl
1n. "Mining Industry Woos Five Billion in Past Decade," TOZ, Mar. 16, 20I2. See
also What Would it Take: 7 ("In Chile, annual production of copper per worker is al·
most seven times greater than in Zambia. A difference of this magnitude cannot be
explained solely by variables like scale, nature of resources and better equipment").
I 78. "Antamina," 2012, bttp://es. wikipedia.org/wiki/Antamina.
179. Amos Irwin and Kevin P. Gallagher, "Chinese Investment in Peru: a Compara·
tive Analysis," Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas.
Discussion Paper no. 34, Dec. 2012: 14. http:Jiwww.cbinaafricarealstory.com/2012/12/
chinese-mining·investment-in-peru-in.html.
180. "Copper Ores: SIC 1021," ffighbeam Business, s.d., bttp:/lbusiness.highbeam.
com/industry·reportslmining/copper-ores.
181. "Highland Valley Mines," 2011, www.informine.com/minesite.asp?sitechvc.
182. "Highland Valley Workers Approve 'Unprecedented' Five-Year Contract,"
Kamploops Daily News (Canada), Oct. 17, 2011. Due to relatively high wages, "labor
costs for mines in developed countries account for around 40 percent of the total,

whereas 20 percent is more typical in developing economies. The proportions for . . .
Zambian copper miners are more typical of de••eloped economy mines." ..Cost Inflation
to Bite Miners' Results in 2013," Fitch Ratings, Nov. 29,2012. http://www.Citchratings.
comigws/en/fitchwire/fitcbwirearticle/Cost-lnflation·to?pr_id=775683. At NFCA, labor
costs are 25-30% of the total cost of production, while in mines in China, labor costs are
10.20% of total production cost. Interview, WANG Chunlai, Chambishi, Aug. 13,2012.
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Productivity in China's copper mines is generally a bit higher
than in Zambian copper mines, but substantially higher than at
CNMC mines in Zambia. If, as HRW alleges, CNMC merely exports to Zambia the labor standards of China, where the more productive mines pay better than less productive ones,' 83 CNMC
would pay much lower wages in Zambia than it pays in mining in
China. CNMC's salaries in Zambia are however about the same as
those paid at copper mines in China (see Table 3).'84
3.

Profits Large and Small

In late 2010, a Wall Street Journal article observed that "The
mining industry is printing money: Citigroup expects it to have aggregate net cash of $70 billion by the end of 2012." 1ss
Among the foreign-owned mining enterprises in Zambia however, some firms are printing much more money than others and
that affects wage levels. The continuing wage gap reflects sharp differences in profit levels between CNMC mines and the larger foreign-owned mines and that profit levels are correlated with frrm
size.
Everywhere in the world, ceteris paribus, large enterprises can
and most often do, pay workers much more than substantially
smaller enterprises. The size of the enterprise often is a critical factor in both pay and working conditions. 186 The US garment industry
is a good example. There were 350,000 US garment workers in the
early 2000s, down from a million in 1950. 187 Only 8% have a union
183. See David Creedy, et at., "Transforming China's Coal Mines: a Case History of
the Sbuangliu Mine." Na1ura/ RtSOiltUS Fomm 30:1,2006: 15-26; Wright, The Political
Economy: 152.
184. Bven if any given Chinese firm did reflexively pay in Zambia or otber African
countries what it pays in Cbina that would generally be a boon to African workers, as
..African workers cost one--fifth of the price of their Cbinese counterparts." ••Chinese
Companies Bring Job5to Africa," CD, Apr. 22, 2012. In any case foreign companies do
not invest in Zambia mainJy because of low wages. as ..Zambia's low wages offer no
advantages to investors. because tbey are offset by low productivity." "Zambia Investment Qinuue Assessment," World Bank, 2005: 1-2, www·wds.worldbank.orglservlel/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/lB/2005/10/031000090341_20051003144616/Rendered/PDF/
336750AfTPSOnotel5.pdf.
185. "BHP's Problem is Caterpillar's Opportunity." WSJ, Nov. 16,2010.
186. In the Chinese context, see XUB Hong. "Local Strategies of Labor Con trot a
Case Study of Three Electronics Factories in Olina," lnremationol Labor and Working

Class History 73 (2008):85· L03.
187. Robert Ross, Slaves 10 Fashion: Poverty and Abuse in lhe Ntw Sweatshops (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004):
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contract. 188 In Los Angeles in 1993, some 120,000 garment workers
labored in 5,000 factories, an average of 24 workers per factory. 189
By 2005 however, the average Los Angeles garment factory had
only 12 workers. 190 Hourly wages in 2008 among workers (le~al and
underground) in Los Angeles garment shops averaged $3.28. 91 The
US's largest garment factory, American Apparel, with about 5,000
workers, is also in Los Angeles. The finn has 10,000 employees
world-wide, 275 stores in 20 countries, and earned $545 million in
revenue in 2008.192 It pays its factory workers $10-12 an hour,193 yet
its owner emphasizes that "American Apparel is not an altruistic
company. I believe in capitalism and self-interest." 194 This self-described "hyper-capitalist" firm pays more because its size permits it
to do so. By paying higher than average wages, its owner creates
low turnover among the mainly skilled and semi-skilled workers
and maintains his enterprise as a non-union shop. 195
The same logic applies in Zambia's copper industry. GAO Xiang has stated,
We know that KCM pays more than we do. But to use
KCM as the bench mark is like comparing a small-time
trader to a billionaire. [I] remember that in 2005 KCM's
profit was 10 times that of NFCA. KCM's profit is US$450
million, while NFCA's is US$45million. Is their workers'
wages 10 times of our workers? 196
Zambia's most productive copper operation in 2010, the Canadian-owned Kansanshi mine, had net sales of $1.66 billion and an
operating profit (net sales minus operating expenses, before inter188. Liza Featlterstone, "The Ten Worst Jobs in America," AlterNet. Sep~ 13,2005.
www.altemet.org/module/ printversion/24927.
189. Riehard Applebaum and Edna Bonacieh, A Tale of Two Citi<?s: the Garment
bulu.srry in Los Angeles (L.os Angeles: Repor1 to the Haynes Foundation 1993).
190. Natalie Allen. " DPCS Internship Stories and Reflections," s.d. (2005?), www.
• dartmouth.edu/-tucker/ tellowshipsldpcsinternshipslnatalie-allan.htmiM<>stl..os Angeles. Moot LA garment factories are sweatshops: 67% do not comply with minimum
wage and overtime laws; 98% do not abide by health and safety eodes. Ibid.
191. "Pop-Ups: Fair Trade Shop Debuting Thursday." Racked LA. Dec. I , 2008.
192. Jim McEigunn, "Canada's Entrepreneurs of the Decade," Profit (28:6 Dec.
2009/Jan.2010):46.
193. " Broken in USA," NYT, Oc~ I. 2009.
194. McEigunn, Canada's.
195. See "Benign Clothing Capitalist." B~tsiness and Finance (June 30, 2005).
196. Ibid.
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est and taxes) of $997 million. 197 Higher copper prices in 2011 resulted in Kansanshi paying $611 million in taxes, of which 85% or
$519 million was corporate tax. Zambia's corporate profits tax rate
is 30%, based on profits declared after deducting costs, as well as
royalties, then paid as 3% of the value of copper ore produced.
That implies that Kansanshi's 2011 operatin~ profit was much
higher than the near $1 billion earned in 2010. 98
In contrast to Kansanshi's high profitability, CNMC's NFCA
reportedly had a 2010 profit of about $40 million. 199 NFCA's profits
began in 2005, seven years after CNMC bought Chambishi mine.
The firm stated in 2011 that it had made a total about $200 million
in profits over the years, which it had reinvested at Chambishi.200
Given that productivity at CNMC's other mine, CLM, is about the
same as Chambishi (see Table 3), profits there are likely to be no
higher than at NFCA. CLM's CEO has said production costs at its
main (UG) Mine, Baluba, are so high it has been working at a loss,
with profits on11:, expected from 2012 onwards from its new OC
Mulyashi Mine. 1 In five years of tax-paying till 2011, FQM's re197. See "ZCCM·IH Presentation: 15 June 2011," http://forum/about=mih.com/
viewtopic .php?f=78&t .,i,747. FQM has much h.igher shareholder returns than even
the largest mining companies in the world. See FQM, "Investor Presenlation, Novem·
ber, 20ll: slide 3, "Shareholder Presentation www.slideshare.netiFirstOuaotum/ inves-

tor-presentation-november-2011.
198. "First Quantum Pays more than US$600m in Taxes to Zambia," Steel Guru,
Dec. 6, 2011. FQM said in early 2012 that it produces 700t of copper and has $5m in
sales a day, i.e. $7,143 per ton. ''Kansanshi in $10m Loss as Strike Bites," TOZ, Jan. 5,
2012. The cost of production in 2011 was $1.15/lb., i.e. $2,535 a ton; production was
about 250,000t. "First Quantum Profit Ufted by Higbe.r Copper Price," Business Day,
May 10, 2011. After a four day strike in 2012, Kansanshi sued the heads of the ZCTU
and PF in Solwez.i for $20m for allegedly inciting workers to strike, claiming that it lost
$5m a day during the strike. ''Kansanshi Mining Sues ZCTU and PF Officials over
Strike," TP, Mar. 27, 2012.
199. Zhang Zhe, "Oiaoyue zhengyi de Feizhou kaifa: Zhongguo zai Zambiya zhenshi cunzai" (Beyond the controversy of Africa's Opening up: Olina's actual situation in
Zambia), Nanfang Zhuomo, Nov. 4, 2010. CNMC bas reported that for 2009, it derived
from Africa $34.3m of its S696m in revenues; for 2010. it was $22Am of $1.36b and for
2011, $38.8m of $1.28b. Web Proof Information Pack: 2.
200. Han and Shen, China's Harsh Squeeze. Profits in relation to taxes are another
matter, however. According to Deputy Minister of Finance Miles Sampa, as of 2012
..All mining companies in the country $8\'e for First Quantum•s Kansanshi Mines are
still recording losses." "Zambian Revenue from Mines Up by 46 Percen~" SteelGuru,
June 6, 2012.
201. Interview, Luo Xing'En, CEO, CLM, Luansbya, August 17, 2012. CNMC has
indicated that all the firms it owns in Zambia together made a $118m profit before tax
and $103m profit after tax in 201 l . CNMC. "Global Offering,• July 25. 2012: 285, 259.
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ported total was $1.6 billion;202 in about the same period of taxpaying, CNMC firms' reported total was $90 million.203
Like other mining companies, CNMC firms have made investments that diminish profits. Investment levels of CNMC firms, in
relation to their output, may however have been quite high, however. The observation of a Consultancy report on this score may not
be far off the mark: "The majority of investments in the copper
mining sector originate from the Chinese owned CNMC."204 Major
expenses began with the costs of rehabilitating Chambishi Mine,
closed for 13 years and flooded before CNMC acquired it. NFCA
spent $132 million restoring it.20s NUMA W's president told us in
2008 that "NFCA's production cost is high, as it had to reconstruct
an abandoned mine. In other mines, such as Kansanshi, there is an
open pit that is not deep and there is naked copper on the top.
NFCA is not making much profit. KCM and Mopani have higher
profits. " 206
A World Bank analysis involving Zambian copper mining
noted that
Production costs can differ significantly between mines,
depending on the type of mine and nature of the deposit
... A mine's cost production is a function of the resource
(the quality of the ore, its depth, etc.) and the extent to
which the most accessible resources have been exploited.
The depletion of resources at the older mines means that
they now need to mine at considerable depth and distance
from the mine head, leading to high costs. 207
The CNMC mines are old and with relatively low ore quality
and, as discussed above, through 2011 CNMC's Chambishi and
Luanshya facilities were both UG mines, while all other firms had
either OC or a mix of OOUG mining operations. Operating costs
are significantly higher in UG mines than in OC mines. As a leadhllp://m.todayir.comltodayirauachment_hkltodayir/auacbment/201206201044044_en.
pdf.

202. '"Kansanshi Pays about K8bn in Taxes Daily: Oen 01inkuli."" TP, Dec. 28,2011.
203. "'CNMC Making Massive Zambia Investment Increase:· CD. Nov. 22. 2011.
204. Denine Walters. '"Examining Zambia's Cnpper Industry."" Cnnsultaney Africa.
Aug.2, 2010, www.consultancyafrica.comlindex.php?option;com_content&view=article
&id=499:examining·zambias..copper-industry-&catid=82:african-industry·a-business&
ltemid ~266.

205. Fraser and Lungu. For Whom: 48.
206. Interview. Mundia Sikufele. [(jtwe, Aug. 27. 2008.
207. What would it Take: Z.
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ing textbook on mineral processing technology observes, mining
costs "vary enormously a.nd are mucb higher for underground
mines tban for open pit operations......, On average, UG operations
are more than three times the cost of OC operations. The difference in productivity of course negatively impacts profits, wbicb in
turn negatively impacts wages.209
NFCA also spent $160 million to develop its West Ore Body,
commissioned in 2011.2 t 0 By 2012, it bad sourced $832 million for
its Southeast Ore Body, scbeduled for commissioning in 2016 and
set to employ 5,000 Zambians.211 By late 2011, NFCA had spent
$500 million on Chambisbi's Multi-Facility Economic Zone
(MFEZ).212
Altogether, NFCA reckons that it bas invested $1.4 billion.2l3
In contrast, substantially more productive KCM and MCM did not
invest much more (see Table 6). CLM spent $74 million to rehabilitate and refurbish equipment a.nd machinery at Luanya mine, neglected by previous owners a.nd closed after J&W abandoned it in
2008. It is spending $400 million to expand Baluba mine and construct Mulla.shi mine a.nd invested $340 million in its smelting facility CCS. 2 '
208. Barry Wills, et al. Wills' M'meral Prrx:csing T«hnology. 7th ed. (Ollford: Butterworth·lfeineman. 2006): 22.
209. K. Shahrior, "Effective Factors Investigation in Choice Between Surface and
Undcraround Mining. Vllth International Conference SOEM, Sophia, Bulgaria, Apr.
27, 2007, http://uut.academia.edufEueddinBokbtavar/ Papers/915012/EffeetivcJDCton_jnvestigation.Jn_choice_betweeuurface_and_underground_mining.
Zambia's Vice President Guy Soon bas oommented, when discu.sing the insufficiency
of job creal ion in mining, thai "You use tbese enormous machines in open cas1 mining
to tear tbe rock of the hole and $tick it in a lorry to take it away. tOO tons 01 a time. It is
""'Y automaled. Some of it is even run by GPS and all you've &ot is 10me chap sittin&
there, read•na a eomJC boot, 10 press the te<l button should sometbin& co awry." "Guy
Soot~ Vice Presklent, ZambU," FT Busit>ea, This ,. Arria. Sept. 2012.
210. "NFCA to Invest S600m in Geology." TOZ. Nov. JO, 2010.
211. "NFCA Annual Copper Prnd.uctioo Riles." TP, June 12. 2012.
212. "NFCA Spends USSSOOm on MFEZ." M<flll World, Jon. 2009: 30. Zambia<llina Economic and Tl'lcle Co-operation Zone (ZCCZ), a firm allJCd wilh CNMC. has
said it bas expended $130m of buildings. -oads. power mtions, etc. in the MFEZ.
"$130m Pumped .nto O.ambisbi Economic: Zone," OM, Dec. 25, 20ll. For a brief
overview of Zambia's MFEZ's, two of which are run by ZCCZ.. see OECO Investment
Policy Revlews:47
213. NFCA 10 Invest.
214. Zombi• Review 201l, no. 12: 48, Sl www.scribd.eomfdoc/6426208l/Zambia·Revicw·2011·12.
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Table 5: Other Foreign-owned Mining Firms 2010 Operating
Profits Compared to NFCA's
2010Tons

(24,000)

Operating
Profits 2010

Op. Profits
x NFCA's
S40m

CUx
NFCA's CU

Company/Mine

cu

FQM/Kansanshi

233,000

9.7

$997m

24.9

Vedanta!KCM

217,000

9.0

$309m

7.7

Equinox!Lumwana

147,000

3.7

$529m

13.2

Metorex/Chibuluma

17,000

.71

S47m

1.2

CNMC CEO LUO Tao has said it incurred great costs in restoring Luanshya in one year, at the unions' request, rather than
two years, as planned.216 MUZ's President confirmed that "the Chinese owners of Luanshya are speaking truthfully about their need
to buy equipment because, while Luanshya was shut down, its
equipment was taken by the fo1mer owners or vandalized. The new
owners had to buy a whole new set of equipment." 217 The substantial expenditures of CLM may explain why there is no indication
that it made a profit in 2010.
Outlays for CNMC mines have been very large compared to
those made at the one almost comparably-sized copper mine in
Zambia, Chibulumba (see Tabie 6).
CNMC's firms play the principle part in making China the
third largest investor in Zambia.218 The company's investment in
215. Table 4 and "KCM Records t;.S. $309 Million Profit," TOZ. May 6, 2011;
"Equinox Records U.S. $529m Profit," TP, Mar. 11, 2011; "Metorex Increase Copper
and Cobalt Output at the End of 2010," Steel Guru, June 16, 2011; "CNMC Kicks of
Production at Copper Mine in Zambia," CD, Nov. 28,2010. MCM has had no declared
profit for some years and is being investigated for w evasion. See Erin Torkelson.
"Copper and Capital Flight: How Corp<>rate Debt Becomes Public Debt," The African.
org. July 2011, www.the·african. org!btoy?p=546. II did declare profits of $6.8 million
in 2003, $85.7 million in 2004 and $28.1 million in 2005 and was then the only foreign·
owned mining firm to do so. "Mine Investors Cheating on Dividends: Committee,"
TOZ. Aug. 21, 2007. Chibuluma wu more profitable in earlier years on less
production. Its 2008 profit was $118m oo 14,600t of copper. Southern Africa Resource
Watch, "Impact of the Global F'mancial Crisis on Mining in Southern Africa": 82,
Metorex Group, "COmpetent Person's Report . . ." 2010:23, www.metorexgroup.coml
...!Metore>LCPR_Chibuluma.
216. Interview, LUO Tao, Beijing. Oct. 18, 2011.

217. Mukuka interview.
218. Kopinski and Polus: 184.
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Zambia totaled some $2 billion by 2011.219 Yet, in 2011 CNMC
mines J,roduced only about one-sixtb the copper produced by
KCM, whose investment was not much more than CNMC's.
Table 6: Foreign Mining Firms: Investment, 2011 CU Prod. & %
of 2011 CU Production
Company/Mine

Total Investment

2011 Prod.

Vedanta/KCM

$2b-2.5b

200,000

23.5

Glencore/MCM

$2b

204,000

24.0

FQM!Kansanshi

$3b

230,000

27.0

%Total Prod.

Equinox, Barri.ck/Lumwana ca. $1.5b

152,000

17.9

Metorex/Chibuluma

$157m (1997-2015)

17,000

2.0

CNMC/NFCA + CLM

$2b ($2.5b by late
2013)

42,000

5.0

Sources221 N.B.: Table's CU production total is 851,000 tons. Zambia's CU
production in 2011 was 869,000 tons, the difference accounted for local SME
miners' production. "Zambia to become World's Ftfth Top Copper Producer by
2015," Tenderslnfo, July 11, 2012.
219. Zambia's Investment CNMC has stated that from 2011-2015 it will invest another $2b. "Zambia 2016 Copper Producti:>n Could Reach 1.6 Million Tons," China
Mining, Jan. 7, 2012, www.gongehang.comlafricafmdustryttends/201Ul1.()7m65.bnnl.
It has also said it will invest $1.65b from 2012-2016. SRK Consulting, ''Technical Assessment Report of CNMC's Copper Properties in Copperbelt Province, Republic of
Zambia," Mar. 2012: IIT-17, www.hkexnew$hkllistedon/.. JECHlNANONFER-201205
14-22.pdf.
220. The CNMC mines do not even supply most of the Zambian copper imported by
China. Even had all the 42,000t it produced in 2011 been sold to China, that would
have been less than a third of thel32,162t ol Zambian copper imported into China that
year. "CNMC Eyes HK Listing for Africaa Copper Assets," Interfax China, May 15,
2012, www.interfax.cn/node/20237. 01 coune, it should not be surprising if CNMC did
ship much of the copper it produces to China, given that China uses 43% of the world's

copper production. "·Global Copper Production under Stress." Proactive Investors,
Nov. 9, 2012.
221. "China Non-ferrous Metal Mining to Invest USD 2 bin in Zambia in 2011·
2015," Xinhua, Nov. 11, 2011; "KK Commends Vedanta's $25bn KCM Investment,"
TOZ, Feb. 4, 2012; "KCM Boasts of $2bn Investment," TP, Dec. 21, 2011; "Otencore
Comments on Mopani Tax Payments," June 2, 2011, www.glencore.com/ documents/
Glencore_Comments_On_.Mopani.pdf; "Zambia Set lor l.Sm Tonnes Copper Output,"
TOZ, July 9, 2012; "Metorex Investor Visit to Chibuluma Mine," Apr. 15, 2008, www.
metorexgroup.coml.. JEMounsey-080416%20ChibVisit(I].pdf; "Technical Report on
the Lumwana Mine, North-Western Provbce, Republic of Zambia," Roscoe Postle
Assoc., Mar. 16, 2012, www.sec.gov/Arehi•esledgar/data/7568941000119312512137665/
d324012dex99J.htm; "$1 Bn Lumwana Project Raises Zambian Hopes of Resuscitating
its Economy," Mining Weeki)' (MW), May 1, 2009; Barrick Gold Increases Investment
in Zambian Mine," Xinhua, Aug. 4, 2011; "Kan$8nshi Operation Sheet," FQM, 2012: 4;
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Some $6 billion in FDI flowed into Zambian mining from 20002010,222 only $1 billion of it from the initial privatizations.223 Thus,
CNMC's investment amounted to some one-third of the total FDI
in Zambian copper mining, yet CNMC's mines contributed only
about 5% of Zambia's total copper production. Such disproportions obviously inhibit the payment of wages at the levels of more
productive and profitable firms.

4.

Other Factors Affecting Wages

There are additional factors that explain the wage gap. Government policy has also been a factor in explaining the wage gap.
NUMAW's Chambisbi Mine chairman told us in 2008 that
The Government is responsible for the slow pay rise. It
issues a bench mark every year and dictates the percent·
age of increase, for example 15%. It announced that the
inflation rate in 2fXJ7 is 9.8%. The government is actually
afraid that much of an increase in wages will destabilize
the single-digit inflation. The management relies on the
government bench mark to negotiate pay raises \vith
workers.224
Indeed, in 2012, MUZ President Munyunyembe confirmed that in
the past the MMD government"gave them (mine owners] the right
to increase only up to 11 percent .. ." 225
After the PF government came to power in 2011, Sata also
adopted a policy of calling on companies to not increase salaries at
a rate higher than inflation, which in early 2012 was 6.4 o/o per anwww.first-quantum.oomfTheme!FirstQuantum/mesldoc_downloads/Kansanshi..April%
20..2012-FINAL.pdf; "Zambia's Copper Assets Intend to List in HK. Raising over $1
Bo,"' AAstocks.oom, Feb. 7. 2012. www.aastocks.oomlenlnewslhk6/61/oow.472557.html;
"China/Zambia Economic Relations wit~ Zhou Yuxiao," ABN Digital, June 19,2012.
www.abndigital.com/page/multimedialvideolbeyond·markets/1229383-ChinaZambia·
Economic-Relations·witb-Zbou-YuXiao; .. Olinese Mining Firm to List its Copper
Assets in Hong Kong." TP, Apr. 18, 2012.
222. OECD Investment Policies Review: 30~ Hu interview. CNMC's S2b investment
is a sizeable part of the 2012 $3.4b stO<k of Chinese investment in Zambia. China/
Zambia Economic Relations. The firm projects that by the end of 2013, its S2.5b invest·
ment will provide more than 20,000 jobs. Chinese Mining Firm.
223. Anthony Ruffini, "The Revival of Zambia's Copper Mining Sector," Engineer·
ing & Mining Journol 207:2 (2006): 39-4l (39).
224. Interview, Mubanga Gillan, Chambishi, Aug. 27. 2008.
225. "Miners Paralyze Kansanshi Operations." TOZ. Jan. 4. 2012.
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num. 226 Commerce, Trade and Industry Minister Bob Sichinga has
stated that "Sata wanted salary increments that did not go beyond
inflation levels because that would create cost-push inflation and
whatever would be paid to the workers would be washed away.'>227
MUZ President Munyenyembe also stated that the "Government's
stance that the unions and management should use the prevailing
inflation rate as the basis for negotiations has complicated the collective bargaining process.'>228 CNMC firms in 2012 went much further than others in defying this policy, apparently in order to meet
CNMC's pledge to narrow the wage gap through that year's negotiations (see below).
When we asked NFCA CEO WANG Chunlai about his company's reputation as a low-wage operation, he pointed out that
NFCA's young age and location are also factors:
Wage levels have to do with the scale and age of the enterprise. In terms of scale, we're ranked number five and in
terms of cost of labor, number five or six. With one company, their lowest wage is lower than ours, but their highest wage is higher than ours. This is because salary
increases are a cumulative annual percentage. The longer
one works, the higher the salary. If you compare us with
other companies, if tlley've been around longer, their
highest salary will be higher than ours, while the salary for
incoming workers will be about the same as ours. Another case involves Kansanshi and Lumwana mines. Their
starting salary is higher than ours. It's a strategic choice
226. "'Don't Antagonise Investors, Sata Tells Ministers." OM, Feb. 1, 2012;
"Zambia's Inflation Rate Down to 6.4 p.c.," Business Reporter, Jan. V, 2012, www.
ukzambians.co.ultlhome/2012101mlzambias·in0atioo·rate-down·to-6-4-p-d. Despite a
reputation for .. populism," the PF government also repeatedly directed strikers tore-turn to work. Labor Minister Shamenda said that "'anyone who would be protesting

after the directive would be breaking the Law. The GO\'emment ... would not protect
workers lazing around in the name of protests.....Widespread Strikes, What's tbe Solu·
tion?" TOZ, Oct. 14, 2011. He also condemned unions for resisting his plan to raise

retirement ages...Shamenda Tells Off Unions over Retirement Age," LT, Dec. 21. 201 1.
Sata bas stated that ""Strikes or industrial unrest have a very negative effect on a fragile
economy like ours." "Sata Acts on Cbishimba Kambwili," OM, Feb. 4, 2012. VicePresident Guy Scott "described the just-ended strilte aetioo by miners at Kansaoshi
Mine in Solwezi as illegal and warned that Government would not defend those who
would be disciplined by way of dismissals." "Kunda Panicking Says Scotl," TOZ, Jan.
12, 2012.
227. "Improve Workers' Pay, Sichinga Urges Investors,• TOZ, Feb. 4, 2012.
228. "Mopani, Unions Agree on 17% Pay Rise, Workers Protest," OM, Feb. 3, 2012.
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on their part, as they are remote and they need skilled
people, so they try to attract them with a higher wage offer. They can afford it. They have attracted a lot of people from NFCA and we've already done the training for
them... A few years ago, we lost a lot of workers; 20%
were lost per year. These days it's rather stable.229
Wang put it that CLM's pay is higher than at NFCA, despite CLM's
higher costs of production, because CLM "is an older enterprise
and was taken over, so there are workers who have accumulated a
lot of years. Their salary is higher because CLM acquired these
workers, but the starting pay is about the same as [NFCA)."230
HRW noted the relatively low wages at Chambishi Copper
Smelter (CCS), a CNMC joint venture with Yunnan Copper Corp.
and an independently registered firm. We asked about wages when
we interviewed a CCS human resources employee in 2010 and were
told that
The average basic wage in 2009 was K600,000, not including a 30% housing allowance, transportation, gratuity, etc.
There was a 12% increase this year [2010) at CCS, so the
present average basic was is now K672,000. The workers
can also earn overtime (time and half ordinary overtime;
double on Sundays), a production bonus (up to K200,000).
If you add up all of these, the average wage is 1 million-1.1
million. This is still 1 million lower than at other companies, including NFCA. The reason wages are lower is because the nature of the company is different from the
Inining companies: other firms are mining companies, but
ours is a processing company. The level of profit of the
229. Wang Chunlai interview. His comparison is in "Zbongsc Zanbiya bagong
shijian," Xln shiji, Nov. 5, 2011. A survey of 129 miners employed in Zambia at five
Chinese-owned firms (NFCA. CLM. JCHX. 15 MCC and Jinchuan) and 84 at three
non-Chinese firms (identified as Swedish, South African and Indian) found that "an
individual employed by a Chinese employer has a wage approximately 44 percent lower
than an individual employed by another foreign employer." The samples, chosen by
MUZ and several employers, were not random however. Of the non-Chinese firms. it
may also be only the "Indian" one (seemingly, KCM) that can be compared to the
Chinese..owned firms. The Swedish and South African firms may be Sandvil< and AIrica Rainbow Minerals- Copper. U so. they did not have operating mines and had only
small workforces at the time of the survey. Louis Granath and Maril<a Larsson, "Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the Zambian Mining Sector," Unpub'd Bachelor's
Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, 2012: 48, https://
gupea.ub.gu.selbitstream/2077/.. ./gupea_2077_3tm_Lpdf.
230. Wang Chunlai interview.
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mines is directly linked to the (market] price, whereas our
profits come only from a processing fee, which is US$100 a
ton. Since we don't have our own mines, we buy copper
concentrate from KCM, Mopani, NFCA, etc. and earn a
gross profit of $100 a ton. The scale of production is different as well. 231
A group of CCS Chinese employees affirmed in 2011 that pay is
affected by CCS not having its own mine, unlike KCM and MCM,
whose production is more than sufficient to feed those firms' smelters. The 40,000 ton production at CNMC-owned mines is insufficient to feed CCS, which opened with a 150,000 ton per year
capacity and is e"xpanding to 250,000 ton. CCS thus must continue
to seek to process, for a small fee, copper from the larger firms'
mines. 232 CCS Acting Managing Director Yang Xinguo stated that
in 2011 "the company experienced a shortage of raw materials
which were in erratic supply from the mining companies," that it
"was also considering putting up a mine which could supply the
smelter with raw materials unlike the current situation where it depended largely on other mining firms" and that it would have to
work with small-scale miners.233
MUZ stated in August, 2011 that CNMC intended to reach the
"industry standard" in salaries in 2012, although that does not necessarily mean a uniform standard, as all countries have a range of
mining wages. Basic wages of US unde~ound miners in 2010, for
example, ranged from $15-$37 an hour. CNMC's CEO said that
"Our production is about a third of KCM's and their mines are better than ours. We are willing to be a high paying employer, but it
must be reasonable, gradual and correspond to our level of
development. •-=
In October, 2011, LU Shaye, Director-General of African Affairs at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on general
salaries at Chinese enterprises on the continent and the salary demands of miners' in Zambia specifically. He noted that "The local
231. Interview, CCS employee, Hong Kong, May 4, 2010.
232. Interview, CCS Chinese employees, Chambisbi, Aug. 19, 2011.
233. "$220m Chambisbi Q)pper Smelter on Track," TOZ, Jan. 3, 2012. Sino Metals

has had a similar problem: an insufficient flow of ore from Otambishi Mine. ..SinoMetals Push for Ucense," TOZ, Sept. 3, 2012.
234. Mukuka interview; Jack Caldwell, "2011 US Mine Wages," I Think Mining, Jan.
14, 2011, bttp1/itbinkmining.com!2011/ 01114120ll·u-s-mine-wages-are-you-eamingyour-wortb-in-miningJ.
235. Luo Tao interview.
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employees working in Chinese enterprises get lower salaries than
those working in the western companies" and attributed that to
"different national conditions. Because the salaries of Chinese employees are lower than the employees of Western companies." He
also related the salary levels in Zambia and China:
In some cases, the salary paid by Chinese companies in
Africa for local employees is even higher than our domestic workers of the same industry ... [T]he local employees
in the Chinese-funded enterprises in Zambia went on
strike to demand [aJ wage rise. The salary and benefits of
local employees in the Chinese enterprises in Zambia
were more than 3 million kwacha, equivalent to $700 to
$800. They required an additional 2 million kwacha salary
rise, equivalent to an increase of about $400. $700 to $800
is equivalent to 4,500 to 5,000 yuan. The minimum wage
of Shanghai, the most developed city in China, is 1,100
yuan. The average wage of construction workers in
Shanghai, Guangzhou and other developed cities in the
east of China is just over 2,000 yuan. The wage of manufacturing workers is between 2,000 to 3,000 yuan. What
does 4,000 yuan a month mean? It is the wage of an ordinary white-collar in China. $700 to $800 plus an additional
$400 is as much as what I earn. This is the wage of a local
Zambian miner. Is it realistic? Improving workers' income is justified around the world. It is the high moral
ground. But any government must take into account the
level of their economic development and their own actual
situation. They cannot go beyond reality; otherwise it will
scare off investors. They cannot achieve their economic
development.236
Lu 's view is not that Zambian workers' salaries must be no
higher than what equivalent workers in China receive because that
is the proper reference point for Chinese firms. Rather, it is that if
Zambians are more highly paid than Chinese for equivalent work,
Zambia will not attract FDI as China has done, thereby limiting
Zambia's development. The Director-General of African Affairs
thus articulated the sole element of the putative "Chinese model"
that Chinese officials actually endorse:

236. The Records.
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According to Chinese experience, it is important to attract
foreign investors in order to gain knowledge. Foreign investment is attracted by favorable investment climates
with competitive advantages, such as low labor costs and
sympathetic tax laws, for eKample. Many Chinese investors in Africa complain about the poor investment climate
due to the relative high wages, bad infrastructure and
strict labor and environmental laws. Chinese investors and
government representatives alike try to convince African
governments that it is not yet the time for strengthening
labor and environmental laws. They argue that Africa
needs to temporarily compromise on these issues in order
to attract the much needed financial and technological
capital from abroad.237
Lu's argument, which jibes with all investors' short-term profit interests, is not that Chinese firms should export China's labor practices or even wage standards to the world. Officials and managers
do not hold to that, but know local practices must be taken into
account. Rather, the argument- disputable wherever investors realize large profits through high commodity prices - is that developing countries should self-limit wages to attract investment, a
position that Zambia's political elites and even union leaders
share.238
In late 2011, CNMC Zambia head TAO Xinghu stated that a
25% raise was reasonable,239 but in early 2012, NFCA and SML
agreed to much larger wage hikes that lessened the gap with other
foreign-owned firms, which agreed to much smaller increases. Because CLM gave a much lower wage increase than NFCA, the gap
between the two firms was also largely narrowed.

237. Sanne van der Lug~ "Otoose yo<r own Development Path: Providing Advice
with Interference?" International institute for Asian Studies. The News/titer no. 60.
2012: 21, www.iias.nllsitesldefaultl fileslllAS_NL60....2l.pdf
23&. Fackson Sharnenda, "Ministerial Statement .•. Ministry of Labor, Youth &
Sport, Nov. 2011. www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option:eom..docman&taskcdoc_
view&gid:912; "MUZ Asks Branch Lellden to be Reasonable When Making Demands
for Improved Salaries; LT. June 28,2012.
239. Private communication to the authors from a Chinese journalist, December 23,
2011.
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Table 7: 20U, 2013 Basic Unionized Miners Salary Increases

Foreign-owned Zambian Copper Mining Firms
Company

2012%

2013%

16

14

NFCA
CNMC Luanshya

SML

100-150

ccs

25

Konkola Copper Mme

17

7.5

Mopani Copper Mine

17

10

Lumwana Mine

18

10

Kansanshi Mine

12

13

Cbibuluma Mine

17

11.5

Source.sZ"l
240. "Zambia Copper Mine Unions Acoept NFCA's 44% Pay Hike Offer: Union,"
Dow Jones Network (DJN), Jan. 2, 2012: "Zambia's Muliashi Copper Project to be
Commissioned End Feb," Plans, Feb. 6, 2012; "Zambian Miners Agree Labor Deal
with Chinese-owned Sino Metals Plant," DJN, Jan. 9, 2012; HRW Report: 128
(breakdown of Sino Metals wages): "KCM Workers Get 17 p.c. Pay Rise." TOZ, Jan.
27,2012: Mopani, Unions Agree: "Lurnwana Workers in 18% Pay Rise." OM. Feb. 8.
2012; "Kansanshi Miners Win 22 p.c. Pay Rise," TOZ, Feb. 28, 2012: "More Money in
your Pocket: Luansbya Mine Awards Workers 26% Pay Rise," Zambian Eye. Dec. 2,
2012; "Mopani Unionized Workers in 10% Pay Hike," TOZ Dec. 28. 2012. The Act.ing
MUZ President stated in August, 2011 :bat MCM's lowest salary was KJ.8m and
KCM's was K2.1m. Mukuka interview. Using the latter figure, for KCM's lowest paid
workers to reach K3m in 2012. an anomalous 43% increase would have been required.
But the MUZ's late President Munyunyembe was quoted as stating that with the 2012
pay increase, the lowest paid employee will now get 3 million Zambian kwacha ($590)
per month." "Zambian Miners Win 17% Fay Rise," Reuters. Jan. 18, 20U. The HRW
report (p. 119) states that the basic salary of the lowest-paid NFCA workers in
September, 2011 was about K1.2m. In August, 2011, NFCA's CEO said that the lowest
basic salary was KJ.Sm, as did Prof. John Lungu. WANG Chunlai interview; Lungu
interview. Based on KI.Sm, a 44% pay rise would bring the lowest NFCA salary to
K2.16m or 72% that of the lowest KCM (permanent) worker. An October, 2011 report
stated that NFCA workers make KJ.67m. but did not make clear whether that is for
lowest-paid workers. HAN Wei and SHEN Hu. "China-owned Mines in Zambia Beset
by Strikes," CaWo, Oct. 21,2011, http://engJish. caWo.com/2011-J0-21/100316S09. html.
Sino-Metals' increase for 2012 was KSOO.OOO acroos the board. Zambian Miners Agree.
The lowest-paid worker there now makes Kl.3m or 43% that of the lowest-paid KCM
worker. CB Minister Urges; "MUZ Describes 17% Pay Rise as not Impressive," TP,
Mar. 23,2012. After the 2012 pay raise, the lowest paid worker at CCS earns a Kl.9m

basic salary. but there is also a 1<230,000 vacation allowance, which does not appear to
exist at other mining facilities. That meals thai tbe lowest pay at CCS bas risen to
about K2.13m or virtually the same as at NFCA. "Cbambisbi Smelter Workers Hail
State for Improved Conditions," OM, Apr. 19, 2012.
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The 2012 salary increases meant that the lowest-paid NFCA
workers would earn almost three-fourths the salary of the lowest·
paid permanent worker at the much more profitable KCM and a
significantly higher percentage compared to KCM's overall
workforce. The proportion of CLM·to-KCM salaries should remain about the same, i.e. about 80%, according to CLM. That being said, it should also be noted that among all the foreign-owned
copper mine that raised wages in 2012, only those provided by
NFCA, CCS and SML represent substantial increases in dollar
terms. As a blogger on a mining journal website explained in
March, 2012, in reference to one firm's offer of a 17% pay increase:
The 17% increase being talked about is in Zambian
Kwacha, the country's currency. The exchange rate when
the last increase was given stood at 4500 Kwacha per dol·
lar. The Kwacha is now trading at 5260 Kwacha per US
Dollar, a16.8% reduction of income due to exchange
losses. Kansanshi, by offering less than this figure, will actually have a wage bill lower than that of January 2011.
This less than 17% offer is being made against the coun·
try's inflation of circa 9%. In short the Zambian worker at
Kansanshi is earning less than they did in 2011.241
Based on the salary tables in their respective 2012 collective
agreements with the union and announced 2013 salary increases for
CLM of 14% and KCM of 7.5%, the lowest-paid CLM miner
should be receiving about 82% of the salary of the lowest-paid
KCM miner. 242
As to one part of the mining workforce moreover, the pay at
CNMC mines may now be roughly compared with that of other foreign-owned mines. A 2012 study states that "Chinese wages for
skilled labor are comparable to other mines in Zambia, and the
Chinese owned Luanshya mine even pays better than the Swiss/Canadian owned Mopani mine.'>243
241. Haswellsikana. post to ''Two Top Copper Mines in Zambia Shut Down," Mining.com, Mar. 4, 2012, www.miniog.oom/2012103104/two-top-copper-mines-in-zambiashut-<lown/. The Kansanshi offer later became 22%, but for two years, i.e. 11% a year.
242. The lowest-paid KCM miner's 2013 basic wage - in rebased kwacbas denomi·
nated at ooe one-thousandth of old kwacbas - should be some KR 3,284 (about
US$630); the lowest-paid CLM miner should earn some KR 2,682 (about US$S18). The
authors retain the basic wage rate tables of the 2012 collective agreements between

1-.-!UZ and NUMAW and CLM and KCM.
243. Gerard van Bracht, • A Survey of Zambian Views on Chin...: People and their
Involvement in Zambia." Africall East Asian Affairs n: 1 (2012): 54-97 (77).
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C. Hours
The HRW report states (p. 3) that " Most miners at Sino Metals
and CCS reportedly work 12-hour shifts, compared to the eighthour shifts outlined in Zambian law and standard in every other
copper mining and processing operation in the country." Its author
has written that "Several Chinese-run copper mining companies require miners to work brutally long hours - 72-hour work week for
some, 365 days without a off day for others ... "244
Western media have expectedly played up this "cruel Chinese"
theme. It is sweepingly inaccurate: the HRW report itself (p. 4)
states only that "Miners in certain departments at Sino Metals work
72-hour weeks without sufficient overtime, while those in other departments work 365 days a year ..." The report (p. 78) is unclear on
how many SML workers have had long hours, which affected workers in only some departments of one of the smaller CNMC firms,245
not "several" firms and not most CNMC workers, 80o/o of whom
work regular 8-hour shifts in the Luanshya and Chambishi mines.
There are also 12-hour shifts at CCS. A CCS employee has explained that
The frontline workers have two night shifts, two day shifts
and two days off. Thus they work 48 hours a week and 2021 days a month. That means there's eight hours of overtime a week. A minority of workers might take a turn to
have 60 hours a week. Chinese staff get only one day off
per week. The reason for doing 12-hour shifts is for the
sake of the smooth operation of the kinds of machines that
we currently have. As CCS is a new plant, most local employees cannot yet independently operate the machines.
So there are still Chinese at each shift, overseeing the operations. Zambian workers prefer to work 8-hour shifts.
The management has considered it, but it would be possible only when local workers have adequate skill for independent operation. So the management is pushing for
localization of skills.246
244. Matt Wells, "China in Zambia: Trouble Down in the Mines." Huff Post World,
Nov. 21, 2011, www.huffingtopost.comlmatt·wellslchia·in·zambia·trouble·d...b_ll02080.
html.
245. SML's 400 employees work in 14 departments, which in late 2011 ranged in size
from 3 to 101 persons. Technical Assessment Report: Ill-150.
240. E-mail from CCS employee to authors, Nov. 14, 2011.
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In smelte~ in Zambia (MCM Mufilira) and Australia (ML 1sa
Smelter) that use the same ISASMELT technology that CCS uses,
employees also work 12-hour shifts.247
The ho~ that Zambian mine~ work do not confirm the contrast HRW bas created between Chinese work-'til-you-drop bosses
and more enlightened manage~ of Western-based firms. In 20CJ7,
KCM mine~ reported that they worked more than 8 ho~. often
up to 12 ho~. without overtime pay.248 1n 2008, a Zambian seeking employment at Chambishi stated that "his countrymen prefer to
be employed by the NFCA rather than other foreign companies.
They say they would rather work the 8 bo~ demanded of them by
NFCA than the 12 hou~ wbicb is commonplace in other
companies.'""'9
In 2008 as well, the managing director of Lumwana mine stated
that miners there work 12-hour shifts and that "if the company bad
its way, it would have wanted the workers to work for more than 12
hours, but it was mindful not to go against labor laws of the country." This contradiction could be resolved however by having the
mine~ work overtime. 250 In 2009, KCM mine~ worked four 12hour days, then two days off.:z.s1 1n 2010, a permanent employee
miner at Lumwana mine said that she and her colleagues work four
12-hour day shifts, then four 12-bour night shifts, followed by four
days off. She noted that in earlier years, they worked 10-hour or
even 8-hour shifts, but hours increased because "in the operations
and production phase, we are facing a lot of pressure.'>2.'l 1n 2012,
striking miners at Kansanshi demanded that their 12-hou~ shifts be
cut to 8 hours.:z.s3
247. Interview, Robinson Mubtll, Man.aser of Safety and Envaronment, CCS, Aug.
16, 2012; Philip Arthur and Li Yun. " YUOJI&O

Cos>!- Carpcnl>OII's New Smeller.·

Chana's F'arstJSAMELT." Paper YuaWI Symposium. San Dqo. .."NW.-Iu:oml
EN/. .ncr. ISASMELT_Paper YC'CTMS2003.pdf:l2.
2A8. Undermining Development?: t4-IS.
249. "Chma in Zambia: from C'om111des to Capitalists?" World News Review, October, 2008, http://oew-revicw. blogspot.conUO.Ot_arcbive.btml. It was reported in 2005
that Chabuluma miners worked 48 hours a week, but the length of <hills, I.e. four 12hour or six 8-bours, was not specified. Muneku, South Arriean: 'l77.
2!10. "Lumwana Intensifies Copper I'Toduetion,• OM. Dec. IS, 2008.
251. Jcan-O>tistophe Servant, "Mmed Out in Zambia," u Mond• Dipwmarlq~.
Moy 9, 2009.
252. Kevin van N'aekert, "Fadn& ond o--oomi.Dg <llallcnp." D11«1ou 'Unabi<J 5:
24-29.
253. Maoers Paralyze.
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A 2011 UK newspaper account of MCM noted that miners
there "toll six-and-a-half days a week in the rock underneath Mufulira," i.e. more hours per week than do NFCA or CLM underground miners and, in effect, up to 365 days a year.U< Presumably,
thousands of miners at MCM work that schedule, while workers at
CNMC SML who HRW said work every day are far fewer, since
SML only has about 400 employees and HRW only claims that
workers in some departments do so. Media reports about the HRW
study nevertheless have quite predictably asserted that long shifts
are a general practice of Chinese-owned mining firms in Zambia and Chinese-owned mining firms alone- while the HRW report
itself tells readers that they should infer something from it about
Chinese practices in Africa generally. Unsurprisingly, neither the
media nor HRW have noted that from 2012, all employees at Sino
Metals work 8-hour days and have at least one day off a week.255

D. Job Security
The HRW report tenns CNMC a good investor, but bad employer; yet job security is a key part of employment and, while
CNMC firms are still behind the "industry standard" of pay, they
do better in job security. There were 63,000 workers in Zambia's
copper mines when the financial crisis hit in late 2008. By spring,
2009, 30% (19,000 workers) were laid off, but only by non-CNMC
firms.256 The industry bad about 20,000 permanent emptor:e min·
ers before the layoffs began and nearly half were laid-off. 7 After
the recovery, some firms did not hire back many workers they laid
254. Oavoes. The Other Face. In 2011, nurses otruct at Metorex's Cbibuluma Mine
hospital tO protest being forced to wort 12-bour shifts in violation of Zambia's 8-bour
day law. One nurse was fired and 24 Olbers issued
"Cbibuluma Mine Fues
Nurse over Post Anicle," TP, May 21. 2011. In early 20t2, CbibuiWNI management
demanded that miners inerease their workdays to eight and a ball hours. "Strike
Looms at 01lbuluma Mine," TP, Feb. 3. 2012.
2SS. Interview, XU Xiliang, Deputy CEO, Sino Metals, Cbambishi. Aug. IS. 2012:
Interview. Peter Kalasa. Assistant Manager of Administration & Human Resources.
Sino Metals. Aug. IS. 2012.
256. Cnsp1n Matenga. "The lmpoct of the Global Financial and f!a)oomic Crisis 011
Job 1..os>es and Conditions of Wort in the Mining Sector in Zambia.· ILO, Lusaka,
2010: Charles Muchimba, "The Zambian Mining Industry. a Status Repon Ten Years
after Privatization," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka, 2010: 27.
2S7. Servant, Mined Out; "Zambian Copperbelt Reels from Global Crisis," w..,hington Post, Mar. 25.2009. For lay-orr numbers as of early 2009 ror vark>us mines. see
Manenga Ndulo. et at., "The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries: the
Ctse or Zambia," The Global Financial Crisis Workshop, 001, Feb. II, 2009. London.

"''1111Jl8S.

www.odi.org .ut/e,entslpresen~t10Mi466.pdi

Tim CHrNESe ARE THE WoRST?

63

off: KCM had 11,978 of its own employees in 2008, but 9,696 in
2010.:1j8 In 2008, MCM bad 10,000 of its own employees and 10,000
contract worlters, but by May, 2009 it pared down to 7,500 permanent employees; in 2011 it had 16,500 total, evenly divided between
permanent and contract workers.259
In early 2009, CNMC adopted a "three not's" (san bu) policy:
to not lay off worlters, not cut back on planned investment, and not
hesitate to malte new investments. A study notes that
In Zambia, the Chinese mine [NFCA] showed a countercyclical expansion, with acquisition and re-capitalization
of a new mine and continuing investment in the MFEZ.
The Chinese mine did not cut production, investment, development projects and was also the only one, with the
South African mine, not to retrench workers.260
In Zambia, each miner, on average, is reckoned to support at least
five family members.261 The study points out that the three not's
also benefited CNMC firm suppliers, whose presence
cballenge[s] the expectation that the Chinese mine would
operate as an enclave ... Mine development was undertalten by Chinese firms, but the bulk of extractive operations relied on a diversified basis of local, regional and
foreign suppliers ... [C)ounter cyclical investment to expand mining and refining capacity meant that pressure to
cut costs, experienced by other mining companies, did not
play a major role in the Chinese supply cbain."262
CNMC firms, unlike other foreign investors, not cutting back on
purchases presumably helped to maintain the livelihood of Zambian suppliers. Beyond miners, their family members, suppliers and
their dependents, the livelihood of additional Zambians' were probably protected by the three not's policy, as a study has shown that in
258. " KCM Employees Reduced.• TOZ, JUDe 1, 2011.
2S9. Zambian Parliament, Commouee: 18; "Copper Mine Pa.res M<><c Jobs," TOZ.
May 6, 2009; Davies, The Other FIKlC.
260. Fcssehaie, Development: 26; See also "Chibuluma to Keep Workers." TOZ.

Doc. 19, 2008.
261. "Sustainable De'·elopment in Zambia: Experiences ond Ways Forward." United
Nations UoiveiSity, lostitute of Advanced Studies, s.d. 2006?, www.ias.unu.edu/sub_
paae.upx?catlD=107&ddiJ0;20?. O<MC bas stated that its htnn& of 2.2SO local minen at Cl.M beodined 20,000 local people. "OliDa Noofenous Metal MJIIIOJ Group."
CRJEqlisll. Ocl. 14, 2010. bup-Jienabsh..cri.cD/71461201MOt'1<1121MI~.htm.
262. FessdWe. Devetopmenc 60.
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South Africa, where mining directly empl~s 500,000 people,
"every mining job represents 26 livelihoods."2
The three not's idea was CNMC's, but was adopted br, Cbina's
Ministry of Commerce, despite a potential for great losses. 64 It perhaps renects a conclusion drawn in a 2009 study of Chinese investment in Zambia:
Historically, western FD!s in Zambia have come from privately owned corporations which are focused on profit
maximization, generally with relatively short-time horizons. By contrast, recent Chinese FDI comes from firms,
which are either wholly- or partially state owned and are
driven by broader objectives than merely profit
maximization. 265
From 2012 moreover, all NFCA and CLM workers are permanent
employees, while contract workers are still used in KCM and
MCM.2"'<1
To the extent that "good employers" exist at all in Zambian
mining, CNMC was a good employer by not laying off workers
when almost all other fums did so. In fact, it hired more when CLM
acquired Luanshya during the financial crisis.267 In contrast, when
Luanshya's Swiss former owner, J&W (Enya), acquired Luanshya
in 2004, it re-hired only 1,000 of the 4,000 workers who had been
employed there previously.- It then contracted mining development to a South African firm that hired over I ,000 workers at hall
263. "One Mining Job Benefi!S 26 Others: Bafoteng Study," Mini11g Wukly. July 16.
2012.
264. Luo Tao intemew.
265. Jolly Kamw""&" ond Grayson Koy>. "Impact of Cluno-Africa 1nvestment Relations: the Case of Zamboo,": African Economic Researcb Consortium, 2009: 39, www.
aercafrica.org/.• ./Zamblainvestmentrelatlons.pdf.
266. Wang Chunlai and Gao Xiang August 2011 interviews. Heavy use of oonlraCI
workers is widespread in mining; in Peru - the world's second largest copper producer
- in 2008 there were 8.5.000 minett. but only 16.000 permanent workers. whole in lbe
early 19\lOs, almost all moners had been pennanenL 1CEM has observed that "many
employers are using contract and agency labor [CAL) u precisely one of the ways to
avoid a high unionization rate [and) thai many CAL workers have been dl•missed as
soon as they joined a union .•. ICEM. "Contract and Agency Labor Camplligo, .ppt.
2009, www.tucrivers.org/.
267. CLM constituted 115 Zambian "orkforee by binng 1,448 workers laod off by lbe
previous owner. 661 former contnctor's "orters and 341 from the open market.
" Luanshya ())pper Mines has Produced Copper Valued 11 $12m Since Inception.- TP.
Apr. 13. 2010.
268. "Casual Labor Blamed on Weak Policy," TOZ. May I, 2004.
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the regular wage. After taking over, CLM got rid of the contractor
and made the 1,000 workers into CLM's own employees, doubling
their salaries. 269 In November 2011, AJbidon Ltd., 51% of which is
owned by Chinese SOE Jinchuan, indefinitely suspended operations at its Munali nickel mine in Zambia, due to a sharp decline in
global nickel prices and technical difficulties. Despite having to
shut down production, it agreed however to continue to pay full
salaries to its 200 or so workers.= It did so until at least the end of
2012 and thereafter it continued with corporate social responsibility
projects, including building schools and hospitals. 271

E. Unions
The HRW report notes that MUZ complains it is excluded
from CNMC's two processing plants, SML and CCS. It implies that
MUZ was shut out due to its militancy,272 as well perhaps because
of its connection with the PF and that MUZ's exclusion is a
human rights violation. Senior Asia Researcher HRW Phelim Kine
reportedly said "the Zambian miners were severely discouraged
from associating with one of the two national unions, thereby depriving the miners of the right to associate.'>274 Yet, in 2011, at all
four CNMC firms, at least one major union was present, while at
CLM and NFCA, where four-fifths of CNMC firm workers are employed, the two unions, MUZ and NUMAW, bargained jointly with
employers. In 2012, both unions were also present and recognized
at SML.
At the main Zambian copper mines, 50-70% of the workforce
is said to be unionized,275 but when contract workers are taken into
269. Oao Xiang interview. Luanshya MUZ branch chairman Stanislas Mwinbe confirmed this infonnation.
270. "Albidon Suspends Operations at MunaU Nickel Indefinitely," ZW, Nov. 11,

2011.
271. "Over 200 to Looe Job6 at Albidon." OM, Dec. 12, 2012.
272. Implications that MUZ is militant are problematic. It often urges striking miners to return to work. See, e.g.. "Striking Copper Miners Threaten Zambia's Production; Deutsche Presse Agentur," Jan. 4, 2012; "'There's Need to Address Mine
Workers Stoppages,"' TOZ. Oct. 19, 2011.
273. Since soon after PF became significant in Copperbelt, MUZ has denied that it
bas worked with the PF against the MMD and has affirmed its "non-partisan approach
to politics." MUZ Denies Undermining MMD," TOZ. Mar. 18, 2003. NUMAW has
defended the PF government and criticized opposition leaders. "NUMA W Calls Cor
Constructive Opposition Parties." TP, July 12, 2012.
274. Lynch. Labor Abuses.
275. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 43. Of 47,836 employees at 13 Zambian mining
companies surveyed in 2007, including all foreign-<>wned copper ntining firms (45,844
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account, the percentage may be much lower, as at Kansanshi, where
in 2011 two-thirds of the permanent employees, but only a fourth of
the total workforce appeared to be unionized.276 Unionization of
contract workers is exceedingly difficult, due to the fragmentation
of contractors' workforces. For example, in 2010, KCM had contracted with 43 companies, including such foreign ones as U&M of
Brazil and Moolmans of South Africa. According to the MUZ,
such short tenure agreements were "meant to kill the union movement at the country's largest mining units. "277 To the extent that
contractor's workers may be unionized, they may not be in either
MUZ or NUMAW, but rather the Mine Contractors and Allied
Workers Union of Zambia (MCA WUZ), a little-known organization of unknown strength.:ns
By 2008, 70% of NFCA workers were unionized. 279 In NFCA,
NUMAW is stronger, with 1000-plus members in August 2011,
while MUZ had 400-plus. At CLM, MUZ had 1,100 members in
August, 2012; while NUMAW had 1,346 members. MUZ is also recognized at 15 MCC, a CNMC company that has constructed the
new Muliyashi mine for CLM.280 Both unions have staunch PF supporters among their leaders.~'
On the relationship between MUZ and CCS, a CCS employee
told us in 2010 that "NUMAW is present, not MUZ. MUZ will
employees). 52% were unionized. National Economic Advisory Q>uncil (NEAC).
"Quantity and Quality of Employment in the Mining and Manufacturing Sectors in
Zambia, 1991-2006": 19, 24 (author"s photocopy).
276. Ngosa and van Alstine, Seeking Benefits: 7.
277. "KCM Degrading Employment through Sub-Q>ntracting.• TP, Aug. 6, 2010.
278. See " KCM Contractor Recalls 1,200 Retrenched Workers," TOZ, Jan. 21, 2012:
"200 Moolmans Worken Lose Jobs," TOZ. Dec. 12, 2011. The union seems to have
first appeared in 2010 or 2011; it is unclear whether it represents workers at contractor
firms employed outside of KCM.
279. Apotheker, Foreign Copper: 53.
280. Mukuka interview; Interview. Adam Zulu. CLM worker. NUMAW national
Vice-President, Aug. 17, 2012.
281. Some NUMAW leaders suppon PF; some MUZ leaders do not. Alex Mwale.
NFCA NUMAW branch chairman, is a local PF politician. Interview, Chingola, Aug.
20, 2011. Stanislas Mwimbe, an MUZ branch chairman at CLM, was said in 2010 to
have been a supporter of the (then-ruling) Movement for Multipany Democracy
(MMD). "MUZ Warns MMD over Failure to Address Miners' Concerns," TP, Apr. 30.
2010. MUZ leaden, including the former MUZ president and present (PF) Deputy
Minister of Labor Rayford Mbulu, have praised the MMD government for its actions
relating lo miners and economic development. See. e.g., .. Banda's Handling of Mining
Sector Hurdles Cheer MUZ," TOZ. Dec. IS, 2008; NGP Receives Kudos for Acknowledging Eeonomic Developments, TOZ. July, 13. 2011; "LiatoSiams Job Casualisation,"
Apr. 28. 2010.
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probably be present eventually, but as of now they don't follow the
national legal procedure to establish themselves at CCS, yet complain that they've been shut out.•>282 The CCS employee said in
2011 that contrary to HRW's assertion, CCS is not aware of any
court order that requires it to recognize MUZ.283
The issue of a court order and the reason why MUZ was recognized by NFCA, CLM and 15 MCC, but not by Sino Metals and
CCS, requires further investigation.284 It would however have been
odd for Sino-Metals and CCS to display anti-MUZ animus when
NFCA, CLM and 15 MCC do not. Sino-Metals, CCS, and 15 MCC,
while distinct legal entities, are directed by NFCAW and "At CLM,
both NUMAW and MUZ operate freely, whereas at NFCA, MUZ
has operated a branch office since 2006, with NUMAW establishing
its own branch office soon after the union's creation in 2003." 286
There seems no basis then to imply that CNMC companies are hostile to MUZ for political reasons; neither is MUZ particularly hostile to CNMC: the MUZ branch chairman at CLM told us that
"When Chinese came [to take over Luanshya], it was at a time of
anti-Chinese sentiment. The union supported it [CNMC]."287
What has most devastated union activism in Zambia's mining
sector is not CNMC, but the sharp decline in membership due to
retrenchment at non-CNMC firms during the financial crisis.
MUZ's membership dropped from 26,000 before the crisis to 12,000

282. Interview, CCS employee, Hong Kong. May 4, 2010. Another human relations
CCS employee stated in 2012 that MUZ still had not met legal criteria for recognition.
When MUZ applied for recognition, most workers listed were still NUMAW members.
Zambian law provides that a worker must give 3 months notice to quit a union. Inter·
view, Irene Tembo. Assistant HR Manager CCS. Chambishi. August 15, 2012.
283. CCS employee e-mail to authors, Nov. 14, 2011. MUZ President Rayford
Mbulu IOid us in an Aug. 28,2008 interview in Kitwe that MUZ had taken Sino-Metals
to court and that MUZ had 4QO.plus members at NFCA.
284. MUZ, despite not being formally recognized by CCS management, may still
have input to the annual wage negotiations there. See "Chambishi Smelter Workers
Strike." Mewls Week, Mar. 28. 2011 (''1'be secretary of the National Union of Miners
and Allied Workers. Goodwill Kaluba, recendy said that unions including the Mineworkers Union of Zambia had concluded negotiations with all the mining companies,
which included the Chambisbi Copper Smelter").
285. Dan Haglund, Policy Evolution and Organitational Learning in Zambia's Min·
ins Swor, unpub'd PhD dissertation, University of Bath (UK), Nov. 2010: 107.
286. Chusa Sichone, "Workers Cry for Improved Conditions of Service," TOZ. Nov.
14, 2011.

287. Mwinbe interview.
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in August 2011.288 Sino-Metals and CCS aie moreover not the only
mining entities where there bas been only one union. Chibuluma
has only MUZ.289 Interestingly, that has been seen as an aid to
organizing: interviewees at Chibuluma have explained that because
"the mine has only one union, the MUZ, (t)berefore the membership is easier to mobilize for anything, as opposed to the situation in
other mines were there is more than one union. "290
The multiplicity of unions in Zambia has in fact been the result
of an effort to weaken trade unions, which played a key role in the
struggle against the decades-long presidency of Kenneth Kaunda
(in power 1964-1991), which included the establishment of the
MMD. In 1990, in an effort to derail the movement against him,
Kaunda put in place a new Industrial Relations Act, designed to
"liberalize" and thereby divide the labor movement. The Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), led by Frederick Chiluba, op·
posed the Act. But after the MMD won the 1991 elections and
Chiluba became Zambia's president, he endorsed the International
Monetary Fund's neo-liberalizing structural adjustment program
(SAP) and carried out privatization that weakened the labor movement. SAPs led to changes that
have produced a decline in formal-sector employment,
more cutthroat competition, the increasing mobility of labor and capital, and the growing casualization of labor.
Whereas Zambia was formerly considered a middle-income developing country in the 1970s, it now qualifies ...
for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HlPC) debt relief
291

Moreover, "paradoxically, Zambian interest groups bad real influence under the former one-party structures and this influence was

288. Mukuka interview. NUMA w. historically the smaller union. also has 12.000
members. Kaluba interview.
289. '"Olinese Firm Offer> Zambia Miner> 17% Pay Rise."' Reuter>, Mar. 23. 2012.
290. John 1.-ungu and Sumbye Kapena. "South African Mining Corporate Govern·
ance Practice in Zambia: lhe Case of Olibuluma Mine Pic."' in South African Research
Watch. "South African Mining Companies in Southern Africa: Corporate Governance
and Social Responsibilities." 2010. 47-97 (88). www.boell.org.za/downloadsiSARWbook
FA.pdL

291. M. Anne Pitcher. '"Whal has Happened to Organized Labor in Soulhern Af.
rica:• lmemational!Abor and Working Class History 72 (2007): 134·160 (136).
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reduced as a result of the combined processes of political and economic liberalization." 292
When some unions opposed the SAP, Chiluba ~promptly distanced himself from the trade unions and began a regime of antilabor policies that ultimately led to the division of the once solid
ZCTU." This "state-ordered split" was fostered by the ~right" of
workers in an enterprise to be represented by more than one union.
As unions fought each other and were used for leaders' personal
advancement, they experienced "a massive membership loss. " 293
[U]nion membership declined to about 250,000 members
by 2000, consistent with the decline in formal-sector employment from about 750,000 workers in the 1970s to
478,000 workers by 2000. In the important copper sector,
union membership dropped precipitously from 62,000 in
1990 to 25,000 in 1999 due to mine closures and job
losses.294
Since then, as a ZCTU official has noted, the "proliferation of
unions in Zambia, a country where barely 15 percent of regularly
employed workers are unionized" has continued, as "'A union
leader who loses an election can sometimes leave with his supporters and set up another union to keep himself in a job," while unions
are seen by some of their leaders "as a stepping stone to political
advancement.'>295 MUZ president Chisbimba Nkole stated in 2012
that "the proliferation of trade unions must be discouraged because
it weakens their ability to effectively represent workers. 'This system of forming many unions is not good at all. It is not healthy for
the sector. It weakens us at the end of the day."'296
Zambia's leading political parties, the main union federation
and a human rights group have aU stated that having one union per
workplace or even one per industry is advantageous to workers.
The (MMD) Minister of Labor, speaking in parliament in 2011 on
292. Lise Rakner, Political ond Ecvrwmsc Ub<rolisarion m Z..miM 1991-2()()1
(Stcxkbolm. 2003): 178.
293. Tayo Fasboyin, "Policy Reforms and Employment Relations In Zambia," Internotional Lobour Organisation Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa. Issues Paper
no. 29, 2008: 5-6, /www.ilo.or&tpublk:/englishlregjonlalprolborare/downloodlissues_paper..29.pdf.
294. Potcher. 143.

295. "Demoos Faced by Zambio a l..es5or CO£ SA Unionists ln.ide Lobor," 1M Sar
(South Africa). Mar. 4. :lnll. Sec abo '1loe Oeatiol1 oCSplontcr Unions by the MMD,"
ZW, Jan. 26. :lnll.
296. "Di-.isioos in Mine Union lrts MUZ Boa." DM, July S, 2012.
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having more than one union a1 mining firms, said "we are focusing
on supporting the mosl represenrative group as a way of ensuring
thai no confusion is crealed ... ,"indicating a policy of no! requiring
recognition of more !han one union.297 The subsequenl PF Minister
of Labor has exlended thai policy 10 whole induslries.198 zcru
head Leonard Hikaumba has called on unions to merge, as "'somelimes there is divided attention 10 issues where unions in the same
secror consider lhemselves as rivals'" and "multiple unions in rhe
same secror are leading 10 compromised an ineffective negotiations
299
•• .''
zcru Generai-Secrerary Roy Mwaba has said !hat while
freedom of association is a constirutional righl, il is being abused by
the proliferation of trades unions and that "We need to have one
union for each sector. ">00 Zambia's Democratic Governance and
Human Rights Advocates leader Gerald Mutelo has said that
"Having one union will represent the workers effectively."301
Conversely, from the slandpoint of mining management, having only one union carries disadvantages, including the inability to
play unions off against each orher or at least gain leverage due to
union leaderships warring wilh each other. Where a second union
is presenl, but not recognized, non-recognition of !hal second union
may lirnil the bosses' abiliry to reach an agreemenl when workers
strike. For example, in 2012 there was a five week-long, violenl
strike a1 the (while) Sourh African Impala Platinum (lmplats)
Mine. The Nation Union of Miners (NUM) represented 70% of
the workforce, some 17,000 miners. During the strike, the rival Association of Mineworkers and Conslruction Union (AMCU), which
was seeking recognition without any formal process having taken
place, recruited NUM strikers to join it and organized rock drill
operators (RDOs) to attack NUM members who wanted to return
to work. lmplats managemenl expressed ils frustration a! not being
able 10 lalk with AMCU because NUM was !he only recognized
union at its operation. -.n
2'17. Debate, Mar. 22. 2011. www.parliament.gov.zmlindex.php?option=eom_cootent
&taskovicw&idal410&ltem•d~l'mit•t&limitstart;l,

298. "Shamenda Warns Companies Flouting Labor Laws," OM, Nov. 2S, 2011 ("On
concerns by the public over many labor unions (the Minister of Labor! urged that each
sector should have a big union for easy bargaining witb employers").
299. "ZCTU Ponders Merger of Same Sector Unions." DM, Feb. 17. 2012.
300. "Trade Union Fragmentation Worries ZCTU," OM. Nov. 8, 2012.
301. "Splinter Unions Setback to Bargaining Power," TOZ. Dec. 29. 2011.
302. "lmplats Strike Esca!a1<>." M10eweb. Feb. 2. 2012; " lmplats Gets New CEO.
but Worters Stay Av.ay." CAJ Ne"'S. Jao. 31. 2012. bttp:/lca)newsa&eocy.comfm·
des.phptiovestiog137S·•mplats·&ets·ne.,.-ceo-but-worlters·•lly·lway. 1be strike was ille·
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While workers are entitled under Zambian Jaw to set up more
than one union in a workplace, it hardly amounts to a human rights
violation if they have only one union, provided it represents their
interests. In practical terms in fact, workers may find their rights
violated when the presence of more than one union divides the
workforce. That is what happened when three unions at KCM were
involved in negotiating the 2013 contract. The result was a pay rise
of 7.5%, by far the lowest rise among the mines that year. MUZ
Secretary General Joseph Chewe observed that "(t)here was no
unity among ourselves as union. We had some union officials who
were pushing their own agendas. " 303
The US-based HRW must be aware that the principle of "exclusive representation" applies in unionized workplaces. An economics textbook has explained that the
NLRA (National Labor Relations Act) provides that only
one union can represent the employees in a bargaining
unit. If workers in a unit decide to organize and are successful in convincing the majority of employees who vote
in the election to support the union, that union becomes
the exclusive representative for those employees. No
other union can represent any other workers in that unit.
In addition, the union that wins that election acquires the
responsibility to represent all employees in that unit, not
just the employees who voted for the union. 304
Rather than amounting to a "labor abuse," US unions have
seen exclusive representation as augmenting their power to a.chieve
labor rights. An opposing argument can be made: that the presence
of more than one union produces competition that usefully drives
up bargaining demands, but that involves a political question, not a
right.305 Laws may also be framed that provide workers the freegal and lmplats fired 17,200 workers. When the strike ended. it agreed to take back
only 15,000. Among the 2,200 not rehired were the "perpetrators of the violence. •
"lmplats Says Strike Over, Mining to Resume March 5," Miningm, Feb. 29,2012, www.

miningmx.comlnewslplatinum._group_.metalsllmplat.s--says·strike-over·mining..to-.re·
sume-Marcb-S.btm
303. KCM Workers.
304. Paul F. Qark and Julie Sadler, "The Role of Labor Unions in Labor Markets,"
in Rbona C. Free, 21st C<ntury Economics: a R<ferene< Handb()()k (Thousand Oaks.
CA: Sage Publications, 2010): 163-172 (169).
305. A!)lles Akkerman, "Union Competition and Strikes: the Need lor Analysis at
the Sectoral Level," Industrial & Labor Relations Review 61:4 (200&): http://digitaloommons.ilr.comeJLedulcgi/viewcontenlcgi?article=1342&oontext=ilrreview.
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dom to join other unions, but they have no "right" to be represented by them. As for CNMC miners in Zambia, they are almost
all permanent employees, and thus they are not "barred from joining a trade union at pain of dismissal," as contract workers, at
MCM for example, have attested is the case for them.306
HRW evidently made no effort to determine whether the absence of MUZ at SML and CCS had any practical effect on the
workers situation. Needless to say, HRW has not publicly noted
that since 2012, MUZ and NUMA W have jointly bargained collectively at Sino Metals. 307 It is thus likely that HRW raised the issue
of dual union representation at CCS and Sino-Metals as merely an
additional way to claim that CNMC is "the worst." That approach
parallels what its report does with regard to wages. Although the
report is supposed to have been written in order to pressure the
Chinese government to have its SOE mitigate labor abuses,- the
report's author has stated that "our report never makes a call to the
Chinese companies to increase wages."309 That must mean that
HRW does not consider that lower than average wages at CNMC
firms amount to a labor rights abuse. The inclusion of an elaborate,
albeit wholly misleading, discussion of wages in the report is thus
little more than another way to frame CNMC as "the worst. "

m. METHODOLOGICAL CONFUSIONS
The main method used in the HRW study is interviews, with 95
miners from four CNMC operations and 48 from non-Chinese
owned copper mining firms. On its face that is a sound way to learn
about specific labor abuses that workers have experienced or wit306. Davies, The Other Face. The percentage of union contract workers at Zambian
mines is unclear. Muneku, South African Multinationals in Zambia: 272, indicates thai
350 of the 400 Chibuluma permanent workers - but no contract workers - were un~
ionized. A study, discussing Olibuluma contract workers. related that "Even though
the law does not restrict trade union from organizing and representing casual employ-

ees the sub- contractor that normally engage these casual employees often inlimidate
and warn them from associating wilb unions... Oupa Bodibe. "The Extent and Effects
of Casualization in Southern Africa," National Labor & Economic lnstiute, 2006: 131,
www.sarpn.org/documenJSI.. JEffects_Casualisation_Nov2006.pdf.
307. Kalasa ioterview.

308. A repon that singles out Chinese firms ror criticism is unlikely to influence
them and a poorly reasoned one even less so. See James Wan. "Zambia-China: Pragmatism Prevails ("Beijing and Chinese firms pay lillie heed to Western judgments on
[their) engagements in Africa). ThinkAfricaPress (TAP), Nov. 10,2011, hllp://thinkafri-

capress.comtzambialpragmatism-prevails-china-relations.
309. Email message from Matt Wells 10 YAN Hairong, Dec. 16, 2011.
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nessed. The method becomes dubious however, where it is used to
draw conclusions that cannot be inferred from the interviewee's direct observations. Thus, the report asserts (p. 3) that "nearly all
Zambian workers and union officials who spoke to Human Rights
Watch said the Chinese copper operations were the country's worst
when it comes to health and safety." It then implies that these statements show that Chinese copper operations are the worst in
Zambia on safety. Such an inference however is empirically in error and violates the basic logic of social science and law, the disciplines in which studies of human rights are grounded. There are at
least six reasons why the comparisons made by HRW's interviewees
are likely to be little or no value.
First, national and mine branch-level union leaders do not generally hold that CNMC firms have the worst safety practices. MUZ
President Munyenyembe rejected that notion and union leaders we
interviewed all recognized that mine safety deficiencies generally
exist. Given the fatalities in Zambia's largest, non-Chinese-owned,
mines, these leaders' observations could hardly have been different.
That at least some Zambian union leaders now see Chinese as unexceptional copper mining bosses partly results from CNMC's
adaption to local standards, but also shows that these leaders, if not
HRW, have broken with anti-Chinese discourse.
Second, because CNMC finn miners do not necessarily know
the conditions at other mines, they cannot judge how their employer's operations compare. They may not even generally know
about conditions where they work, as each operation has several
departments, severa l shifts, etc. HRW interviewed 95 CNMCfirm
employees in a 6,000-plus workforce; yet without a random sample
it cannot be determined whether these employees' experiences are
even representative of those in their own firms. It also cannot be
assumed that CNMC-firm interviewees have a basis to compare
CNMC practices with those at other mines. Even if only interview-s
and not a survey were possible and even if all interviewees agreed
that ~the Chinese are the worst," that would still be conjecture,
given that they have no comprehensive and current understanding
of conditions at both their own mine and other mines. 3' 0
Third, even miners who work at a CNMC-owned operation,
but formerly worked at other mines, may not make sound compari310. UIIIOQ activists wbo fonnerly - e d al ..-her fum may not oec:essarily see
lhc:1t current OIMCeiiiJ>Ioyn 11 ...,..... Alex Mwale ......tr.ed f0< Ka.t and then NFCA
and told us KCM is the: went =player.

74

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

sons. Safety conditions vary over time. A worker's observations of
safety practices at KCM in 2008 and then at NFCA in 2011 is not an
adequate comparison. That requires knowing safety practices at
NFCA and KCM in 2008 and at NFCA and KCM in 2011.311
There may also be a selection bias where such interviewees are
concerned. Safety conditions for contract workers are much worse
than for permanent employees. 312 As a Zambian analyst has noted
A large contributor to a poor safety environment is casualization - the situation in which a dual labor market develops: a core of permanent workers with a periphery of
workers on fixed-term contracts, or contracted as self-employed individuals. Casualization diminishes safety in two
ways. First, it provides the employer the incentive to undertake dangerous and reckless mining activities because
the contracted labor is not fully tied to the mining com·
pany. The expected cost to the employer when something
goes wrong is therefore diminished ... Secondly, casual
labor by its nature is less tied to the firm and therefore has
minimal incentive to undertake mining activities that are
safe for all employees in the long term. The most common
accident in mines is "rock fall." These usually happens by
casual laborers going mad developing [new seams) and
leaving people exposed without support in roof sheets.
Most of the development work in mining is done by casual
laborers.313
Many who labor at non-CNMC firms are contract workers, yet
HRW does not tell readers whether the interviewees who worked at
a non-CNMC firm before moving to a CNMC firm were contract
workers. The interviewees who worked at both CNMC and nonCNMC mining facilities were very likely from among the skilled,
permanent workers who bad been employed by KCM or MCM and
311. In social science parlance, such a comparison involves drawing diachronic infer·
ences from synchronic data. Many studies have shown that witness testimony is also
fragile and vulnerable to contamination, the more so as time passes. See Laura Beil,
"The Certainty of Memory bas its Day in Coun." NYT, Nov. 29. 2011.
312. MCM workers in 2005 blamed surging fa ta lities on increased use of controct
workers, who Jack the skills of permanent employees. The Mines Minister noted lhat
"The victims of accidents, the vast majority are employees of contractors." A union
president said contractors recruit untrained workers off the streets and send them un-

derground the next day. •Zambia's Miners Paying the Prioe." DJN, Dec. 10. 2005.
313. Chola, "Mining Reflections: Proposition Three," Zambian Economist, Dec, 2,
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were hired by CNMC companies after they were laid off by those
other firms during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Few, if any, would
have formerly been among the less-skilled contract workers found
at some non-CNMC firms, as CNMC firms could in 2008-2009 pick
from the sudden supply of more-skilled, ex-permanent workers.314
The HRW interviewees thus probably experienced the better safety
conditions of permanent employees at their old employers and not
the worse safety conditions that the many contract workers experience. Their experiences thus cannot be seen as representative of
workers at non-CNMC firms and they cannot speak authoritatively
about how safety at CNMC firms compares to safety at their former, non-Chinese-owned places of employment.
Fourth, as we have shown, it is much more difficult to make a
UG mine safe than an OCone. All CNMC miners worked underground as of 2011, but less than half of minders at other foreignowned mines did so. Even if the non-CNMC interviewees were
representative of their workforces {which they are not), most would
have worked in conditions necessarily safer, because they are above
ground, than those worked by CNMC miners, who work underground. That they are necessarily safer has nothing to do with the
comparative safety practices of the non-CNMC mine bosses; it h as
to do wl safety differences that are globally attributable to the UG
and OC mining configurations.
Fifth, HRW has stated that as to statistical surveys, "it does not
deploy that methodology anywhere in the 90 countries where we do
research. We rely on interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and
other knowledgeable parties to provide evidence of human rights
abuse. " 315 Interviews can be useful for investigating specific incidents of abuse, but cannot be relied on to draw general conclusions
with comparative implications about the extent of abuse because
they may reflect a form of bias known in social science as selection
on the dependent variable; for example, seeking to learn the extent
of safety violations by searching out those who have experienced
them. No general conclusions about the overall situation in CNMC
firms or how conditions there compare with other mines can be
drawn from such attestations. Those objectives can however be
achieved with random sample survey data.

314. Interview. Gabriel Maseko, Head of Industrial Relations, CLM, Aug. 13, 2012.
315. Sipho Mtbathi. "Critics Must Talk to Farm Workers," Busines> Day (South AI·
rica), SepL 19, 2011.
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In fact, Swedish researchers Louise Granath and Marika Larsson surveyed, in 2012, 129 NFCA, CLM, JCHX, 15 MCC and
Jinchuan miners asked questions about safety (availability of PPE
and after-accident emergency care), as well as whether the miners
were satisfied with their working conditions. Regression analysis to
determine the relationship between the responses to the safety and
satisfaction questions was carried out in light of the HRW claim of
discontent about safety conditions at Chinese-owned mines. The
researchers expected that safety would have a statistically significant impact on miner satisfaction, but it did not. They reported the
"unexpected outcome" that "there is a lack of empirical evidence
that the issues concerning safety records are of major importance
for whether employees with Chinese employers are satisfied with
their working conditions or not." Granath and Larsson concluded
that "one explanation to this unexpected result might be that the
issue about safety record is more concerned in media than among
the employees. "316
Granath and Larson's result of accords with what union officials have told us: safety is not a sufficiently important issue at
CNMC-<>wned facilities to be a subject of collective bargaining.
The key factor for the surveyed workers' satisfaction was instead
wages. If the workers do not regard safety conditions as impinging
significantly on their satisfaction with overall working conditions,
then it might be queried how safety conditions at CNMC mines rise
to the level of a human rights violation.
Sixth, where workers are racist or have an unconscious racial
animus ("implicit discrimination" in the psychological literature)
against employers, they may not accurately depict even conditions
they say they experienced or observed. Studies show that racial
prejudice and racialized discourse shape attitudes and distort evaluations on a wide range of issues. 317 Prejudice may affect even the
perceptions of those with the most incentives to be objective.318
3I6. Granath and Larson, Cllinese Foreign Direct Investment: SO.
317. For example, in the US as to how people evaluate welfare measures. Paul Kel·
Jested!, ~ Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). Racial prejudice also influences evaluation of job
applicants and politicians ln the US. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullianathan,
"Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisba and Jamal? A Field Experiment
on Labor Marker Discrimination,"' Anu:ricon £co,wmic Rev;ew 94:4 (2004): 991· 1013;
Spencer Piston. "How Explicit Racial Prejudiee Hurt Obama in tbe 2008 Presidential
Election," Political Behavior 32:4 (2010): 431-451.
318. For example, referees in professional sports. For an overview of the literature

see Jordan Bass, et al., .. Racial Bias in NBA Referees: a Test of Line Movement." pres·
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Bias also affects memories; for example, prejudiced witnesses may
have a greater "perceptual memory trace" of wrongful acts when
the perpetrator of those acts is from a racial group against which
the witness is biased. 319 Thus, in the existing racially-charged atmosphere, Zambian miners may have a greater perceptual memory
trace of wrongdoings when the firm owners are Chinese than when
they are not. A direct example of the interaction between prejudice
and accuracy is the anti-Jewish discourse spread by politicians and
media among white miners in South Africa a century ago. Many
adopted it, affecting their ability to objectively evaluate the actions
of Jewish mine owners.320
One way in which such prejudice is stirred is by media signaling of ethnicity. For example, two US scholars asked a 2009 survey
of Americans "How much to blame were the Jews for the financial
crisis?" A quarter of respondents placed moderate or higher blame
on "the Jews," with the proportion much higher among the lowereducated. They also presented to different groups of respondents
the same news report, but which either signaled or did not mention
that Bernie Madoff, a financier convicted in a well-known fraud
scandal, is Jewish. The researchers then asked respondents their
view of government tax breaks to big business to spur job creation.
Those who were primed about Madoff's ethnicity were twice as
likely to oppose the tax breaks, as those who were not.321 In
Zambia, where a misdeed is allegedly committed by a Chinese, the
media never fail to mention the supposed perpetrator's ethnicity,
entation to the North American Society for Sports Management annual conference,
Seattle, USA, 2012, myweb.fsu.edu/BassNewmanKimNASSMabstract.pdL
319. John Edlund and John Skowronski, "Eyewitness Racial Attitudes and Perpetrator Identification: the Uneup Method Maners," North American Journal of Psychology 10:1 (2008): 15-36 (30-31).

320. Milton Shain, The Roots of Ami-Semirism in SouJh Africa (OtarloUesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994). South Africa's anti-Jewish discourse eventually fiXed
on the National Partts claims tbat Jews are unassimilable because of their closed communities and operation as a state within a state. Alena Norval. Deconstructing
Aportheid Diswurse (London: Verso, 1996): 64. The same claim is made in the Otinain-Africa discourse. Michael Sata said in 2007 that wben a Chinese-run MFEZ in
Charobishi comes on line "(the Chinese) will have their state within a state, and will
truly be able to do as they please." Andreas Lorenz and Thilo Thielke, "Olina's Conquest of Africa," Der Spiegel, May 30, 2007. The MFEZ is now operational, but Otinese law does not apply there and it is open to all nationalities. "MFEZ Open to All
Investors," TOZ, Dec. 25, 20ll.
321. Neil Malhotra and Yoram Margalit, "Anti-Semitism and the Economic Crisis,"
Bos1on Review, May/June 2009. http://bostonreview.net/BR34.31malhotra.;nargalit.php.
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which they often do not do with regard to the misdeeds of other
foreigners.322
Views of conditions at firms about which pervasive negative
racial and political discourse exists, as it does as to CNMC and "the
Chinese" in Zambia, are thus bound to be skewed. Miners of the
kind HRW interviewed have been the main targets for mobilization
by the PF, which fanned anti-Chinese sentiment from 2005 onwards
to bolster its electoral chances.323 Analysts have noted that "The PF
enjoys overwhelming support on the Copperbelt Province, where it
secured a large majority in the [2006 and 2008] presidential elections" and that "Sata won by a huge margin (in 2011] in the Copperbelt Province, where he has enjoyed unwavering support since
the 2006 polls."3 2A They have also noted that mobilization is relatively easy there and found that many CNMC firm miners "hate the
Chinese."325 In 2011, "The China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation ... became the maligned face of Chinese investment dur-

322. We extensively discuss such ethnic signaling in Zambian media in Barry
Sautman and Van Hairong, "Bashing 'The Chinese': Contextualizing China's Collum
Coal Mine Shooting... fonhcoming in 2014 in Journal of Conumporary China.
323. "Mining for Votes," Africa ConfidmtliJI 51:23, Nov. 19, 2010.
324. Rohit Negi, "The Micropolitics of Mining and Development in Zambia," African Studies Quanerly 12:2 (2011): 27-44 (37); "Zambia: Sata Goes Easy on China Despite Big Shake-up," Africa-Asia Conjidenlial, Nov. 10, 2011.
325. Kopinski and Polus: 190; Peter Behar, "Mining Copper in Zambia," Fast Company, June 1, 2008, www.fastcompany.com/magazinef126/zambia-chinas-mine-shaft.
html?page..0%2C2. PF leaders deny hating Chinese, but deprecate them generally.
Michael Sata said in 1JXJ7 that "'Olinese coming to Zambia are crooks and prisoners"
and be did not want Chinese to onme. "Chinese Flooding into Zambia to Take Over,
Says Opposition Leader," Emerging Minds, Oct. 31, 2007, http://emergingminds.org/
Chinese-Flooding-inte>-Zambia-to-Take-Over-Says-Opposition-Leader.btml. MP Yamfwa Mukanga (in 2011-2012, Minister of Transport, then Minister of Mines) said in 2008,
''I do not hate the Chinese, but what they do." Zambian Parliament, Debates, Feb 28,
2008. www.parliament.gov.zmlindex.php?option• com_content&taskaview&id;;707&
ltemid=86&1imit=1&Limitstart"". In 2009, he said "we [the PF) do not hate the Chinese
... I hate what they do and their culture." Zambian Parliament, Debates, Oct.20, 2009.
www.parliament.gov.zm/index.pbp?option=com..content&task=view&id=l043&Itemid
=86&1intit• l&limitstart:3. PF MP Davies Mwila (in 2011-2012, Luapula Province Minister) said in 2009, "We do not hate the Chinese, but we hate what they do." Zambian
Parliament. Debates. Oct. 16, 2009, www.parliament.gov.zm!index.php?option=eom_
content&task=view&id=I041&1temid=86&limit=l&limitstart"". Such statements resemble Canadian aboriginal leader David Ahenakew's defense, during his 2008 trial for
willfully inciting hatred: "I don't bate the Jews. but I hate what they do to people."
"Canadian Aboriginal Leader Tried for Anti~Semitic Commenrs' .. Jerusalem Pos1, Dec.
22.2008.
.
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ing a bitter election campaign. " 326 In the view of Chinese officials,
Sata carried out "vitriolic attacks against the Chinese in his election
campaign messages. "327 Analysts have argued that "anti-Chinese
rhetoric was key to the victory of former opposition leader Michael
Sata in the 2011 Presidential elections."328 After the elections, Chinese reportedly felt the need to ask the new government forJ'rotection,329 but anti-Chinese incitement by officials continues. 3
Even Zambia's Vice-President Guy Scott has acknowledged
"anti-Chinese resentment among the unemployed and others" that
has included "mild intimidation" and "manifests itself as anti-orientalism," so much so that "the Catholic church has had to send elsewhere, priests from the Philippines who had been working in
Zambia."33 ' Workers at CNMC enterprises have shown through
their use of anti-Chinese slogans that they are influenced by the PF
and Western anti-Chinese discourse.332 During strikes at NFCA,
CCS and the private, ethnic Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine
(CCM), there has also been violence and threats against Chinese,
with mining firms and local police responding with violence of their

326. "China Aims to Rewrite Perceptions on Africa Investments," Reuters, July 18,
2012.
31:7. "Sata Moves to Mend Zambia.Sino Relations," African Review, June 2, 20U,
http://www.africareview. com/News/..J979180/1419182/-/g4r5g2zl-/index.html
328. Mamodou Gaz.ibo and Olivier Mbabla, "How China Seduces Africa,• The
Newsletter 60, 2012:24-25; "Michael Sata Wins Zambian Presidential Elections,"
Guardian (UK), Sept. 23, 2011. P<r conrra, see Henry Hall, "Sata Wins, Changes for
China," France 24, Sept. 29, 2011, bttp://chinafrica.blogs.france24.comlarticle /2011109/
29/sata~wins-changes·china..O.

329. "Chinese Investors ask Zambia President for Protection amid Labor Unrest,"
DIN, Oct. 31, 2011.
330. Soon after his election, Sata said "there are too many Chinese coming into
Zambia." "There are Too Many of You in my Country, Sata Tells Chinese Envoy"
Sept. 26, 2011. Three months later, Vice-President Guy Scott complained of a continued presence of Chinese workers. "Zambia: '"We're Ahead of the Game': Guy Scott,"
Africa Report, Dec. 21, 2011, www.theafricareport.com/index.php/2011122150178006/
politicians/zambia-%E2%80%9Cwe%E2%80%99re-ahead-of-the-game%E2%80%
9D-guy-scou-50178006. html Anti-Chinese incitement under the PF government is discussed in Sautman and Park, Dragoo Slayers, Sautma.o and Yao, Bashing the Chinese

zw.

and Sautman. The Olinese Defilement Case.
331. Zambia'sTest.
332. Han and Sheo, China's Harsh; HAN Wei and SHEN Hu, "Zambian Workers
Return to Jobs at Chinese-owned Mine," Caixin Online, Oct. 23, 2011, http://eoglisb.eaixin.cn/2011-10-231100316622.html; "Chinese-Zambians in Fists of Fury," LT,
Mar. 4, 2008.
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own to workers' beatings, stone throwing, and arson.333 It is not
rare for Zambians to perceive that their countrymen who work for
Chinese firms are mostly anti-Chinese.334
Miners and Zambians more generally may also have a general
prejudice against Chinese and favor whites in mining. A long-serving Zambian political leader and enterprise manager told us in a
2008 interview that
The hollowness of knowledge about China and the Chinese opens the door to demagoguery about them in
Zambia ... The messages coming out of Washington,
London and Paris about the Chinese presence in Africa
has led to the cultivation of prejudices against the Chinese
among some Africans who identify with the West. This
kind of prejudice is also cultivated by political forces in
Zambia ... The focus on the Chinese-owned mine has actually shielded the other foreign-owned miners from criticism . . . There is a prejudice in Zambia with regard to
Indian and Chinese mine owners, because Indians are
seen only as shopkeepers and Chinese are not seen as
knowing anything about mining. Only whites are viewed
as having mining expertise.335
The HRW report's attempt to establish that the Chinese are
the worst in Zambian copper mining resembles an analysis produced by a Russian anti-Czarist militant - a human rights advocate
of the day - about reasons for the 1881 anti-Jewish pogroms. His
interpretation was that it "was an expression of the people's anger
over being exploited ... The Jewish exploiters were more crafty
than the non-Jewish ones ..." 336 The HRW report draws readers to
similar conclusions: that Zambian miners attack Chinese as the
333. Mwale interview (threats and violence during strike. at NFCA). We disc\Jss
anti-Chinese violence during strikes and protests at NFCA. CCM, and a KCM construe·
tion site in '"Bashing the Chinese:·
334. See Sarah Hard us, '"China in Africa: Consequences for Traditional Donor Aid,"
unpub"d M.A. thesis, Uruversity of Amsterdam, 2009: 62.
335. Interview. Akasbambatwa Lewanika, Lusaka, July 21 . 21:JY1. The conception
that Chinese do not know about mining exists even though, in 2008, China accounted
for almost 15% of the value of global metal mine output. ECA, Minerals and: 33.
Sata's positive view of wbites included calling for a return of British colonialists to
Zambia. Lorenz and Thielke, China's Conquest. Sata confirmed his statemenl in an
interview with us in Lusaka, July 17. 2007.
336. I. Michael Aronson, Troubltd Waltr.t: Origins of the 1881 Anli.Jtwish Pogrom
in Russw (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990): 208.
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worst exploiters because they actuaUy are and tbat Chinese copper
mining managers craftily attempt to cover up non-serious injuries in
the mines, while non-Chinese (mainly white) owners do not.337 Yet,
under conditions of racial prejudice, it is questionable whether
workers may even reliably attest to their own experiences; or attest
to whether conditions at CNMC facilities are indeed the worst.

IV. CONTEXTUALIZlNG THE CLAIM
The HRW report offered an explanation as to why a Chinese
firm is the worst Zambian copper mining in terms of labor rights:
Chinese insist on bringing their own labor practices from China,
which include trivializing safety and paying super-low wages. We
bave shown that each of the claims that "Chinese are the worst" is
empiricaUy inaccurate and are often based on methodology not in
keeping with the logic of social scientific and legal analysis. By the
same token, an explanation or why HRW chose to focus on CNMC
in Zambia is needed.
Labor abuse in Zambian mining, while deplorable, is not an
outstanding human rights issue in the context of Africa. Uke other
parts of the world, tbe continenl experiences massive violalions and
HRW has a guideline: "We respond to emergencies, but we also
challenge entrenched, longstanding, or steadily deleriorating
human rights problems."338 There is no emergency in Zambian mining. Conditions at CNMC firms have seen modest improvement, as
337. A 2008 South African Depnrtment of Labor study concluded that South African
minina firms - mainly run by whiteo - bring in contract worken from neigbboring
eountriC$ to avoid having direct responsibility for injuries and even deaths. ICEM.
Contract and Agency. Crafti,... i> a common trope of anti-Ciunese pol•tical leaders.
MIChael Sata. deoouncii!J "the Chinae" for "bringiin&) the ..-bole Chtna" to labor in
Zambia. has stated that "No(w) amona the Zambian people the Cluneae are very crafty.
I know the Chinese well.• ·s...·o Verbatim tntel"'-iew oo Gay RigbiJ,• TOZ. Mar. 22.
2011 . In the US. "Chinese craftmell" IS often connected .,;th the 1101>00 that "the Chincoe ore up 10 501Dethin& craf1y oo the currency ••. hinlii!J 11 c~a..rdly behind-Jbe.
JICCDCI Orienlal deviousness.• David Marsh. "Playing Polillcs WJ!b Cluneoe Currency;
Markel Walch, Apr.lO, 2010. H151orian or China Maurice Meisner. alluding to a Seoalor•s accusations that •crafly.. Chinese are spying in the US. hal wrlllen thai "opportunistic American politicians now portray Otinese in stereotypical rashion. The
lncrel!t~ingJy dominant images are of 19th century vintage: Chinese arc crarty. deceitful~
villainous aod hall-crazed automalons manipulated by evil rulers.• "Mulual Raeism and
Arropnce Undermines lies,• Los Angtl<> Times, May 30. 1999. That view<. now tk
r11utur in China bashing worb. suc:h 11 Woshingll>ll Times jouma!J>ts Brett Deeter and
Wilbom Tripplel"s 1Jo>vin8 to Bn}mg· flow Bartldc ObwM 11 fiiiSt<nUif Amoie•'s D~
dmt •nd Ushering A Cor"'ry of~ DomiNidon (Wasbingtoo: Resn<rY 2011 ).
338. HRW. "Our Reseatdl Methoclolo&Y." ..-.hrw.cqit>Odd?SI41
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unions leaders cited above. The Chief of Research and Planning of
Zambia's Human Rights Commission bas also observed that rights
violation "problems are not exclusive to Chinese companies: 'Several investors, whether from Europe, America, China, and even
some Zambians, often don't adhere to Zambia's labor laws."339
There has also been no shortage of critical studies and reportage
about labor conditions in Chinese-owned mines in Zambia.340 In
fact, that story has been the centerpiece of media attention about
China-in-Africa since 2005, largely because of the PF's anti-Chinese
incitement.
Several factors may explain HRW's focus on the major Chinese investor in Zambia. The report's author has provided one explanation: that it was issued because "we have faced constant
questions from African human rights allies, policy makers, and media for our opinion from a human rights viewpoint on China's growing investment in Africa. "~ 1 Such queries themselves however
smack of "racial profiling" a form of policing that links criminality
and other malpractices with a specific race, ethnicity or national
origin.
If indeed, HRW decided to investigate Chinese mining in
Zambia based on "constant questions" about "China's growing investment in Africa," it did so in contravention of the approach
HRW normally takes in selecting its investigation subjects. Asked,
in a 2012 interview, "how do you select those samples or cases for
your Human Rights Watch report[s]?," HRW Executive Director
Kenneth Roth responded that "In any given country, the researcher
will begin by consulting with local groups, What do you see as the
most serious problems? What do you see as the problems that we're
339. ·Ask Not What China Wan IS from Africa. But Wba1 Afnca Wan IS from China."
Huffington Impact Umted Kongdom. June tl. 2()12, www.buffingtonpo6LCO.uk/racllaela kidilafria~ina-aslt-not·wbat-<:hUUI·WiniJ._b_1518719.html.
340. Cbmg Kwan Lee. "Raw Eocounters: Chinese Manqers: A!nean Workers aod
the Pobtic:$ of Casualization in A£rica's Chinese Enclaves," China Quortuly (CQ) 199
(2009): 647-699: Dan Haglund, "In it for the Long Term? Governance and Learning
among Chinese Investors in Zumbla's Copper Sector," CQ 199 (2009): 627~; Peter
Kragelund, "Part of the Di'lease or Part ol the Cure? Chinese lnvcslments in the Zam·
bian Mining and Construction Sectors,.. European Journal of Dtvtlopmtnt Resrarch
21:4 (2009); 644-661; Austin Muneku, "Chinese Investments In Zambia." in Anthony
Yaw Baah and Herbert Jauch (eds.), O.ints.lnvestmtnts in Africa: o LAbor Penpectivt
(ALRN: 2009): 160-202. There arc hundreds of newspaper articles. See. e.g.. "NFC
Afnca," Business & Human RoghiS Resource Centre, s.d., www.busmess-bumanrightsora341. E-mail from Man Wells to Van Hairoog. Nov. 2.5, 2011.
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most able to do something about? We'll put together a list. " 342 No
one who knows Zambia would conclude that its major human rights
problem is labor practices that affect one-tenth of one percent of
the workforce and in the industry with among the best-paid workers
to boot. Everyone who knows Zambia would also know that anyone who made such a claim would likely do so for political reasons,
i.e. as part of the opposition's anti-Chinese mobilization that is
ongoing in Zambia.
Given that HRW eschewed its normal approach to selecting
investigations in taking up the case of CNMC in Zambia, it may
well have done so as part of a political agenda. In the same interview, HRW's Executive Director also asserted that "One of the
things we found was that China had so much economic clout in
Zambia that the Zambian government was reluctant to enforce its
own laws on worker rights. It just feared China was too powerful a
player. And you clid find that the Chinese supervisors were mistreating the workers in a way that an ordinary mine or factory in
Zambia wouldn't have been allowed, but that went on in the Chinese-owned mine because Zambia feared the repercussions of criticizing the Chinese company." The HRW report however does not
show that Zambia's government "feared the repercussions of criticizing the Chinese company," nor is there any evidence for such
"fear" elsewhere. It would be surprising if there were such fears, as
CNMC is responsible for only one-twentieth of total production
and is a much smaller player in the Zambian copper mining industry than most other foreign investors. Moreover, from 2012 onwards, the PF, a party now in power that has never shrunk from
strongly attacking "the Chinese," has not criticized CNMC. Indeed,
some top Zambian officials have praised it, as clid Finance Minister
Alexander Chikwanda343 - and this despite HRW's assertion that
CNMC "still lags behind" other foreign investors in labor rights.
HRW's invention of the Zambian government's fear of China also
jibes with a political agenda.
A focus that includes Chinese-owned business in Africa would
not entail racial profiling. The queries to it reported by HRW and
the HRW report itself however single out Chinese firms by reporting on malpractices at such enterprises, while neither similarly investigating wrongdoing at non-Chinese-owned operations nor
342. Kenneth Roth, "Human Rights Watch: Promoting Ethical Behavior wben it's
Contested." Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles, Nov. 15, 2012.
343. • Alexander Chikwand," Africa-Asia Co11jidentill/ 5:10 (Aug. 2012).
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comprehensively evaluating how differences between the situations
of Chinese-owned firms and other companies may account for varying levels or safety, pay, etc.
The HRW report posed the wrong question to begin with. In
law and social science, the proverb expressed by the renowned
American novelist Thomas Pynchon appl.ies: "U they can get you
asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about the answers. " 344 In politics, if you ask the wrong question, there may be
more consequences - in this case a predictable heightening of antiChinese sentiment, and not just anti-Chinese government, as
neither the media nor the public evidently distinguishes the Chinese
people from the Chinese state.345
By singling out companies based on nationality, HRW approached its Zambia study differently from how other NGOs have
done firm-level studies of foreign copper mining companies there.
NGOs that studied KCM did so "because of its sheer size." Their
report shows that development of Zambia copper mining has disadvantaged, rather than benefited society at large. 346 They did not focus on KCM because it is UK-based or ethnic Indian-owned;
neither did they critically distinguish KCM from other firms. A
study of MCM's misbehavior, while specific, questions "the link between development and mining in general," makes nothing of the
fact that MCM is a Swiss citizen or that its top officers are whites
and points out that MCM is "far from a stand-alone case." 347 Stud344. Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Ralnbcw (New York: Viking, 1973): 2SI.
34S. Survey research shows much variation by coun1ry in unravorable attitudes toward Chino and the Chinese. However, in most principle Western European SIJiteS,
Japan. and India. there bas in recent years been a high degree or disfavor toward 1>01h
China and the Chinese. See. e.g.. "24 Nation Pew Global Allitudes Survey." Pew, 2008:
36-37, hllp:llwww.pewglobal.~l2/chapoer·3·v•eW>-of·elllnli. In cootrast a
study based on sul'eys among Chinese found thai "Chinese olf.Wis, elites and the
generol pubbe generally differentiate bet-..·een the American people and the US government" and "dKI not find an anti-American bias" (defined as)a 'pervasl\e oondesc:ension
and den•grauon." AJast.tir loin Johnston and Dan~ela Stodl:mann. "Cbmeg Attitudes
toward the Unlled SIJitcs and Americans." 1n Peter KatzensltiD and Robert Keolwle
(eds.), Anii·Amwc.,.ums m World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Um>en•ty Press. 2007):
IS7·19S (IS9, 192).
346. Undermllllng Development?
347. Counter Balanoe, The Mopani. A study of corporate social responsibility (including labor praeti<:e>) in 2008, at NFCA and then Swiss-owned Luansbya, coocluded
"In the perception of the employees interviewed at both mines. their employers fail in
all elements of CSR," although perceptions at Lunn•hya were better on some points.

Apocheker, Foreign Copper: 91. There was however no nnti-Swiss agitation in Zambia.
lhcn or now.
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ies of mining firms operating outside Zambia also do not focus on
their nationalities or rank their labor practices among peers. For
example, a global union group's report on labor abuses and other
activities in Africa of Rio Tinto, the world's fourth largest mining
company, ignores its citizenship and leaders' nationalities. It does
not compare its record to that of other giant firms such as BHP
Billiton, Freeport McMoRan, etc.:w8
HRW however constructed a binary of CNMC, as a Chinese
firm, versus the rest.:w 9 Despite its focus on one company, the report (p. 13) is self-<lescribed as "a useful magnifying lens into Qrinese labor practices in Africa." It thus tries to turn Lhat Chinese
firm into a strikingly negative example of investment in Africa.
HRW decided that its first study of Chinese investment in Africa would be about an SOE that has had some problematic labor
practices, but is also a unique object of racialized media attacks that
portray its activities in Zambia as exemplifying malpractices by Chinese investors throughout Africa. It was thus predictable that media reports about HRW's study would pour oil on the fire. They
immediately did so;)~ so much so that China's media-savvy ambassador to Zambia commented that in the Western media, "if you
have not written something bad about China in a given day, then
you have not done your job.•J"
1IR W's other studies of abuses in African mining are two implicating Zimbabwe's government - a target of Western sanctions
- plus one, issued after HRW's report on CNMC, on the non-coo348. lodu.striAII. "Rio Tin to in Africa: Global Citizen or Corporate Shame?" 2012,
www.mdustriall-uoion.org/silcs/dcfaulllfilcs/uploads/doc umeoiJiindustnall-rio-tio!<Hif·
nca-report.pdf. Rio Tmlo is UK·beadquartered, wilh bead otr1001 to Alblnlia; tts top
mana,en and diredors are wb1te W~rs.
349. Sllttes may be responsible for extra-territorial violations by thctr corpontions of
tolemaliooal human rights, but ooo-<tale-owoed 6rms also may be requu~d to respect
human n&hls. See Alice de Jonge. Trtt11Sn4llonal Corport11ioiU •nd lnttmtllion41 JAw:
Accounrabl/ity in th• Global Bu.rintsJ Enwronmtnt (Oiellenbam: Edward Elpr. 2011):
47-SI. There is !bus no need 10 single 001 SOEs in reportin& on corponle rights
violatlon.s.
3SO. See, e.g., "Rigllts Group Sloms China for Alleged Zambia Mine Abuses," Voice
of America News, Nov. 3, 2011;" "Olina Ignores Wamin& Bells." Radio Free Asia,
Nov. 1. 2011; "Zambia"s Go~mmenl Needs to Oo More to Addreu Chinese Mine
Abuoe<." OJN. Nov. 3, 2011: Simon AUtJOO. "Hwnan Ri&hts Watch on Olloese Mines
•n !be Country: Honor, Horror." D..ty Mavtridc (South Africa). Nov. J, 2011.
lSI . StO\en Myula aud Anlbony MukW11a, "We are Here to Silty: Ouna." OM, Nov.
10, 2011
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troversialtopic of child miners in Mali.352 Another factor explaining
HRW's choice to repon on CNMC thus may be ideological: a need
to produce studies that accord with mainstream Western views of
countries, such as China, that have authoritarian regimes, and concomitant positive views of the West Such an approach is likely
prevalent among HRW's almost wholly Western base of financial
support (see below) and belies the claim that the liberal discourse
of human rights is based on apolitical moralism, as in fact the discourse is deeply immersed in politics.353 HRW itself is imbricated
with liberalist Western political and media forces and mutual antagonism with the Chinese state. The latter is evidenced, on HRW's
side, by its webpage entry of repons on "China and Tibet, " 3sc a
classification that implies that Tibet is not pan of China, even
though neither the United Nations nor any state regards Tibet as
independent.'" In separating China and Tibet, HRW follows a
practice unique to the US government.'$(! Needless to say, HRW
does not have such categories of reports as "Canada and Quebec,"
"Britain and Scotland," or "Spain and Catalonia," although substantial popular support for independence can be confirmed in
those places.
Its immersion in US political culture may also explain why, despite its repon's fatal empirical and methodological flaws, and despite some regarding it as "discredited and (h)aving many
352. HRW, "Deliberate Chaos: Ongoing Human Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields in Zimbabwe," June 20, 2010; HRW, "Diamonds In the Rough: Human
Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe," June 26, 2009. There
are severe abuses in the Maran&• diamond fields, but serious abuses as well in mining
openotions that are not ln US and UK-prodaimed "roaue sUites." See, e.g. Geoffrey
York. "Oaims of Sexual Abuse in Tanzania Blow to Barricl< Gold," Ole« & MaU,JUI>C
8. 2011 (multiple l<i.l.liJ1&$ and rapes of "illegal mi.oers" by local and mone polo<e at Canadoan-oo.'IICd mloe in Tanzarua).
353. Vasuti Nasiab, "Tbe Rose and Fall of the Human Roghts Empore," Foreign Polocy on Focus, June 28. 2012. www.fpif.org/anicle5itheJise_and_fall_of.the.human.
rights_empire..
354. HRW, "China and Tohet," http://www.brw.org/asia/china.
355. See, e.g. "The President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama,"
The White House Blog (President Obama "Reiterat[es) the U.S. policy that Tibet is a
pnrt of the People's Republic of China and the United States does not support independence for Tibet"). www .wbltehouse.gov/blog/2011107117/presldent·.. meeting-bis-holi·
neu~xiv.-dalai·lama.

3S6. See. e.g. Thomas Lum. "U.S Assistance Programs on Chona.· Convessiooal Research Service, RS22663. I'Oov. 10, 2011 (detailing prognoms on "Chona and Tibet"),
http1-w.fas.org/SgplcrslrO"IRS22663.pd!.
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shortcomings,"357 HRW has said it will wholly "stand by our report. " 358 Indeed, a year after the report was issued its author
claimed that CNMC's goodwill in Zambia is being lost through its
labor record and that "it still lags behind on ... key areas of safety
in comparison to other companies." 359 US political actors habitually
"stand by" whatever they have done and eschew apologies, regardless of the consequences of their actions. 360 Many months after its
issuance, Western media continue to publicize the report361 and
HRW continues to ignore its predictable reinforcement of anti-Chinese racism. Its refusal to recognize that the conclusions drawn in
its report are misplaced stands in sharp contrast to the reaction of
other NGOs when significant flaws in their studies have been
adduced.362
HRW is close to being wholly Western-funded: of donations to
HRW, "almost 75 percent comes from North America and about 25
percent from Western Europe." 363 It issues reports about human
rights violations by natural and corporate citizens of a range of
countries. HRW rightly focuses much attention on Chinese government rights violations, but seldom probes the actions of Western

357. Sishuwa Sishuwa, "Sata and Zambia: Robert Rotberg Disappoints and Con·
founds," TAP (UK), July 25,2012.
358. HRW, "'Critiquing the Critique on Otina in Zambia: Human Rights Watch and
Labor Abuses in Olinese State-owned Copper Mines," Pambazuka News, Feb. I, 2012,
www.pambazuka.org/enlcategorylfeatures/7957()1prinL HRW continued to stand by its
report in relation to CNMC's !PO in Hong Kong in 2012. See HRW, "'CNMC Public
Listing Needs Investor Vigilance," Apr. 22, 2012, www.hrw.orglnewsl2012104122/chinaenmc-public-Jisting-needs-investor-vigilance.
359. "Safety Still Concern at Zambia's Chinese-Owned Mines," Agenoe Franoe
Presse, OcL 19, 2012.
360. "It's Not Easy for Presidents to Say 'I'm Sorry," AP, Feb. 24, 2012.
361. See, e.g, "Big Finns Latch on to Africa's Boom Time," Independent (UK), July
7, 2012; "Enraged Zambian Miners Kill Chinese Manager," LM Angeles Times, Aug. 6,
2012.
362. For example, the International Land Coalition has recognized that a report on
land grabbing it issued in 2012 contained highly dubious data about many projectS, especially those suJ>PO$edly associated with Olina. See Deborah Brautigam, "'Zombie'
Olinese Land Grabs in Africa Rise Again in New Database!" China in Africa: The
Real Story, Apr. 30, 2012, w-..'W.chinaafricarealstory.coml20121041zombie-chinese-landgrabs-in.africa.html; Petrus Brenner, "Tbe Land Matrix: Much Ado About Nothing,"
Food Crisis and the Global Land Grab," Apr. 27, 2012, http11farmlandgrab.orglpost/
view!20405.
363. "Human Rights Watch Visit to Saudi Arabia," July 17,2009, www.hrw.org/enl
node/84512.
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governments per se,364 even though the latter have conducted many
wars and occupations of developing countries, supported many
rights-abusing regimes, and structured the world's highly unequal
neoliberal economic dispensation.365 A political agenda is likely reflected in HRW's failure to attribute large-scale human rights violations to Western governments per se, while singling out as an
exemplary violator of African labor rights a Chinese SOE whose
violations are far from large-scale. HRW's conclusion that "the Chinese companies [are] the biggest violator of workers' rights among
Zambian copper industry employers" (p. 22} in effect expands its
negative appraisals of human rights inside China to include Chinese
state human rights practices abroad.
US media and other US human rights NGOs have expectedly
followed HRW's approach. Time magazine, for example claimed
that "The Sino-Zambian relationship is a microcosm of China's engagement with the entire continent."366 Soon after the HRW report
was issued, the webpage of New York-based Freedom House, 80%
of whose funds in 2007 were derived from the US govemment,367
featured an article by one of the organization's academic advisors in
which he urged Sata's government to protect the rights of Zambian
workers, "especially those employed in the growing number of Chinese-owned mines and related industries," which he claimed "bear
the attitudes and standards that prevail in the Chinese labor mar-

364. From 1991-2011, HRW issued 60 reports on Olina. These generally deal with
conduct attributable to the government itself. Altllough Western governments have
recently waged many wars. HRW reports usually limits its criticisms to individual politi~
cians and rarely attributes rights violations to Western governments per se, even tbough
there is a close connection between wars and human rights violations. See Chandra
l.ekha Sriram. et al., War, Ccnflict and Humon Rights: Tlw>ry and Practice (London:
Routledge. 2010).
365. William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA lmerverufon.s Slnce World
War II (Common Courage Press. Monroe ME. 2000); Hilton Roo~ Alliance Curst: How
the U.S. Lost the Third World (Washington. DC: Brookings Press, 2008); Uri Friedman.
"America's Unsavory Allies," Foreign Polley. October 28. 2011; Ray Kiely, Empire in
tlu! Age of 0/obalir.ation; U.S. Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder (london: Pluto
Press, 2005): Branko Milanovich, •·Global Inequality: from Class to Location, from
Proletarians to Migrants," World Bank, 2011, http1/go.worldbank.org/A9QH4Z7H70.
366. ··Human Rights Watch Reports Abuses in Chinese-run Mines in Zambia," Time
(US). Nov. 4, 201 I.
367. Diego GiJinnone, .. Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of Democracy: the Freedom House Case," Democratir.ation 17:1 (2010): 68-97 (75).
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ket," where the "Communist Pari/ has assiduously suppressed even
the most basic of labor rights. " 3
Labor rights abuses affect millions in Africa. CNMC in Zambia
only employs about 6,000 people, one-tenth of the country's mine
workers, little more than 1% of formal sector workers, and less
than one tenth of 1% of Zambia's workforce.369 Even in terms of
Chinese-generated employment for Zambians, the CNMC
workforce does not play an overwhelming role, as Chinese investment in Zambia is reckoned to have created 50,000 local jobs.370
Labor rights violations are almost certainly more common
outside mining than inside it3 71 and conditions at smaller,less-profitable Zambian-owned firms are often worse than those in foreignowned ones.372 For example, the fatality rate for artisanal ("illegal")
368. Thomas R. Lansner, "After the Democratic Power Transfer, Zambia Must

Tackle Olioese Investment Issues and Human Rights Reforms.," Freedom House. Nov.
15, 2011, www.freedomhouse.org/bloglafter·democratic-power·transfer-zambia·must·
tackle-cbioese-lnvesunent-issues-and-human~rights.

A Zambian political scientist who

nas consulted for US agencies, has written that "There are reports that the USA was
supporting Sata because of the expectation that Sata, once elected would curb Chinese
investments in the country. 1be UK was reported to prefer the PF over the MMD
partly because of Dr. Guy Scott, a White Zambian of British ancestry, PF Vice Presi·
dent and now Vice President of the country." Njuoga M. Mulikita, ''Zambia's 2011 Political Transition: What Impact on China-Zambia Relations?" paper presented at the 2d
Meeting of the Chinese-Africa Think Tanks Forum, Bisboftu, Ethiapia, Oct. 12·13,
2012: 176-178 (178). bttp://www.ipss-addis.orglsitesldefault/files/IPSS_Cbina·Africa..
Think_Tanlcs_Forum_Final%20(2).pdf.
369. There were said to be 53,5n miners working in Zambia in March, 2011. "Minis·
terial Statement by Hon. Maxwell M.B. Mwale . . ." s.d. Mar. 2011, www.scribd.com/
doc/51570144/Ministeriai-Statement-Mining-Development-in-Zambia. Zambia's
worldorce is 5 million, with 500,000 in the formal sector, half of those in the public
sector. Zambia Business Survey, "The Profile and Productivity of Zambian Businesses"
(2010): 7, www.pdfio.com/k-2?5981. html; "How to Create Jobs in Africa," Christian
Scitnce Monitor, OCL 10, 2012. Of course, in the Zambian context, 6.000 formal jobs

are no insignificant. In the construction sector for example, lbere are less than 14.000
formal jobs. "The Chinese Loan Conundrum: Who is Beoefit.ting from Zambia's Phantom Growth in Construction?" zw. Nov. 30, 2012.
370. "Chinese Firms Create 50,000 Jobs," OM, Apr. I, 2012. If indirect employment
is taken into account, CNMC firms have been said to ha,•e created one-fourth (12,500)
of the jobs attributed to Chinese firms in Zambia. "CNMC to Invest $400m More in
Zambia," TOZ. Sept. 28, 2012.
371. See Silane K Mwenecbanya, "Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Labor Rights in
Zambia," United Nations Development Program, 2007, web.undp.org/.. Jreports/.. J
27_5J.abor..,Rigbts.pdf.
372. For example, pay has been lower at Zambian-owned mining firms, such as
Ndola Lime, Cbilanga Cement, and Kariba Minerals which, in 2007, had worlcforees in
the 35().500 employee range. NEAC, Quantity: 19, 24.
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miners in Zambia is much higher than that for workers in foreignowned copper mines. From the founding in 2008 of the Federation
of Small-$cale Miners Associations of Zambia, through late 2011,
231 of FSSMAZ's 4,300 members have died in mine collapses.373
Zambia has some 180 informal mines, all of them Zambian-owned,
where most miners work manually. They earn wages as low as $40
a month and unionization is very difficult. 374
HRW recognizes that labor conditions at CNMC firms are improving, yet there is no evidence of improvements among firms in
Zambia generally. Instead, conditions in mining communities deteriorated after privatization of state-owned Zambian Consolidated
Copper Mine's (ZCCM) assets,37 s with "a 1999 survey of the local
community on the privatization of ZCCM ... show[ing] that for the
majority of Zambia, the sale of ZCCM has brought hardship and a
decline in economic and social development. " 37 Since then, labor
conditions in the privatized firms that make up much of Zambia's
formal sector have deteriorated. Moreover, as an elaborate study
of the effects of the privatization of mining in Zambia has stated,
lower gainful employment of the mineworkers, the degrading of the
conditions of employment of mineworkers, and the substitution of
local capacities to the mines with foreign capacities undermined
rather than promoted local capacities.377
It is not malpractices in mining arising from privatization that
concern HRW, but only those it says are due to a Chinese state
presence, even though privatization has been the major obstacle to
373. "Miners Body Gives State Ultimatum," OM, Dec. 6, 2011; "FSSMAZ Seeks to
Achieve Unity in Mining Sector," Maravi, May 28, 2008. http://maravi.blogspot.coml
2008105/fssmaz-seeks-to-acbieve-unity-in-mining. btml. The FSSMAZ seeks legalization and state allocation of MCM and KCM dumpsites to members, wbo make $3-5 a
day. "The 'Blaclc Mountain' a Source of Livelihood for over 1,000 Men," TP, Dec. 25,
2011.
374. Interview, Sifuniso Nyumbu~ Pres., Gemstone and Allied \Vorkers Union of
Zambia. Lusaka. Aug. 3, 2012.
375. "Privatisations under Probe by the Sata Government," Maravi. Jan. 20. 2012.
http://maravi.blogspot.com 12012101/mailing-list·privatisations·under-probe.html.
376. Brenda Motya and Brighton Lubansa, "Privatiz.atioo of the Mining Sector in

Zambia: The Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines,·· in Ernst von Weizsacker, et
al. (eds.), The Limits of Privati.sation: How ro Avoid Too Much of a Good Thing
(London: Earthscan, for the Club of Rome, 2005): 41-46 (44).
377. Rahima Ahmed, "The Olanging Role of the State and Transnational Corpora·

tions in the Development of Mining in Zambia: an Evaluation of the Influences of the
Transition from the State to Private Ownershp of the Mining Sector." Unpub'd PhD
diss.. University of Witswatersrand, 2010: 343. wiredspace.wits.ac.zal... /Rahima%20
Ahmed%20+rahima&type=autbor.
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Zambian miners' demand for equal pay for equal work across the
board. That aspiration cannot be realized while varied conditions
impel uneven cost/benefit analyses by different companies. Industry-wide coordination and, through it, the realization of worker aspirations for equal pay for equal work can occur only with a much
higher level of public ownership than now exists in Zambia mines,
yet both of Zambia's major parties oppose it. 378
HRW's study of CNMC labor practices in Zambia cannot teU
us anything generalizable about Chinese investments in Africa or
even in Zambia. It instead reinforces the skewed Western Chinain-Africa discourse and creates a new set of negative conclusions by
the media about China and "the Chinese."

V. CONCLUSION: WHY "THE CHINESE
ARE THE WORST"

In 2012, as the Eurozone financial crisis reached a peak, politicians such as German ChanceUor Angela Merkel were discursively
dividing Europe into two classes of "fiscally virtuous and industrious northern Europeans and profligate and indolent southern
Europeans."379 Greece was labeled "the worst" example of fiscal
indiscipline. Greeks were commonly portrayed by northern European media as tax evaders, anti-business, lazy and corrupt. Harvard
University Professor of Public Policy Richard Parker challenged
these "moralizing cliches." While acknowledging Greece's problematic debt levels, he noted that Greece's taxes are a third of the
GDP, about Europe's average; Greece has more small entrepreneurs per capita than any other European country; the Greek government workforce is around 20% of the total labor force, again
Europe's average; and corruption in Greece is not generalized, but
largely concentrated in the health care sector.380
378. "Musokotwane Attacks Donors Advocating Higher Mine Taxes," TP, June 21.
2011; "Zambia Won't Renationalize Mines," TOZ, Nov. 22. 2011.
379. Alazar Kebede, "The Economic Crisis and tbe Emergence of Nationalism in
Europe," Capital, Feb.6, 2012, www.capitaletltiopia.com/index.php?option• com..con
teot&view=-article&id=49l:tbe-eco.nomic-crisis--and~the·emergence-of·nationalism·in·

europe-&catid=52:footers.
380. Richard Parker, ..A PERSONAL JouRNEY TO niB HEART OF GREECE'S DARKNESS," Fiflllnclal Times, Feb. 15, 2012. In fact, Greeks put in the longest bours annual
total of work of any nation in Europe, fully six bours a week more than Germans,
although the latter have mucb bigber levels of productivity. "Who Works the Longest
Hours in Europe?" Guardian (UK) Data Blog, Dec. 8, 2011, www.guardian.eo.uk/newsl
datablog/20llldec/081europe-working·hours. Surveyed Britons. Germans, Spaniards,
and other Europeans nevertheless uphold a stereotype of Greeks as being the least
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Two factors may explain these inaccurate stereotypes of
Greeks and southern Europeans generally. They allow center-right
northern European governments to denigrate the center-left politics more prevalent in southern Europe. They also reflect longstanding northern European racism against southern Europeans. For
example, when a cruise ship ran aground in the Mediterranean in
early 2012, a leading German newsweekly's columnist commented
"Hand to heart: is anyone surprised that the captain of the Costa
Concordia is Italian? Can you imagine a German pulling a hit-and·
run stunt like that, or a British captain?"381
Whether or not HRW's report originated under similar biases,
it was predictable that it would play into them. HRW could instead
have undertaken studies of more significant violations of labor
rights and other human rights violations created by foreign investors in Africa's mining sectors. Studies of mine labor conditions
elsewhere in Africa or even in Zambia generally would reveal much
more intensive rights violations than those at CNMC firms. The
share of Chinese firms' in non-African investment in Africa generally and African mining specifically is, after all, nowhere near as
large as is commonly conceived. China is not the major foreign investor in Africa and by some measures is not even a major one. A
2011 study by the African Development Bank (AIDB), OECD
UNDP and UNECA of FDI flows to selected African countries
from 2005-2010 found that 43.7% was from EU countries and
37.4% was from the US. China's share was only 0.9%. 382 An
econometric study of Chinese OFDI for 1991-2008 revealed that
Chinese firms are in fact not metals-seekers, in the way they are
motivated to seek fuels.383 A 2011 UN study observed
hardworking nation in Europe. while respondents in every country surveyed. except
Greece, believe Germans are the most hardworking Europeans. "European Unity on
the Rocks." Pew Global Attitudes Project, May 29, 2012, www.pewglobal.org/2012105/

29/european-unity-on-the-rocksl.
381. ltalienische FabrerOucht (Italian Hit·and·Run), Du Spiegtl Online Politik. Jan.
23,2012, www.spiegel.de/ politikldeutschlandi0.1S18,811817,00.btml.
382. AfDB, et al., A[ricon Economic Outlook 2011: 101, www.undp.org/contenVdam/
undpmbrary/corporate/ Reports/UNDP-Africa-20ll·Economic.Outlook.pdf. The selected countries were: Morocco, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Gabon,
Tanzania. Mauritius, Malawi, Nigeria~ Rwanda and Uganda. Ibid.
383. K.C. Fung and Alicia Garcia·Herrero, •·Foreign Direct Investment Outflows
from China and India," Chino Eccrwmic Policy Review 1:1 (2012): 1·15 (5. 10}. The oil
sector. which is highly capital intensjve, aooounts for about 70% of cumulative commit·
meniS of Chinese FDI in Africa. Africa Progress Panel, Africa Progress Report 2012:
Jobs, Justice, Equity: 45, www.africaprogresspaoel.org].. ./APR2012_FINAL_VER
SION_EN_FOR·PRESSPACK.pdf.
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Chinese mining investments abroad are small relative to
those from other countries. Less than 1 percent of total
world mine production outside China is controlled by Chinese companies ... Most investments have been in Australia, with very few in operating African mines ... The
number of investment projects in Africa indicates a growing Chinese presence, but progress is often slow. Chinese
firms have yet to acquire the experience of large projects
that many companies from industrialized countries
bave.384
Table 8: Stock of Investment in African Mining by Country

Australia
France

Date
End of2009
2011
End of2009
2011
Endof2009

Brazil

2012

Country of Firms

China
Canada

us

Investment Stock
(Billions)

$29

$32
$25

$20

$18
t/.7 {Vale 6nn alone)

Sources3~t~

Canadian mining firms are in first place in African mining investment; their $32 billion in place by 2011 compares with the $39
billion stock of Chinese global OFDl in mining at the end of
2009.386 The centrality of Canadian firms in exploiting African minerals is to be expected: the Canadian stock exchanges "are horne to
384. ECA, Minerals and Africa's Oevelopmenc 36-37. Africa accounted for 14.6%
of global mining project investment in 2009, a bit less than Oceania and only about half
of what Latin America drew. Ibid: 33.
385. Wu Fang, Chinese Investment: 9 (China, US. France): Lucien Bradet, "A
Reality Check on Canadian Mining in Africa." Canadian Council on Africa. Nov. 23.
2011, http://ocafrica.ca/ {$32b stock reflects lOx increase in past decade): "Australian
Miners Invest $20b in Africa; Billions More in Pipeline" MW. Aug. 31, 2011; "Africa:
Brazil Forging Strategic Alliance with Continent." IPS, May 7, 2012. In 2012, an
Australian official said there is $SOb of Australian investment in Africa in place or

planned. "Australian Mining Investment in Africa More lban $50 Billion: OFAT,"
International Mining Development Centre. Feb. 14. 2012. http://im4dc.org/australian·
mining-investment-in-africa-more-lhan-S<H>illion-dfatl.
386. China Ministry of Commerce, 2()()9 Statistical Bulletin of China's OuJward Foreign Dirtcl lnvmment {Beijing: MOFCOM, 2010) {mining 16% of $245b total o! Chinese OFDI).
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58% of the world's public mining companies and raise 60% of the
world's mining capital."387 There are some 185 Canadian headquartered firms with mining projects in Africa. 388 By 2007, 17% of Canadian mining firms' cumulative assets outside Canada were in 35
states in Africa and, apart from South Africa, "Canada dominates
the rest of the continent."389 In 2010, one-tenth of Canadian mining
investments in Africa was in Zambia. 390 Contrary to common assumption, the activities of Canadian firms are also no less problematic than those of other countries. 391 Nor are the activities of
Canadian mining firms in Africa purely private:
The growth in African mining operation is partly attributed to interventions by the Canadian government such as
fiscal measures favoring mining interests, particularly in
the internationalization of mining and exploration by the
Juniors. Export Development Canada (EDC) facilitates
outward investment and in 2007, supported projects totaling $22 billion worth of exports and investments in Canadian companies in the extractive sector.392
Studying labor matters at Canadian firms in African mining, using a
comparative perspective, would thus likely contribute more to mitigating abuses than singling out Chinese-owned copper mining firms
in Zambia. Unlike the HRW report's contribution to anti-Sinicism,
it also would not contribute to anti-Canadian sentiment in the
world, as none exists. The same might be said of the mining operations of Australian mining firms.
Comparative study of labor rights violations requires empirical
and methodological soundness, but also avoidance of condemnations that lead to aspersions cast on the behavior of any nationality.
Martin Luther King once responded to claims that Jewish landlords
and shopkeepers exploit African-Americans by stating that "The
Jewish landlord or shopkeeper is not operating on the basis of Jew387. Michael Schwartz, "$1 Billion and Counting," Resource Stocks. AprJMay 2012:
50-52 (51).
3SS. "Africa Mining Draws Canadian Miners," MW, Jan. 27, 2012.
389. AU & UNECA, Exploiting: 17.
390. Bonnie Csrnpbell, '"Do as You Please' Approach in Africa Comes at High
Cost," Coii(Jdian Dimension 45:1 (2011), bttp://canadiandimension.oomlarticles/3982/.

391. Karyn Keenan, "Africa: Bringing Canadian Mining to Justice,.. PN, June 23.
2011, http://allafrica.com/ storiesi201106270n5.html; Campbell, Do as You Please: De·

nis Tougas. ''Canadian Firms Dominate Mining Activities in Africa and have a Bad
Human Rights Record," East African (Nairobi), Mar. 1. 2010.
392. AU and UNECA, Exploiting; 18.
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ish ethics; he is operating on the basis of a marginal businessman"
and the solution "is for all people to condemn injustice wherever it
exists. "393 Dr. King understood that structural, not cultural factors
created the exploitation at issue.
Given the context of anti-Chinese agitation in Zambia and the
skewed China-in-Africa discourse, HRW could have studied rights
violations in Zambian mining generally, to "condemn injustice
wherever it exists," instead of singling out a Chinese firm. A study
of that kind would likely have found that violations are common in
mining. Indeed, a committee of the Zambian parliament, composed of ruling and opposition party members, did just that in 2010.
It researched the question of "The impact of the extractive industries on the Zambian economy in the post-privatization era: a case
of mining." The committee visited two foreign-owned copper mining firms (MCM and Chibuluma), two emerald mines, one zinc and
one nickel mine. As to labor matters, it said of these mines that
workers complained of poor working conditions, no salary
structure, intimidation, lack of training programmes, lack
of research and an increase in the number of foreign workers ... [T]he lowest paid worker on average was paid
about Kl million ... [A)ll workers were on contract for
periods ranging from one to four years, and not all workers were entitled to gratuity... [Since privatization], the
quality of jobs has gone down. There are also cases of
mines employing more unskilled or semi-skilled foreign
workers, unfavorable contract conditions, lack of skills
transfer and other forms of training, intimidation and lack
of respect of labor laws. Poor conditions of service are the
other major problem for those working for contractors in
addition to some having no union representation. 394
An example of a comparatively-grounded, non-racial profiling
study that involves a Chinese mining firm abroad and that has some
parallels with the case of CNMC in Zambia appeared in 2012. Two
US scholars compared Shougang Hierro Peru's iron ore mining facilities, owned since 1992 by a subsidiary of a Chinese central-government SOE Shougang Group, with similar-sized foreign- and
domestic-owned mining firms in Peru.
393. Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black..Jewish Relation• in the
American Century (Princeton Unive..ity Press, 2010): 223.
394. Zambian Parliamen~ Committee on: I, 20, 23.
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Shougang is the only Chinese mining firm in Peru large enough
to allow for study. It has the worst reputation among mining companies as to labor practices, especially safety and wages. The study
found however that "Shougang does not stand out for labor violations." As to safety, it has a significantly higher rate of serious accidents, but not fatalities, so that "Shougang does not appear to be
the outlier that its reputation would suggest." While "Shougang's
wages are lower than its counterparts ... this differential is both
smaller and less central to worker welfare than others suggested."
When benefits are added in, Shougang may pay its workers about
the same as most other firms. Shougang moreover uses fewer contract workers, who generally earn only half of what directly-employed workers earn, so that "Given Shougang's lower use of
contractors, its average wage for indirect and direct workers combined may exceed those of Antamina and Yancocha," Peruvian
mining's two best paying firms. The Peruvian subsidiary of USbased firm Doe Run "performed worse than Shougang on almost
every indicator of labor standards."395
HRW's fixation on CNMC operations in Zambia exceeds that
of the US State Department in its 2010 US report on human rights
in Zambia. Its section dealing with workers' rights is by no means
even-handed: its examples of labor abusers are confined to a small,
private, Chinese-owned coal mine and a Chinese employer of two
household workers. The State Department report said nothing
however about CNMC firms, even though they are the largest Chinese-owned employers in Zambia.396 The State Department's 2011
report on human rights in Zambia however devotes a third of the
section on acceptable conditions of work to the HRW report, with
the remainder merely describing relevant Zambian labor laws.
Thus, the US government in effect adopts the HRW reports and,
like HRW, singles out Chinese mines as the only nationality-focused example of unacceptable conditions of work.397
395. Irwin and Gallagher, Otioese Investment: 11·12, 14-15.
396. US State Dep't, "2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zambia."
2011, http://zambia.usembassy.gov/2008human.btml.
397. US State Dep't, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011:
Zambia," 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rlsthrrptlhumanrightsreportlindex.htm?dy·
oaoUcJoad_id• 1862S51wrapper. In another section. the State Dep't report also
claimed that "Asians and South Asians continued to be brought to and through Zambia
for forced labor in the mining and construction industries. An increasing number of
Chioese and Indian men recruited to work in Chinese or Indian owned mines in the
Copperbelt region were reportedly kept in oooditions of forced labor by mining oompa·
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The HRW study appears to apply to one Chinese SOE in Africa the inaccurate claims set out in a 2006 statement on "China's
Exportation of Labor Practices to Africa," by the International
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) Hong Kong Liaison Office
(ILH0).398 Like the HRW report, the ILHO statement focuses on
health and safety, wages and workers' right to join a union. The
ITUC's fixation with labor practices of Chinese firms in Africa has
continued: examples it gave of violations of trade union rights in
Zambia in 2008 were almost exclusively about Chinese-owned mining firms; the one exception was an Indian-owned construction
firm.399 The HRW study also accords with the PFs 2005-2011antiChinese campaign. Its findings fit in with the racial hierarchy propounded in 2006 by Guy Scott, a white farmer, deputy PF leader,
and now Vice-President of Zambia: whites are better than Indians
and "the Chinese are the worst. " 400 This racialist view is embedded
in some miners. For example, NUMA W's chairman at NFCA told
us that "Chinese, sorry, are not good investors, but white people are
very good." He added that "In China, you have too many people,
so if someone dies, you don't care" and that white South African
investment in Chibuluma mine was good, but that the ethnic Indi-

nies." There is no evidence however of such "'forced labor," although there was areport of Indian construction workers being poorly housed.
398. www.ilho.org/CINTW/ArticlcLabourPracticeExport.html. ITIJC is a 2006
merger of the (anti-communist) InternaUonal COnfederation of Free Trades Unions
(ICFrU) and World Confederation or Labor (WCL). During the Cold War, the CIA
financed the ICFT'U, which in tum backed anti-oommunist dictatorships. Anthony Ca.
rew, et al., The lntunational Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Bern: Peter Lang,
2000). The WCL was linked with Christian Democratic parties in Europe. The ITUC is
now counter-posed to the ..anti-capitatist" World Federation o.fTrade Unions (WFTU).
See "'The International Labor and Trade Union Movement in the 21st Century,..
WFTU, '111J7.www.wftucentraLorgl?page_id><40&1anguage.aen.
399. ITUC, "Annual Survey 2009 of Violations of Trade Union Rights":71m www.
unhcr.org/refworldlcountry, ITUC..ZMB.456d62Ie2,4c.'i2cabdc,O.html.
400. "Anti-China Candidate Michael Sata Hopes to Become Zambia Presiden~"
Telegraph (UK), Oct. 30, 2008. As Vtce-President, Scott said that "classifying people
aa:ording to color is a waste of time." "Could this Guy become Zambia's Next Presi·
dent?" The Cititen. Oct. 17. 2011. Scott has also opined that in Zambia, "People are
nostalgic, not tor exploitation and division, but tor the standards of colonial rimes, when
you wen[ to the hospital there was medicine, when you went to schools there were
books, when you went to the shops there were goods to buy. There is a sense of these
being ~white man's standards.' Whether rightly or not rightly is another matter."
"Zambia's White Vk;e..President Hails 'Cosmopolitan' New Era."' Guordlan, Oct. 4,
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ans who own KCM, "are very different from white people" and
"brought a lot of the Indians who are now walking our streets. " 40 '
Like HRW, PF leader Michael Sata said in 2008 that "safety
standards at Chinese-run mines and factories were miserable," but
never produced evidence for his claim. 402 If, however, PF leaders
were convinced that safety at Chinese-run mines was worse than at
other mines, they had a mechanism for determining whether that
was so. In 2009, the Zambian parliament's Committee on Government Assurances carried out tours to investigate safety levels in
copper mines. The Committee was chaired by Chisimba Kambwili,
PF MP from Roan Constituency, where the Luanshya Copper Mine
had recently been acquired by CNMC. By then, CNMC's
Chambishi Mine had been fully operational for six years. Kambwili
is the most vituperative critic of "the Chinese" in Zambian politics.403 The Committee inspected four mines (MCM, KCM,
Lumwana and Kansanshi), but despite the PF's supposed concern
about safety in Chinese-owned mines, toured no CNMC facility.
After undertaking firm-conducted guided tours and being assured
by executives that all was well, Kambwili said the Committee was
satisfied that adequate safety measures were in place. 404
Employing "vehement and systematic anti-Chinese rhetoric"
Sata told Reuters newswire in 2010 that "Chinese and other Asian
mining firms in Zambia are creating 'slave labor' conditions."405
HRW's conclusions equally echo unsupported claims by arch-China
bashers, such as Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, who have written
that "Regarding worker health and safety, there is nothing but fear
and loathing in the factories and mines that Chinese bosses run in
Africa and Latin America. For just as in China, it is a tale of long
hours, low pay, unsafe working conditions, and incredibly abusive
bosses . . .":oM
401. Mwale interview.
402. Peter Hitchens, "Africa's Last, Worst Hope: A Continent that Withstood European Colonialism Welcomes Chinese Conquest," American Coltfe.rvative, Dec. 1, 2008.
403. See, e.g.. "Chinese Labor Force Coming into the Country should be Reduced:
Kambwili," LT, Jan. 24, 2012.
404. "Second Report or the Committee on Government Assurances for the Fourth
Session of the Tenth National Assembly, Appointed on 23rd September 2009": 64-74,
bttpJ/www.scribd.comi'Zambian-Economist/dl 242Jl0962- Second -Report-of-tbe-Com-

mittee·Of·Government·Assurances-for-tbe-Third·Sess:ion·of·the·Tenth·Naliooai-Assembly; "MPs Commend Government," TOZ, Dec. 3, 2009.
405. "Sata Accuses Chinese and Malaysian Investors of Slavery." LT. Jan. 21, 2010.
406. Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, Dt4th by Chin4: umfronting the Dragon - 4
Glob41 C411 w Action (New York. Prentice Hall, 2011): 102. Their assertion was accom-
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There are however PF leaders whose brief seemingly does not
extend to racially profiling investors and who affirm that labor
abuses are common among mining flllllS in Zambia and Africa.
Wynter Kabimba, a lawyer, PF Secretary General, and now
Zambia's Minister of Justice, spoke in 2007 on a panel at a meeting
of the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ), the premier group
of analysts of economic affairs in the country. Kabimba spoke to
the question of whether it matters where foreign investment comes
from. He stated that most analyses he had read "concluded that the
foreign investors in Africa paid low wages and contributed to environmental degradation and corruption" but, referring to mining,
"He added that there was no distinction between the behavior and
practices of European, American and Chinese foreign investors"
and concluded that "the excitement about Chinese investments in
Zambia was misplaced." Another panelist, zcru President Leonard Hikaumba, expressed a similar view: " In his experience, Chinese investors were not exceptional in offering poor conditions of
service. Zambian employers were probably worse in their disregard
for labor and employment regulations and destruction of the environment." Moderator Muna Hantuba, CEO of Aflife, a major local
financial firm, also questioned "whether Zambian employers behaved better towards their employees" than Chinese investors.407
If CNMC is not "the worst employer," it does not mean that
conditions at CNMC facilities should not be improved, especially
salaries and safety. China's ambassador "has directed Chinese investors who engage local workers to pay them in accordance with
Zambia's labor laws" and said that his government will "sternly
'deal' with Chinese companies ... if they 'Douted' Zambian laws
and abused workers ... because we do not want one single company to be responsible for damaging the international image of
China." He has urged the Zambian government to "prosecute and
panied by an onaocurate description al the 20t0 sboolonp 0( Zambwl auaen by two
Chinese supen--. at tbe Coth1m COal Mine and Nanno and Auuys in""'tioo 0( a
2010 "ma.sac:re" at a CNMC-owned mine.
l!(f1. "What M ba~ learned from Foreisn Investment: Dots 11 Matter Wbere it
comes from?" EAZ. Proceedings of Montbly Meetina, Nov. 22. '1iXJ7 (photooopy in
possession ol authors): 2-4. About 90'll. ol semstone minina, lor eumplc. iJ coo trolled
by Zambian finms. Zambian Pllrliamcnt, Committee: 22. There arc also Zambianowned industrial companies. For example, during a 2012 strike at a (wblte) Zambianowned eement plant, tbe United Mineworkers or Zambia revealed that the lowest-paid
Among the more than 600 worken; received K900,000 ($180) n ntonth and the highest
Kl.8m. "ZambeJJ Portland Worlr.en; Protest,'' TOZ, July 21, 20l2.
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jail the particular offender ...," but has also argued that Chinese
mining f1rms were not Zambia's best or worst payers.408
All of Zambia's foreign-owned mining firms exploit labor, resources and environment. Working lifetime wages are so low that
within six months of retirement, according to an NGO's report,
miners are reduced to beggars,- unlike their counterparts at mines
in the West owned by the same companies. On tbe wages they receive, most Zambian miners are poorly housed in hugely underserviced communities. As a Zambian commentator put it, "Towns
housing the mines are in ruins, infrastructure is in a dilapidated
state and the local people are living in abject poverty yet on a daily
basis their land produces millions of dollars."• 10 Improvements
across the board are called for, but that is less likely when attention
is focused exclusively on Chinese firms as "the worst." The other
improvement to be sought is in the quality of analysis of human
rights deficiencies. There is a need for empirical accuracy, for application of basic methodological principles, and, most of aiL for eschewing political bias that contributes to the deepening of racism.

408. " Envoy Tells Cbinese to Pay Fair Wage:· OM. July 27. 2012; Myula and
Mulcwha. We are Here.

409. See Apotbeker. Foreign Copper: 61 . quoting "Annual report Caritas Ndola

2007".
410. Otoolwe Muzyambe. "Rlcb Zambia, Poor Zambians."' Tumfwcko. Nov. 14.
2011. hllp://tumfweko.oom/2011111114/rich-zambia-poor-?ambians/.

